Ali v. Carney, CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-4320

• Decision Date: 14 December 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-4320
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: SHARIF ALI, aka RAYMOND SHELTON Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER BLANCHE CARNEY, et al. Defendants.

SHARIF ALI, aka RAYMOND SHELTON Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER BLANCHE CARNEY, et al. Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-4320

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DECEMBER 14, 2020

MEMORANDUM

GALLAGHER, J.

Pro se Plaintiff Sharif Ali, a pretrial detainee housed at the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center ("PICC"), has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he names as Defendants Commissioner Blanche Carney of the Philadelphia Department of Prisons, PICC Warden Michelle Farrell, Deputy Warden C. Martin, and Sergeant Black. He also asserts a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Each Defendant is sued in their official and individual capacities. Ali has also moved to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Certain claims in the Complaint will be dismissed in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Ali will be granted leave to amend his Complaint to attempt to reassert claims dismissed without prejudice or he may opt to proceed only on those claims the Court deems plausible as currently alleged.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Ali alleges that on or about July 10, 2019 he was denied participation in weekly Friday religious services for those of the Islamic faith. (ECF No. 2 at 4.)¹ In the period from June 21, 2019 to September 2, 2019, he was only allowed to attend services three times. (Id.) He alleges his faith requires he attend weekly services. (Id.)

Ali filed a grievance about being locked in his general population cell for 21 hours each day due to a shortage of staff. (Id. at 5.) He asserts this lock down lasted from June 22, 2019 to September 2, 2019. (Id.) On August 12, 2019, he submitted a grievance with respect to his being denied attendance at religious holiday services. (Id.) On August 28, 2019 he submitted a grievance about Defendant Black's "tyranny on housing unit H2 during which he didn't allow Muslims to pray either alone or in congregation outside of the cell." (Id.) Ali also alleges that Black "sucker punched a Muslim inmate inside of the cell and on another occasion a Hispanic inmate."² (Id. at 5-6.) Black allegedly kept the unit on lock down by moving officers to other areas to punish inmates on the unit. (Id. at 6.)

It appears that in or around early September 2019, Ali was transferred to the Special Management Unit ("SMU") at PICC. On September 4, 2019, Ali filed a grievance regarding the law library in the SMU being inadequate because he had to choose between recreation time, shower time, or law library time. (Id.) He had only twenty minutes of library time with no assistance and could not make copies. (Id.) He submitted a grievance on September 9, 2019 regarding being kept in handcuffs and shackles during his exercise period. (Id.) The same day he filed a grievance because his wife was allegedly not permitted to visit because he was in the SMU. He alleges the prohibition on visitation was arbitrary even though he concedes that no inmates in the SMU on punitive status are allowed visitors or phone calls. (Id.) Finally, he filed a grievance on October 9, 2019 after a segregation hearing before Deputy Warden Martin. Ali alleges that Martin placed him in segregation and removed him from his prison job in retaliation for filing grievances. (Id. at 7-8.) Ali asserts that Defendant Carney did not respond to his attempts to contact her. (Id. at 8.)

Ali asserts that Defendants Carney, Farrell, and Martin violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") because he could not attend services every Friday and on a religious holiday. (Id. at 8-9, 9-10.) He also alleges the Defendants permit other groups to observe their religious holidays. (Id. at 9-10.) He alleges that Carney, Farrell, and Martin violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights whenhe was locked in his cell for 21 hours per day while housed in the SMU with no opportunity for exercise. (Id. at 9.) Ali asserts that Defendant Black has "stopped Muslims from praying, interrupted my prayer and locked us in our cells for praying in the dayroom." (Id. at 10.) Black also allegedly assaulted inmates and Defendants Farrell and Martin had knowledge of his actions. (Id.) He alleges the lack of library resources, being restrained during exercise periods, and being denied visitation while in the SMU, violated his rights. (Id. at 10-12.) Finally, he claims Deputy Warden Martin violated his rights at the segregation hearing by referring to Ali's history of filing grievances. (Id. at 12-13.) Ali seeks money damages and injunctive relief that he be allowed to (1) participate in weekly prayer, (2) not be locked in his cell for 21 hours per day, (3) participate in Muslim holiday services, (4) have access to a computer in the law library, (5) exercise without restraints, (6) have visitation while in the SMU, and (7) return to the general population and be moved out of the SMU. (Id. at 13-15.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Ali is unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, the Court grants him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.³ Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id.As Ali is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Ali's Complaint cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. That section provides in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A. Claims Based on Grievance Process

Ali appears to assert claims against the Defendants based upon their roles in the prison grievance process. These claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Constitutional claims based on the handling of prison grievances fail because "[p]rison inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance process." Jackson v. Gordon, 145 F. App'x 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Accordingly, the facts alleged by Ali about grievances do not give rise to a plausible basis for a constitutional claim and will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Ali has sued the Defendants in their official as well as individual capacities. Claims against City officials named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against the City.⁴ See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'") (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). "[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. To plead a basis for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality's policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. "To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). "'Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.'" Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). "'Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.'" Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, the Defendant must have "had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to his injury." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Ali makes no allegation regarding a custom or policy by which official capacity claims may be maintained. He mentions only a policy under which his wife should have been permitted to visit him since he had no visitation restrictions, but also states that inmates in the SMU on punitive status, where he was apparently housed when his wife attempted to visit him, are not allowed visitors or phone calls. (ECF No. 2 at 7.) He...