Alexiadis v. N.Y. Coll. of Health Professions
| Decision Date | 20 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No 10-cv-3509 (JFB) (ETB),10-cv-3509 (JFB) (ETB) |
| Parties | CHRISTOS ALEXIADIS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK COLLEGE OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Christos Alexiadis ("plaintiff" or "Alexiadis") brings this action against the New York College of Health Professions ("College"), Lisa E. Pamintuan ("Pamintuan"), Errol Virasawmi ("Virasawmi"), and Steven Haffner ("Haffner") (collectively, "defendants") alleging violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112; Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiff also alleges the following state law claims: breach of contract, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, violations of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, violations of the New York State Constitution, and respondeat superior. In particular, plaintiff alleges that he is a disabled individual due to his HIV-positive status and related illnesses, and that he was arrested, suspended, and subsequently dismissed from the College as a consequence of his disability. Defendants contend that his arrest and dismissal from the College were not based upon his alleged disability, but rather were based upon his theft of a bag of hand sanitizer from a hallway dispenser outside of a classroom on July 31, 2009. Plaintiff counters that this purported reason was simply pretext in that he was bringing the hand sanitizer into the classroom so that students could use it before their lab session and, in his deposition, the professor confirmed that he saw plaintiff, on the day in question, sharing the hand sanitizer with other students.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff's ADA Title I claim is unexhausted; (2) the adverse action here was not taken "because of" plaintiff's alleged disability; (3) plaintiff'sHIV-positive status does not qualify him as disabled under the ADA; and (4) even if plaintiff met his initial burden to present a prima facie case of discrimination, defendants have met their burden to show that plaintiff's dismissal was based upon legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that there is a genuine dispute as to material facts concerning (1) whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) whether defendants' actions were taken "because of" plaintiff's disabled status; and (3) whether defendants' explanation for their actions with respect to plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the public accommodation claim under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; the claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the claim under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. The Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's other state law claims.
The Court has taken the facts set forth below from the parties' depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, and from the parties' respective Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's 56.1 Statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has pointed to no evidence in the record to contradict it.1
On December 10, 2008, plaintiff completed an application to enroll in the College's full-time Massage Therapy Program beginning in January 2009. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) With his application, plaintiff enclosed a high school diploma from Belford High School. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) A valid high school diploma or equivalent qualification is a prerequisite for admission to the College, as well as a requirement to receive a massage therapy license from New York State. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff believed the diploma to be valid at the time he submitted it to the College, but later learned, in 2010, that the diploma was not valid. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was accepted as a student in the Massage Therapy Program at the College in December 2008 and began the process of enrollment in January 2009.
Plaintiff applied for employment in the College's Financial Aid Department under the Federal Work-Study program, and was hired by the College as an Administrative Assistant in the Financial Aid Department on or about June 26, 2009, where he was paid ten dollars an hour. Plaintiff's supervisor, an employee of the College, signed and approved his time sheet showing that heworked in excess of twenty hours per week.2 (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 4.) The College was not aware that plaintiff had submitted a resume containing false employment experience, as well as a false educational history. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 5.) Defendants contend that plaintiff submitted time sheets that showed that plaintiff was claiming to work when he was actually attending classes. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts, however, that the time sheets were signed and approved by the College and plaintiff had been excused from class or class had been cancelled on the days in question. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 5.)
status
At the end of May and lasting into early June 2009, plaintiff suffered from a Staph infection, which caused him to be absent from several classes. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 6.) In early June 2009, plaintiff disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Stephanie Kraszewski ("Kraszewski"), the Director of Student Services, and to Haffner, then the Dean of Students and a professor.3 (Id.) Defendants allege that plaintiff also disclosed his HiV-positive status to Dr. richard Keohane ("Keohane"), plaintiff's Anatomy and Physiology Professor, in early June 2009. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he disclosed his HiV-positive status to Keohane two to three months prior to June 2009. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that, after he disclosed his HIV status to Haffner, Haffner stopped greeting plaintiff in the morning, which was contrary to how he treated plaintiff prior to learning of plaintiff's HIV status. (Pl.'s C.S. 56.1 ¶ 91.) Plaintiff also disclosed to Kristen Alexander ("Alexander"), his supervisor in the Office of Admissions, that he was HIV-positive after he returned from a two-week absence for a Staph infection. (Id. ¶ 88.) One week after plaintiff disclosed to Alexander and Haffner that he was HIV-positive, Mary Rodas ("Rodas"), the Director of Admissions, began slamming the door to her office while plaintiff was working in the office, began checking plaintiff's work-study hours, and made plaintiff sign a piece of paper saying he would not work in excess of ten hours. (Id. ¶ 93.) After plaintiff disclosed his HIV status to Haffner, plaintiff observed Haffner, Pamintuan (the President of the College), and Virasawmi (the Chief Financial Officer of the College) clustered together, on at least two or three occasions, making comments directed at plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 98.) Pamintuan's secretary also treated plaintiff very coldly and closed the office door on plaintiff when plaintiff went to give Pamintuan paperwork. (Id. ¶ 101.) Pamintuan gave plaintiff unpleasant looks when plaintiff dropped off paperwork. (Id. ¶ 102.) Haffner's demeanor changed after plaintiff disclosed his HIV status, becoming very cold and avoiding speaking to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 103.)
On July 30, 2009, during class, Keohane asked students to practice conducting palpitations on one another, and instructed the students to clean their hands, preferably with soap and water, but suggested hand sanitizer as an alternative. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 7, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 7.) Hand sanitizer was availablein the room, but the supply ran out while the students were cleaning their hands. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 7, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff went looking for hand sanitizer because he was not sure if a Staph infection he had contracted earlier was still contagious. (Pl.'s C.S. 56.1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff asserts that he asked Keohane if he could go get hand sanitizer, and Keohane granted him permission to do so. (Id. ¶ 20.) Keohane states that he gave students permission to leave the room to clean their hands, but he did not give permission to "break open a hand sanitizer and bring it into the classroom." (Pl.'s Ex. G, Keohane Deposition ("Keohane Dep.") at 67:15-68:6.) Plaintiff then went into the hallway and opened a wall-mounted hand sanitizer dispenser and removed one of the cartridges inside that contained the hand sanitizing liquid. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8.) A surveillance camera recorded plaintiff opening the dispenser and removing the cartridge. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8.) Plaintiff then returned to the classroom, where, plaintiff contends, he distributed the hand sanitizer amongst his classmates. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8.) Keohane, at his deposition, confirmed that plaintiff was sharing the hand sanitizer with students in the class. (Keohane Dep. at 62:7-13.)
On July 31, 2009, Virasawmi was informed by College security and maintenance staff that a student had been caught on videotape removing a cartridge of hand sanitizer from a wall dispenser. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 9, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9.) After viewing the video from College security, Virasawmi called the Old Brookville Police Department to report the alleged theft. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 9, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9.) Officers from the Old Brookville Police Department arrived at the College later that day and spoke to Virasawmi and Pamintuan, viewed two pictures from the video of plaintiff by the hand sanitizer dispenser,4 and requested to question plaintiff. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 10, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 10.) Haffner escorted the plaintiff to the...
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