Alford v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–5457. |
| Citation | 13 F.Supp.3d 581 |
| Parties | Catherine P. ALFORD, et al. v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Donald T. Carmouche, Diane Adele Owen, John Hogarth Carmouche, Ross Joseph Donnes, Victor Lynn Marcello, William Robert Coenen, III, William Peter Connick, Connick & Connick, LLC, Metairie, LA, for Catherine P. Alford, et al.
Michael Raudon Phillips, Alan James Berteau, Brittany Buckley Salup, Charles Simon McCowan, III, David Phillip Curtis, Louis Victor Gregoire, Jr., Michelle Purchner Cumberland, Shannon A. Shelton, Kean Miller LLP, Loulan Joseph Pitre, Jr., DeMarcus J. Gordon, Jane Jackson, Terrence Kent Knister, Gordon, Arata, McCollam, Duplantis & Eagan, Craig Isenberg, Andrea Mahady Price, Michelle M. Rutherford, Richard Edward Sarver, Zachary I. Rosenberg, Barrasso, Usdin, Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Paul J. Hebert, David K. McCrory, Ottinger Hebert, LLC, Lafayette, LA, for Chevron U.S.A. Inc., et al.
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Chevron Pipe Line Company, and Gulf Oil Corporation (collectively “Chevron”) move for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) and also move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against them.1 Defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation also moves for a more definite statement and moves to dismiss several of plaintiffs' claims, on substantially the same grounds as Chevron.2 The Court DENIES defendants' motions for a more definite statement because plaintiffs' complaint is sufficiently detailed to allow defendants to prepare responsive pleadings. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART both motions to dismiss because plaintiffs have failed plausibly to allege necessary factual elements of certain claims. Plaintiffs will be allowed an opportunity to amend their complaint.
Plaintiffs allege that they own and/or use certain property in Township 18 South, Range 15 East, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, in the Potash Field,3 and that defendants engaged in oil and gas exploration and production activities that caused harm to that property.4 The Louisiana Supreme Court has dubbed this type of lawsuit “legacy litigation” because it “arise[s] from [oilfield] operations conducted many decades ago” that left “an unwanted ‘legacy’ in the form of actual or alleged contamination.” Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 238 n. 1 (La.2010) .
Plaintiffs sued Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Chevron Pipeline Company, Exxon Mobil Corporation, and Gulf Oil Corporation. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. is allegedly the successor in interest to Gulf Oil Corporation; Chevron Pipe Line Company, the successor in interest to Gulf Pipeline Company and Gulf Refining Company; and Exxon, the successor in interest to Humble Oil & Refining Company.5 Plaintiffs allege that defendants, or companies to which defendants are successors in interest, “conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities” on the property in their capacity “as operators, and/or working interest owners, and/or mineral or surface lessees, and/or mineral surface lease assignees, and/or mineral sublessess, and/or servitude, executive interest or other mineral interest owners, and/or personal or predial servitude owners.”6 More specifically, defendants allegedly constructed and operated “various oil and gas facilities, including but not limited to, pits, wells, sumps, pipelines, flowlines, tank batteries, wellheads, measuring facilities, separators, and injection facilities” on plaintiffs' property over the past several years.7 These facilities have allegedly discharged hazardous substances into plaintiffs' property.8 Plaintiffs also allege that defendants have disposed of oilfield wastes in “unlined earthen pits” on or near the property.9 According to the complaint, this waste, which contains numerous toxic and hazardous substances, seeps into the surrounding area, contaminating “both surface and subsurface soils and waters.”10 The resulting pollution has “permanently damaged the drinking water and other aquifers” under plaintiffs' property.11
The complaint alleges that “[d]efendants knew or should have known that their day-to-day operations in the [Potash12 ] Field would cause the soil, surface waters and groundwater of plaintiffs' property to be contaminated” with hazardous substances.13 But, rather than removing the substances, defendants allegedly “chose to conceal and cover up their contamination.”14 Specifically, defendants “bur[ied], hid[ ], or actively conceal[ed] pollution” and failed to inform plaintiffs of the potential harm the unlined earthen pits could cause to plaintiffs' property.15 Plaintiffs claim that, because of this alleged “fraud and misrepresentation,” they did not have actual or constructive knowledge of defendants' pollution until less than a year before they filed this lawsuit.16
Plaintiffs bring a host of claims based on the harms they claim to have suffered from defendants' misconduct. They allege that defendants committed negligence under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 ;17 a continuing tort and continuing trespass;18 breach of express contract;19 breach of implied obligations under the Louisiana Civil Mineral Codes;20 violations of Civil Code article 667 ;21 and violations of Civil Code articles 2317 and 2322, which concern premises liability.22 Plaintiffs also allege that defendants are liable for punitive damages for wanton or reckless conduct under former Civil Code article 2315.323 and civil fruits of trespass under Civil Code article 486.24 Finally, plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to damages for unjust enrichment if they have no other adequate remedy at law.25
Plaintiffs have attached to their complaint photographs of the property at issue26 and several documents relating to the chain of title to the property.27 These documents include an “Oil, Gas, and Mineral Lease” on the subject property in the name of Humble Oil & Refining Company and Gulf Refining Company, dated December 14, 1950;28 various amendments to and conveyances of the 1950 lease;29 evidence of a mineral servitude granted to Humble Oil on the property, dated February 17, 1960;30 and documentation of Humble Oil's merger into Exxon in 1973.31 Although plaintiffs repeatedly refer to “leases” and “servitude agreements” and other types of “agreements” (in the plural) in their complaint,32 the only such agreements attached to the complaint are the 1950 lease and the 1960 servitude. Because plaintiffs have alleged no facts plausibly suggesting that there are any other leases, servitudes, or other agreements applicable to the property, the Court will limit its focus in this order to the 1950 lease granted to Humble Oil and Gulf Refining Company33 and the 1960 mineral servitude granted to Humble Oil.34
Plaintiffs have also attached to the complaint the Operator History of the property.35 That document reflects that Humble Oil and Exxon have operated two different wells on plaintiffs' property.36 Operations on well number 46753 were permitted on September 11, 1952, and concluded on December 28, 1973, when the well was plugged and abandoned.37 Operations on well number 93246 were permitted on November 14, 1962, and concluded on October 23, 1985, when that well also was plugged and abandoned.38
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 2, 2013 in the 25th Judicial District Court of the Parish of Plaquemines of the State of Louisiana.39 They amended their petition on May 3 to add an additional plaintiff, Citrus Realty, L.L.C.40 On July 30, 2013, plaintiffs filed a second supplemental and amending petition, which added River Realty, L.L.C. as a plaintiff and included the Operator History of the wells on the property in question.41
Defendants removed the suit to this Court on August 16, 2013.42 On September 3, the Court consolidated this action with Civil Action No. 13–5457, Alford et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., et al.43 Defendants in this case, No. 13–5464, now move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff's complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Under Rule 8, a complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations,” but must simply provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief. Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.2007). A district court will grant a party's motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) when the pleading at issue “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The motion must state the defects in the pleading and the details desired. See id.
Given the liberal pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored. Mitchell v. E–Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir.1959) ; Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 10–1333, 10–2296, 2012 WL 2087438, at *6 (E.D.La. June 8, 2012) (following Mitchell ); EEOC v. Alia Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1250 (E.D.Cal.2012) ; see also5C Charles Allen Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (3d ed.2010) (). Motions for a more definite statement are “not to be used to assist in getting the facts in preparation for trial,” because “[o]ther rules relating to discovery, interrogatories and the like exist for this purpose.” Mitchell, 269...
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