Alexis v. District of Columbia, Civ.A. 98-151(RMU).

• Decision Date: 29 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 98-151(RMU).,Civ.A. 98-151(RMU).
• Citation: 77 F.Supp.2d 35
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Alice F.W. ALEXIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

77 F.Supp.2d 35

Alice F.W. ALEXIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 98-151(RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 29, 1999.

Marion E. Baurley, Vanessa Santos, Marion E. Baurley, P.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiffsAlice Alexis, Anna-Marie Brannic, Constance Graham, Mohammed Hmaey, Deloras James, Hermena Kinard, and Negussie Timikate.

Jack M. Simmons III, Asst. Corp.Counsel, D.C., Washington, D.C., for defendantDistrict of Columbia.

Mary E. Pivec, Timothy E. Deahunt, Proskauer Rose LLP, Washington, D.C., for defendantsAnthony A. Williams and Deloras Shepherd.

Stephen Taylor, General Counsel, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Washington, D.C., for In-House counsel for the Office of the CFO of the District of Columbia.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

URBINA, District Judge.

Granting DefendantAnthony Williams's Motion for Dismissal on the Ground of Qualified Immunity

I.INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendantAnthony Williams, who is sued due to events and statements arising out of his tenure as the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of the District of Columbia.The plaintiffs, nine former District of Columbia government employees, brought this consolidated action asserting claims under the United States Constitution, federal law and District of Columbia law arising out of their termination.Following this court's decisions in favor of the defendants on previous dispositive motions,¹ only one claim survives: the plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Williams's² derogatory comments at a press conference violated their Fifth Amendment liberty interest in their reputation, i.e., their interest in not being defamed.Moreover, the claim survives only as to four of the original eight plaintiffs, Ms. Alexis, Ms. Graham, Ms. James and Ms. Kinard.³

Mr. Williams moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the statements in question.⁴For the reasons which follow, the court will grant Mr. Williams's motion.

II.BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history of this case are set forth in this court's Memorandum Opinions issued on March 30, 1999 and June 15, 1999.On September 9, 1999plaintiffs' counsel and Mr. Williams's counsel contacted chambers by telephone and informed the court that Mr. Williams refused to respond to interrogatories and document-production requests and refused to be deposed as a party in this matter.Mr. Williams stated that he is entitled to qualified immunity which shields him not only from liability but also from discovery.

By order dated September 10, 1999, this court granted Mr. Williams's motion to stay all discovery directed at him pending resolution of the instant motion to dismiss.Discovery continues, however, as to the four remaining plaintiffs and the defendantDistrict of Columbia.

III.LEGAL STANDARD

A.Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests not whether the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, but instead whether or not he has properly stated a claim.SeeScheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90(1974);Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).The court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.SeeHishon v. King & Spalding,467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59(1984);Atchinson v. D.C.,73 F.3d 418, 421(D.C.Cir.1996).In deciding such a motion, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.SeeMaljack Prods. v. Motion Picture Ass'n,52 F.3d 373, 375(D.C.Cir.1995).The court need not, however, accept as true the plaintiff's legal conclusions.SeeTaylor v. F.D.I.C.,132 F.3d 753, 762(D.C.Cir.1997).

B.A Government Official's Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

1.Objective Test

"Government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396(1982).The test is not whether the particular official actually knew that his conduct violated clearly established rights or intended to violate such rights under the Harlow standard, "a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant's conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated.Evidence concerning the defendant's subjective intent is simply irrelevant to that defense."Crawford-El v. Britton,523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 140 L.Ed.2d 759(1998);see alsoACLU v. Barr,952 F.2d 457, 468(D.C.Cir.1991)("bare allegations of improper purpose do not suffice to drag officials into the mire of discovery" from which qualified immunity shields them).Rather, the qualified-immunity test is objective: would a reasonable person in the official's position have known his conduct to be unlawful in light of "clearly established" law and the information he possessed?⁵SeeAnderson v. Creighton,483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523(1987).If the court answers this question in the negative, the official is entitled to qualified immunity and the complaint must be dismissed as to the official.See, e.g., Watkins v. Arlington Cty.,1997 WL 404878, *2(D.C.Cir.1997)(police entitled to immunity and summary judgment where affidavits established that actions complained of "did not violate any clearly established constitutional right or constitute objectively unreasonable behavior under the circumstances").

To determine whether immunity applies, the court must determine "whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, the official's conduct violated clearly established law."Crawford-El v. Britton,523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1597, 140 L.Ed.2d 759(1998).If the official's entitlement to immunity can be proved based on the pleadings, the official will be dismissed prior to discovery.Id.

2.What Constitutes a "Clearly Established" Right?

For purposes of qualified immunity, a right is "clearly established" if "the contours of that right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."Wilson v. Layne,526 U.S. 603, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1699, 143 L.Ed.2d 818(1999);see alsoFarmer v. Moritsugu,163 F.3d 610, 613(D.C.Cir.1998).The "clearly established right" requirement protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."Hunter v. Bryant,502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589(1991);see, e.g., Garcia v. District of Columbia,56 F.Supp.2d 1, 14(D.D.C.1998)(no immunity, because "any reasonable correctional officer must know that retaliation for the filing of a grievance would violate the inmate's constitutional rights").

In short, the doctrine "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by government officials acting in the discharge of their duties.Id.;see, e.g., Harris v. D.C.,932 F.2d 10(D.C.Cir.1991)(police had no clearly established obligation to obtain medical care for drug overdose victim who died in custody).In Kroll v. United States Capitol Police,847 F.2d 899(D.C.Cir.1988), for example, Michael Kroll attended a ceremony held to welcome an Olympic Team.Mr. Kroll brought a sign protecting U.S. policy.Capitol Police arrested Mr. Kroll because they thought a U.S. Senate Resolution concerning the ceremony required permits for people who were protesting but not for others.This court held the police were entitled to immunity, without deciding whether they had in fact violated Mr. Kroll's First Amendment rights.Id. at 900-901.The Court of Appeals affirmed.Judge Robinson concurred, even though he suggested the policemen's interpretation of the Resolution was quite wrong.The Judge emphasized, "Of decisional importance is not what Senate Resolution 342 did or did not do, but what the involved policemen reasonably thought in that regard."Id. at 906(Robinson, J., concurring in judgment).

3.Scope of Qualified Immunity

Where qualified immunity applies, it provides not simply a defense to liability, but also "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the purely legal question whether the conduct ... violated clearly established law."Farmer v. Moritsugu,163 F.3d 610, 613(D.C.Cir.1998)(quotingMitchell v. Forsyth,472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411(1985)).One purpose "of the ... qualified immunity standard is to protect public officials from the `broad-ranging discovery' that can be `particularly disruptive of effective government.'"Anderson v. Creighton,483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523(1987).

IV.LEGAL ANALYSIS

A.The "Right" Which Must Have Been "Clearly Established"

The plaintiffs contend that qualified immunity does not apply, because Mr. Williams "clearly knew that defaming a persons [sic] character and infringing on their Fifth Amendment liberty interest was a violation of their rights from which he could not be immune."SeeOpp. to Mot. to Dis.at 6.This formulation mischaracterizes the issue.Surely a reasonable official should have known the employees had a clearly established right not to be defamed.But this begs the question whether he should have known. that criticizing a large group of employees, without naming or singling out any one in particular, violated some clearly established right.

In other words, the plaintiffs frame too broadly the "right" which must have been "clearly established."The issue is not whether they had some generalized liberty interest in not being defamed.Framing the...