Ali v. Chelsea Catering, 1:94 CV 925.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1:94 CV 925.,1:94 CV 925.
• Citation: Ali v. Chelsea Catering, 910 F.Supp. 338 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
• Parties: Mir Masood ALI, Plaintiff, v. CHELSEA CATERING, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

910 F. Supp. 338

Mir Masood ALI, Plaintiff, v.CHELSEA CATERING, Defendant.

No. 1:94 CV 925.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

November 27, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Howard Mishler, Westlake, OH, for plaintiff.

Jeffrey J. Wedel, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, OH, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NUGENT, District Judge.

This matter is before this court pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.(Doc. # 17).Plaintiff has filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant's motion.(Doc. # 27).Defendant has entered a Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Response Brief (Doc. # 32) and a Motion to Strike Ex. # 9 attached to Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. # 34).Defendant's Motion to Strike(Doc. # 34) is DENIED and for the reasons that follow, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment(Doc. # 17) is GRANTED as it pertains to all causes of action raised by Plaintiff.

I.

The present action was originally filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on March 31, 1994.Thereafter, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio on May 3, 1994.This Court has subject matter jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and the federal question involved in this claim, and over the state claim based on supplemental jurisdiction.This matter was originally assigned to Judge Ann Aldrich.However, on July 10, 1995, pursuant to the protocol adopted by the judges of this Court for the creation of a docket for Judge Donald C. Nugent, this matter was transferred to the docket of Judge Donald C. Nugent.

In his complaint, Plaintiff sets forth five causes of action against Defendant, Chelsea Catering.Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that he was wrongfully discharged by Chelsea Catering.The second cause of action alleges that Chelsea Catering engaged in prohibited handicap discrimination in violation of Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.02and4112.99.The third cause of action alleges violations of ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.Plaintiff's fourth cause of action sounds in contract and claims detrimental reliance upon an alleged misrepresentation and/or fraud.Finally, Plaintiff's fifth cause of action is against Defendant for the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress that was the result of his termination.

II.

The undisputed facts of the present case are as follows:

Defendant, Chelsea Catering supplies meals, snacks and related items to Continental Airlines flights in cities including Cleveland, Ohio.Plaintiff, Mir Ali was hired by Defendant as an outside ramp coordinator in 1991.As an outside ramp coordinator, Mr. Ali's job was to act as a liaison between Defendant's inside airport operations and its delivery operations to the various airplanes.At the time of his hiring, Mr. Ali was given an employee manual entitled "Chelsea Cleveland — What You Can Expect From Us".Defendant's policy for sick leave is clearly spelled out within this manual.The manual clearly states that an employee's leave of absence "may not exceed a maximum of six months."Furthermore, the manual clearly states that although a "leave of absence protects your continuous service record and eligibility for certain benefits", "the Company cannot guarantee that the employee's position will be available upon returning from a leave of absence."

Plaintiff was injured in an employment related accident on Defendant's premises in early July, 1992.As a result of this accident, Plaintiff injured his knee, patella, tibia and lower back.Plaintiff remained out of work for approximately five (5) weeks.During this time Plaintiff received a leave of absence with pay and workers' compensation benefits for temporary total disability.Plaintiff returned to his full time position in early August 1992.However, in early 1993, Plaintiff's knee began to bother him and he was put on "light duty" assignments by Defendant.

On or about February 2, 1993, Plaintiff was in need of surgery on his left knee and obtained a medical leave of absence of one month for this surgery.As a result of the surgery, Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Angley, felt that Plaintiff could not immediately return to work.Pursuant to company policy, Plaintiff monthly submitted a note from Dr. Angley.In each note, Dr. Angley stated that Plaintiff needed to be off work for a few more weeks.Finally, on July 30, 1993, Plaintiff procured a return to work slip from Dr. Angley stating:

"... Mr. Ali is under my care for his left knee.He is able to return to work on Monday, August 2nd, 1993, but to avoid prolonged standing and walking and to use one crutch."

Plaintiff submitted Dr. Angley's note directly to Defendant and informed Defendant that he was ready and able to work.

It is at this point that the parties begin to disagree on the facts.

Pursuant to the Company's leave of absence policy, Plaintiff had six months from his initial leave in which to return from work or be subject to termination.As previously stated, Plaintiff had obtained his initial medical leave on February 2, 1993.Therefore, it was necessary for Plaintiff to return to work by August 2, 1993 in order to conform with the Company's leave policy.

Defendant contends that on August 2, 1993, Manager of Human Resources, Ms. Catherine Mitchell, informed Plaintiff that the company had no work available at that time within the limits of Dr. Angley's restrictions.However, Plaintiff contends that Ms. Mitchell and her supervisor, Mr. Weger, told Plaintiff that no position was available and that he should return to work in two (2) weeks.As a result of this, Plaintiff claims that he was not informed he was discharged until early October 1993.

On the other hand, Defendant maintains that Ms. Mitchell clearly explained to Mr. Ali that there were no positions that fit his physician's restrictions.Defendant claims that the only reason Plaintiff was terminated was because he could not safely and substantially perform his essential job duties, and no light duty work was available at the time to accommodate the Plaintiff.It is as a result of the Plaintiff's termination that the Plaintiff filed the present action.

III.

In determining whether summary judgment is to be granted, the court must consider only that evidence which is properly before it.Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).The burden of showing the absence of any such "genuine issue" rests with the moving party:

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)(citingFED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).

The court will view the summary judgment motion"in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."U.S. v. Diebold, Inc.,369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176(1962), see alsoU.S. v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc.,759 F.2d 557, 562(6th Cir.1985).Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of their case.Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc.,48 F.3d 937, 941(6th Cir.1995)(citingCelotex,477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552).Accordingly, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the Plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the Plaintiff."Copeland v. Machulis,57 F.3d 476, 478(6th Cir.1995)(quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby,477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986)).Moreover, if the evidence presented is "merely colorable" and not "significantly probative,"the court may decide the legal issue and grant summary judgment.Anderson,477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11(citation omitted).

Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the nonmover.The nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleadings, but must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury."Cox v. Kentucky Department of Transportation,53 F.3d 146, 149(6th Cir.1995).The text of FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e) states:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Id.The Federal Rules identify the penalty for the lack of such a response by the nonmoving party as an automatic grant of summary judgment, where otherwise appropriate.

The district judge, in considering this type of motion, is to examine "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law."Anderson,477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.The court will not consider non-material facts, nor will it weigh material evidence to determine the truth of the matter.Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.The judge's sole function is to determine whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial; this does not exist unless "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."Id.

In sum, proper summary judgment analysis entails:

"... the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual

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