Ali v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT
Decision Date | 24 March 2010 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-01950 (HHK). |
Citation | 697 F. Supp.2d 88 |
Parties | Tarick ALI, by his personal representative, Monica Ali, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT and District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Service, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Donna Williams Rucker, Gebhardt & Associates, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Heather R. Skeeles-Shiner, Tasha Monique Hardy, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Tarick Ali, by his personal representative Monica Ali,1 brings this suit against the District of Columbia Government ("District") and the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Service ("D.C. Fire and EMS") alleging religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C.Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq. ("DCHRA"). Ali's claims arise from his alleged unlawful treatment as an employee of D.C. Fire and EMS. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Ali's complaint filed by both defendants # 20. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the Court concludes that the motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
Tarick Ali, a practicing Muslim, was at all times relevant to this case a firefighter and emergency medical technician for D.C. Fire and EMS.
In observance of Islam, Ali prayed five times a day. On June 15, 2006, he participated in an afternoon prayer session with a co-worker at the fire station where he worked. As Ali was in the process of returning his prayer mat to the locker room, his immediate supervisor, Lieutenant Michael Malinowski, rang the fire house bells, signaling that the members of the house were to line up for a training drill. After the firefighters lined up, Ali alleges, Malinowski "singled out" Ali and his co-worker by "berating them for allegedly reporting to the floor approximately 30 seconds after the unit was placed out of service for the training drill." Compl. ¶ 10.2
Shortly after this incident, Malinowski told Ali that he no longer needed to fill out a "special report" for reporting to the floor late.3 Malinowski allegedly also told Ali that he "needed to choose between his job or his religion." Id. ¶ 14. Ali asserts that on the date Malinowski made this comment, Ali expressed opposition to the "discriminatory threats" made to him, and on or about this date, he filed an "internal complaint" alleging discriminatory treatment. Id. ¶ 15-16.
Ali alleges that "defendants harassed and retaliated against Ali when they strongly instructed him to change the subject" of his internal complaint. Id. ¶ 19. Ali alleges that Malinowski also "harassed and retaliated" against him by ordering Ali to "sign in his release in the journal signing out equipment, which is a task that was not part of a routine practice" and which was required of no other employees. Id. ¶ 20.
On July 5, 2006, Ali met with Malinowski and Battalion Fire Chief Steven Dove and again expressed opposition to his "discriminatory treatment." Id. ¶ 17. During this meeting, Malinowski allegedly admitted to asking Ali "what's more important to you, you know, your religion or the job of the fire department?" Id. ¶ 22. Malinowski allegedly then stated: Id. ¶ 23. Ali further alleges that, during this meeting Dove threatened that if Ali continued to pursue the "harassment charge," Ali's "Islamic co-workers would be placed on charges as `ramifications' for his action." Id. ¶ 24.
Ali maintains that following the July 5, 2006 meeting, Dove retaliated against him by "making the decision to require all employees to file a special report, which created a hostile work environment for Ali." Id. ¶ 25.4
On September 21, 2006, Ali filed a charge with an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office. Id. ¶ 18. He filed this action on November 12, 2008.
Ali brings claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA against the District and D.C. Fire and EMS. Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against D.C. Fire and EMS because that entity is not properly subject to suit and against the District for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants argue that D.C. Fire and EMS, an agency within the D.C. government, is "non sui juris and cannot be a party to this lawsuit." Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Mot. to Dismiss") at 6. In particular, defendants contend that D.C. Fire and EMS, a creation of D.C.Code § 5-401, is not the type of independent corporate body that has the authority to sue or be sued, and therefore Ali's claims against it must be dismissed.
Defendants are correct. "The law is clear that `agencies and departments within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate entities.'" Does I through III v. Dist. of Columbia, 238 F.Supp. 2d 212, 222 (D.D.C.2002) (quoting Gales v. Dist. of Columbia, 47 F.Supp.2d 43, 48 (D.D.C.1999)); see also Harvey v. Dist. of Columbia, 949 F.Supp. 874, 875 (D.D.C.1996) (). Consequently, Ali's claims against D.C. Fire and EMS shall be dismissed.
Ali relies on two theories to support his claims of discrimination on the basis of religion: (1) disparate treatment and (2) hostile work environment. Defendants have moved to dismiss these claims based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Ali has not alleged facts sufficient to support the contentions that he suffered an adverse employment action or a hostile work environment.
The state of the law regarding pleading requirements in Title VII cases is unsettled. The D.C. Circuit established in Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C.Cir.2000), that a plaintiff in a Title VII case "need not set forth the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination at the initial pleading stage." Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113. The Circuit Court's rationale relied not only on Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but also on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See id. at 1114-15 ( ). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), an opinion issued seven years after Sparrow, the Supreme Court abrogated Conley, articulating a new formulation of the standard by which courts are to evaluate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 555, 562-63, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ( ). The Supreme Court's opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), reiterates the holding of Twombly and further describes the manner in which courts are to evaluate motions to dismiss. See id. at 1949-51.
Despite the questions that arise about the continued validity of Sparrow in light of Twombly and Iqbal, Sparrow's holding that a plaintiff need not "`make out a prima facie case of discrimination' in his complaint," Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1114, is still good law. And Rule 8 requires only a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Mindful of these principles, the Court has carefully considered Ali's complaint. Although it is unlikely that Ali's claims of discrimination will ultimately prove meritorious,5 he has said enough to continue past this stage of the proceedings. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ( ). Therefore, defendants' motion is denied as to Ali's claims of discrimination.
As to Ali's retaliation claims, the Court need not resolve the issue of which pleading requirements apply because Ali's allegations are sufficient to survive defendants' motion to dismiss even if Sparrow does not control. To successfully make out a claim of unlawful retaliation, an employee must ultimately demonstrate that "she engaged in protected activity, as a consequence of which her employer took a materially adverse action against her." Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C.Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ali has alleged that he filed an internal complaint, and defendants do not dispute that he engaged in protected activity. They argue only that Ali has not faced a materially adverse action. That argument fails.
An action is materially adverse for purposes of a retaliation claim if it "could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Taylor, 571 F.3d at 1320 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165...
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