Alford v. State

• Decision Date: 29 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 44647,44647
• Citation: Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1975)
• Parties: Learie Leo ALFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 433

307 So.2d 433

Learie Leo ALFORD, Appellant, v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 44647.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 29, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1975.

David Roth, of Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, and Joel T. Daves III, of Burdick & Daves, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ADKINS, Chief Justice.

Again we consider the constitutionality of the Florida murder statute, Fla.Stat. § 782.04and§ 921.141, F.S.A., which we upheld in State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1(Fla.1973).Jurisdiction to hear this cause lies in Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A.

Appellant, Learie Leo Alford(hereinafter referred to as defendant), a 27-year-old male, was convicted of the rape and murder of a 13-year-old female.

On Sunday, January 7, 1973, the deceased left her home to meet her girl friend at a neighborhood bus stop so the two could go to the beach together.Later that day, her body was discovered lying atop a trash pile in an area west of Riviera Beach.She had been raped and shot to death, execution style; her nude body was found blindfolded, with bullet wounds in her head, chest, back and arm.

Several witnesses described a man wearing a white hat and fitting Alford's description and a car similar to the one driven by him present at or near the scene of the crime at about 10:30 a.m., the approximate time of death.

Ballistic experts stated that at least one of the projectiles found in the victim's body came from the pistol of defendant's supervisor, Willie White.White, a security guard, testified that on the morning of January 7th, he had given and pistol to Alford when the latter relieved him of duty at the freight yard where he worked.

Pursuant to a search warrant which authorized a search of defendant's dwelling for spent .38 caliber cartridge casings, various items of clothing, including a floppy white hat, were seized.The clothing indicated the presence of blood factors A and O.Also, cotton swabs taken from the vaginal and anal area of victim's body indicated the presence of blood factors A and O.The victim's blood type was A; defendant's blood type is O.

The only defense raised by appellant at the trial was alibi.He denied involvement in the crime.

After finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, the jury in a separate sentencing proceeding pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., recommended the death penalty.The trial judge then made his written findings of fact required by Fla.Stat. § 921.141(3)(b), F.S.A.Although the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity, the trial judge gave as a reason for imposing the death sentence the following aggravating circumstances: The capital felony of murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or in flight after committing a life felony, which was rape, and of which he was convicted in the same trial; this capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel.

This appeal is from the judgment of guilt and sentence to death.

Defendant first contends that Fla.Stat. § 782.04, F.S.A., taken in conjunction with the penalty provisions found in Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is unconstitutional and violates the dictates of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346(1972).Defendant recognizes that this Court upheld the statute in State v. Dixon, Supra, but says that we should recede from this decision because Discretionary death penalties are unconstitutional or, in the alternative, the imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

We reaffirm the decision in State v. Dixon, Supra, holding that the mere presence of discretion in the sentencing procedure does not violate Furman v. Georgia, Supra.This Court, in State v. Dixon, said:

'Discretion and judgment are essential to the judicial process, and are present at all stages of its progression--arrest, arraignment, trial, verdict, and onward through final appeal.Even after the final appeal is laid to rest, complete discretion remains in the executive branch of government to honor or reject a plea for clemency.SeeFla.Const., art. IV, § 8, F.S.A., and U.S.Const., art. II, § 2.

'Thus, if the judicial discretion possible and necessary under Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of Furman v. Georgia, Supra, has been met.What new test the Supreme Court of the United States might develop at a later date, it is not for this Court to suggest.'283 So.2d 1, pp. 6 and 7.

The procedure outlined in Fla.Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is such that the discretion is controlled and channeled until the sentencing process becomes a matter of reasonable judgment rather than an exercise in discretion at all.

Furthermore, capital punishment is not, per se, violative of the constitution of the United States or of Florida.SeeWilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321(Fla.1969).

Defendant next contends that the Legislature failed to adequately distinguish between felony murder in the first degree and felony murder in the second degree, in that these provisions are so ambiguous that the same act may constitute either first degree or second degree murder, depending upon the whim of the prosecutor.This question was also laid to rest in State v. Dixon, Supra, which we reaffirm on this point also.For the purpose of determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation, the United States Supreme Court will take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest Court of the State has interpreted it.An authoritative construction of a state statute by the Supreme Court of Florida is binding as to what the statute does or does not mean.SeeWainwright v. Stone and Huffman, 414 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179(1973);Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419(1973).

The first and second contentions of defendant, attacking the constitutionality of the capital punishment statute as well as the procedure thereunder, are without merit.

Defendant next contends the trial judge committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence that the defendant and another man attempted to engage in an homosexual act immediately prior to the commission of the offense charged.

It is settled law in this State that evidence of any facts relevant to a material fact in issue, except where the sole relevancy is character or propensity of the accused is admissible unless precluded by some specific exception or rule of exclusion.Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654(Fla.1959).

The trial judge in the case Sub judice admitted testimony that defendant and another man attempted to engage in anal intercourse in the hour preceding the rape and murder of the victim.Defendant says such evidence was irrelevant and constituted an improper assault on the character of the defendant, prejudicing him in the minds of the jury.

The State says that defendant's unfulfilled desire to have sexual relations with another man led to the abduction of the victim and the sexual assault upon her.The other man testified that he and the defendant were unsuccessful in engaging in anal intercourse due to the presence of other people in the area.Thus the State maintains that sexual frustration resulting from the inability to complete the homosexual act occurring around 9:30 a.m., was the motive for the sexual assault on the victim occurring between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. the same day.Accordingly, the State maintains the testimony was relevant and admissible.

In State v. Statewright, 300 So.2d 674, (Fla.1974), the State attempted to show that the motive for the murder was the accused's fear that the deceased would publicly reveal the accused's alleged homosexuality, the accused supposingly having made improper advances to the deceased.We held that testimony relating to a homosexual act allegedly committed by the accused some five years prior to the crime for which he was tried was relevant to the issue of motive.

Commonwealth v. Winter, 289 Pa. 284, 137 A. 261(1927), is a well-reasoned decision with facts similar to those in the instant case.The facts disclosed a sadistic murder of two children, a brother and sister, one seven years old and the other nine.Evidence was admitted that within an hour of the time when he met them, the accused tried unsuccessfully to solicit the victims' older brothers to commit sodomy.The Court stated:

'The courts are bound to recognize, particularly in crimes relating to matters of sex . . . that the mental state of the accused is an important factor; anything which throws light upon his state of mind just previous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged strongly illuminates his place in the picture of the crime and gives better opportunity to estimate the likelihood of his connection with it. . . .

'Our conclusion is that the evidence of defendant's solicitation of the two other children to commit an unnatural crime was properly received as showing his state of mind on the day in question shortly before the commission of the crime with which he was charged, and the motive which governed him in seeking to have the two deceased children accompany him, and in their subsequent murders.'137 A. 261, pp. 263, 264.

In Lawson v. State, 171 Ind. 431, 84 N.E. 974(1908), the defendant was charged with and convicted of the murder of her husband, which she claimed was done in self-defense.In permitting the introduction of evidence of her improper relations with another man, the court said:

'The state clearly was entitled to place before the jury as evidence any circumstances which might suggest a possible motive on the part of the accused for perpetrating the unnatural...