Alfred P., In re, 84-543

• Decision Date: 17 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-543,84-543
• Citation: 126 N.H. 628,495 A.2d 1264
• Parties: In re ALFRED P.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1264

495 A.2d 1264

126 N.H. 628

In re ALFRED P.

No. 84-543.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 17, 1985.

Stephen E. Merrill, Atty. Gen. (Stephen J. Judge, Manchester, on brief and orally), for the State.

Geiger & Heiser, Penacook (Richard W. Heiser, Penacook, on brief and orally), for Alfred P.

SOUTER, Justice.

On October 5, 1984, a petition was filed under RSA 135-B:28 seeking the respondent's involuntary admission to New Hampshire Hospital. The petition alleged specific acts to demonstrate that the respondent's "mental condition as a result of mental illness [was such] as to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger to himself or to others," as required by RSA 135-B:28 and :26. The Merrimack County Probate Court (Cushing, J.) heard the petition on October 18, 1984. The State offered no evidence of specific acts other than those alleged, and the court dismissed the petition.

On October 24, 1984, the same petitioner filed a new petition for the respondent's involuntary admission, alleging different specific acts, said to have been committed on or after October 5, 1984, some of which were said to have been committed before the hearing on October 18. The respondent moved to dismiss this petition on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court denied the motion and, after hearing, granted the petition. In this appeal the respondent argues that the probate court erred in failing to dismiss the second petition. We affirm.

The doctrine of res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually litigated, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action. Scheele v. Village District, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019, 453 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1982); see MBC, Inc. v. Engel, 119 N.H. 8, 11, 397 A.2d 636, 638 (1979) (cause of action is the underlying right). Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation by a party in a later action of any matter actually litigated in a prior action in which he or someone in privity with him was a party. Caouette v. New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 554-55, 484 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (1984). The respondent argues that these rules preclude his involuntary admission based on any acts proven to have been committed after the date of the first petition but before the hearing on that petition. The argument is unsound.

Since no evidence of such acts was offered at the first hearing, these acts were not in any sense the subject of actual litigation at the first hearing. Collateral estoppel is therefore not applicable.

The applicability of res judicata may be questioned on several grounds. It is sufficient to note here that the doctrine has no application unless the cause of action is the same in each case.

We have described a cause of action generally as "the underlying right that is preserved by bringing a suit or action." MBC, Inc. v. Engel, supra 119 N.H. at 11, 397 A.2d at 638. Under the involuntary admission ...