Alford v. State
| Citation | 33 A.3d 1004,202 Md.App. 582 |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | 2010.,No. 2459,Sept. Term,2459 |
| Parties | Melvin ALFORD v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Nancy S. Forster, Towson, MD, for appellant.
Gary E. O'Connor (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: MEREDITH, GRAEFF, WATTS, JJ.
Following a trial held from October 5, 2010, through October 7, 2010, appellant, Melvin Alford, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of robbery with a dangerous weapon, two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, two counts of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence or a felony, two counts of false imprisonment, theft over $500, and possession of a regulated firearm. See Md.Code Ann., Criminal Law Art. (“C.L.”) § 3–403 (); C.L. § 3–202 (first-degree assault); C.L. § 3–203 (second-degree assault); C.L. § 4–204 (); false imprisonment under the common law ( See Watkins v. State, 59 Md.App. 705, 725, 478 A.2d 326 (1984)); C.L. § 7–104 (theft over $500); and Md. Ann.Code, Public Safety Art. (“P.S.”) § 5–133(b) (). On November 29, 2010, the circuit court sentenced appellant to twenty years' imprisonment for robbery with a dangerous weapon; ten years concurrent, with the first five years without the possibility of parole, for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence; fifteen years consecutive for first-degree assault; and five years consecutive without the possibility of parole for possession of a regulated firearm for a total of forty years.1
Appellant noted an appeal, raising four issues, which we rephrased and reordered 2 as follows:
I. Whether the circuit court erred and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask follow-up questions of Juror 753 who responded affirmatively to voir dire questions?
II. Whether the circuit court erred in denying appellant's request to discharge his counsel?
III. Whether the circuit court erred in handling a note from the jury?
IV. Is the verdict defective because Juror Number Five's response to polling was not audibly recorded?
We answer all four questions in the negative and, therefore, we affirm the judgments of conviction.
On January 24, 2009, Lanay Young, an Assistant Store Manager of a Rite Aid store located in the Patapsco Avenue Shopping Center in Baltimore City, arrived at work around 7:45 a.m. At that time, Young was the only person in the store. The first cashier, Garry McWatters, arrived around 8:00 a.m., the time the store was to open. Young unlocked the door allowing McWatters to enter the store. Young testified that “very, very shortly after [McWatters] started,” she noticed a man enter the vestibule area, put on a ski mask, and enter the store. The man, later identified by Young at trial as appellant, revealed a small handgun and ordered Young and McWatters to move to the manager's office. Young testified that appellant ordered McWatters to lock the front door and he complied.
Appellant ordered Young to retrieve money from the safe. Young testified that she gave appellant money from the safe and after several unsuccessful attempts to stuff the money into his pockets, he ordered Young to put the money into a plastic Rite Aid bag. After appellant left the store, Young called police and described the robber as a short male in his early thirties who was wearing a black face mask, blue jeans, black and gray tennis shoes, and a blue jacket.
Officer Craig Stackewicz of the Baltimore City Police Department testified at trial that he was on patrol in the Lakeland area when he heard a call for an armed robbery. The robber was described as a man wearing blue jeans, a gray sweat shirt, and a face mask, who was said to be running north from the Rite Aid located in Lakeland. Officer Stackewicz drove to the area and noticed a man running out of an alley who matched the description given on the call. Officer Stackewicz ordered the person to “stop where he was,” but the individual “took off running.” After a chase, Officer Stackewicz arrested the person. At trial, Officer Stackewicz identified appellant as the person he chased and arrested. Officer Stackewicz testified that he recovered a gun and a large amount of money from appellant, including a substantial sum of money in a Rite Aid bag that appellant was carrying.
Detective Kenneth Richard testified at trial that he drove Young to the location where appellant was detained, and Young identified appellant as the individual who entered the store demanding money.3
Appellant testified in his own defense and denied that he robbed the Rite Aid. Appellant testified that he had $340 on his person at the time of the arrest but was not carrying a gun. Appellant testified that he received the money from selling ten bags of marijuana to a friend shortly before being chased by Officer Stackewicz. Appellant denied having a Rite Aid bag. Appellant testified that two months prior to the January 24, 2009, incident he had seen the gun recovered by Officer Stackewicz lying around outside and he had thrown the gun into the bulk trash behind his house. 4
Prior to the jury selection process, the trial judge had advised the attorneys as follows:
When we go through the individual voir dire I will ask the attorneys if you have any questions. Once I complete my exhaustive—traditionally exhaustive list of questions, I will continue to ask if you have any questions of the jurors until one of you goes on a fishing expedition and then I will no longer ask you do you have any questions of the jurors.
During jury selection, the circuit court asked the jurors as a group, in pertinent part: The circuit court also asked the group if Juror 753 responded by standing to both questions.
Juror 753 was not asked individual or follow-up questions regarding either question or about any other matters.5 During the juror selection process, when the courtroom clerk asked whether Juror 753 was acceptable to the State and defense, both attorneys responded “Acceptable.” Juror 753 was empaneled as Juror Number Four.
After jury selection, but prior to opening statements, appellant sought to discharge his counsel. The following exchange occurred:
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