Alford v. Alford

Citation298 So.3d 983
Decision Date04 June 2020
Docket NumberNO. 2017-CT-01075-SCT,2017-CT-01075-SCT
Parties Cincinnatus E. ALFORD, III v. Linda B. ALFORD
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: S. TODD JEFFREYS

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CLIFFORD C. WHITNEY III, J. MACK VARNER, Vicksburg

EN BANC.

KITCHENS, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2016, Linda Alford filed for divorce from Cincinnatus ("Nat") Alford III in the Chancery Court of Sharkey County. The parties then agreed to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, allowing the chancery court to divide the marital assets and expenses and to make a determination regarding alimony. The chancellor awarded Linda Alford $5,000 per month in periodic alimony, $5,000 in attorney fees, and $6,000 in expert witness fees. Nat Alford appealed the chancellor's judgment. This Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the chancellor's alimony award and reversed and rendered the amount of attorney fees. Alford v. Alford , No. 2017-CA-01075-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, 2019 WL 3297142 (Miss. Ct. App. July 23, 2019).

¶2. Aggrieved, Linda Alford filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. We granted certiorari because this Court has not answered whether a chancellor should consider Social Security benefits when considering initial alimony awards. We find that consideration of derivative Social Security benefits should be reserved for alimony modification proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the chancellor's award of alimony. We affirm the Court of Appeals decision to reverse and render the award of attorney fees.

FACTS

¶3. On February 5, 2016, Linda Alford filed for divorce in the Chancery Court of Sharkey County. In January 2017, Linda Alford and Nat Alford agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce and "stipulated that the chancellor would decide issues related to the equitable distribution of the marital estate, alimony, and attorney's fees." Alford , ––– So.3d at ––––, ––––, 2019 WL 3297142, at *1. Before trial, "the court entered an agreed temporary order that required Nat to pay Linda $4,000 per month in temporary support[.]" Id. At the time of the trial, both Linda Alford and Nat Alford were sixty-three years old.

¶4. The chancellor divided the marital property and awarded Nat Alford 54 percent of the marital assets. The chancellor awarded Linda Alford 46 percent of the marital assets. After dividing the marital property, the chancellor determined there was a need for alimony and awarded Linda Alford $5,000 in periodic monthly alimony. The chancellor determined also that Linda Alford did not have the ability to pay all of her attorney fees and awarded her $5,000 in attorney fees and $6,000 in expert witness fees.

¶5. Nat Alford argued on appeal that "the chancellor erred by (1) accepting Linda's valuation of his twenty-five percent interest in a closely held corporation that operates a farm in Sharkey County, (2) [by] awarding Linda $5,000 per month in periodic alimony, and (3) [by] awarding Linda attorney's fees and expert witness fees."1 Id. Nat Alford presented three specific arguments regarding the alimony award. First, he contended that the chancellor had failed to consider the financial positions of the parties after equitable division. Id. at ––––, 2019 WL 3297142, at *5. Second, he argued that Linda Alford's expenses were inaccurate. Id. Finally, Nat Alford argued that the chancellor had failed to consider that Linda Alford was about to receive derivative Social Security benefits in the near future. Id.

¶6. At the time of the Alfords’ divorce, "a payor spouse [was] entitled to an automatic, dollar-for-dollar credit against his alimony obligation for derivative Social Security retirement benefits received by the payee spouse." Id. (citing Spalding v. Spalding , 691 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1997), overruled by Harris v. Harris , 241 So. 3d 622, 628 (Miss. 2018) ). After the initial alimony award, this Court, in Harris v. Harris , overruled Spalding and held that derivative Social Security benefits "do not constitute a special circumstance triggering an automatic reduction in alimony[ ]" and that when a spouse receives derivative Social Security benefits, "the trial court must weigh all the circumstances of both parties and find that an unforeseen material change in circumstances occurred to modify alimony." Harris , 241 So. 3d at 628. The Court of Appeals found that, since Harris overruled Spalding , "[t]he alimony award in this case should be reevaluated in light of Harris ." Alford , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2019 WL 3297142, at *6. The Court of Appeals reasoned that " Harris specifically holds that derivative Social Security benefits will not justify a subsequent modification of alimony if the benefits were anticipated or foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Id. (citing Harris , 241 So. 3d at 628-29 ). The Court of Appeals concluded that since it was foreseeable that "Linda [Alford] would receive derivative benefits in the near future[,]" which "[would] not justify a later modification of alimony," the chancellor should have considered Linda Alford's inevitable receipt of derivative Social Security benefits in its "initial determination of alimony." Id.

¶7. As for Nat Alford's two other arguments concerning the alimony award, the Court of Appeals declined to address those arguments because it reversed and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Harris [.]" Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered the chancellor to consider the remaining arguments on remand. Id.

¶8. Nat Alford argued that the chancellor erred by awarding Linda Alford attorney fees and expert witness fees because she "received substantial assets in the equitable division of assets," giving her the ability to pay without having to liquidate all of her assets in order to pay the fees. The Court of Appeals found that the chancellor erred by awarding Linda Alford attorney fees because she had "failed to meet her burden of establishing an inability to pay her fees." Id. at ––––, 2019 WL 3297142, at *8. According to the appeals court, she had not met her burden because "the record [was] insufficient to demonstrate [Linda's] inability to pay." Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gray v. Gray , 745 So. 2d 234, 239 (Miss. 1999) ). The court reasoned that the record was insufficient because Linda Alford had been paying some of her fees in monthly installments, and she had received "nearly half of the marital assets" with no evidence demonstrating she "would have been required to liquidate any significant part of her savings" in order to pay. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the chancellor's award of attorney fees.

¶9. Linda Alford filed for a writ of certiorari , which this Court granted. She argues that the Court of Appeals should not have applied Harris because her case did not involve a modification of alimony. She argues also that the appeals court's interpretation of Harris was erroneous because that court "misconstrued Harris as requiring a chancellor to automatically adjust an alimony award on the front end based on the expectation of future Social Security benefits," which "is the very thing that Harris condemns."

¶10. Additionally, Linda Alford argues that the Court of Appeals’ reversal of her attorney fees conflicts with the holding in Branch v. Branch , 174 So. 3d 932 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). She claims her only means for paying her fees is by "utilizing her share of the marital estate." Therefore, she asks this Court to reestablish the chancellor's award of attorney fees and also to award her appellate attorney fees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11. It is well settled that "[a]limony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor, and his discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless the chancellor was manifestly in error in his finding of fact and abused his discretion." Harris , 241 So. 3d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Armstrong , 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993) ). "Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Gutierrez v. Gutierrez , 233 So. 3d 797, 806 (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Henderson , 757 So. 2d 285, 289-90 (Miss. 2000) ). But "[i]f we find the chancellor's decision manifestly wrong, or that the court applied an erroneous legal standard, we will not hesitate to reverse." Armstrong , 618 So. 2d at 1280 (citing Smith v. Smith , 607 So. 2d 122, 126 (Miss. 1992) ).

¶12. "For questions of law, we employ a de novo standard of review and will only reverse for an erroneous interpretation or application of the law." Lewis v. Pagel , 233 So. 3d 740, 746 (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Boyd v. Tishomingo Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm. , 912 So. 2d 124, 128 (Miss. 2005) ).

¶13. "Generally the award of attorney's fees in a divorce case is left to the discretion of the trial court." Hemsley v. Hemsley , 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cheatham v. Cheatham , 537 So. 2d 435, 440 (Miss. 1988) ); see also Ballard v. Ballard , 255 So. 3d 126, 135 (Miss. 2017) ("We have said time and time again that an award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is largely a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong , 618 So. 2d at 1282 )).

DISCUSSION
I. Alimony Award
A. Did the Court of Appeals interpret Harris erroneously?

¶14. The Court of Appeals held that the chancellor should have considered Linda Alford's near-future reception of derivative Social Security benefits when it made her initial alimony award because " Harris specifically holds that derivative Social Security...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Hammond v. Hammond
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • 14 Septiembre 2021
    ...(Miss. Ct. App. 2019). "[I]f a party is financially able to pay an attorney, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate." Alford v. Alford , 298 So. 3d 983, 993 (¶35) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Gray , 745 So. 2d at 239 (¶26) ). In this case, the only evidence that Jenny offered showed that s......
  • Hammond v. Hammond
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • 14 Septiembre 2021
    ...Ct. App. 2019). "[I]f a party is financially able to pay an attorney, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate." Alford v. Alford, 298 So.3d 983, 993 (¶35) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Gray, 745 So.2d at 239 (¶26)). In this case, the only evidence that Jenny offered showed that she owed her ......
  • Phang v. Phang
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • 16 Agosto 2022
    ...... specifically argues that Vergenia's ability to apply for. Social Security benefits should have been taken into account. In Alford v. Alford , 298 So.3d 983, 994 (¶40). (Miss. 2020), the Mississippi Supreme Court definitively held. that "[a] chancellor cannot make a ......
  • Phang v. Phang
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • 16 Agosto 2022
    ...... specifically argues that Vergenia's ability to apply for. Social Security benefits should have been taken into account. In Alford v. Alford , 298 So.3d 983, 994 (¶40). (Miss. 2020), the Mississippi Supreme Court definitively held. that "[a] chancellor cannot make a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT