Ali v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 19 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–15145.,13–15145.
• Citation: Ali v. Rogers, 780 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2015)
• Parties: Abdulhalim A. ALI and Mohamed Faisal Ali, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Robert ROGERS, aka Bob Rogers and William Bartlett, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

780 F.3d 1229

Abdulhalim A. ALI and Mohamed Faisal Ali, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.Robert ROGERS, aka Bob Rogers and William Bartlett, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 13–15145.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 10, 2015.

Filed March 19, 2015.

Arnold I. Berschler (argued), Berschler Associates P.C., San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Eric Kaufman–Cohen (argued), Trial Attorney, Civil Division/Torts Branch, United States Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Nathanael M. Cousins, Magistrate Judge. D.C. No. 3:12–cv–00340–NC.

Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, Senior Circuit Judge, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, and MARVIN J. GARBIS, Senior District Judge.^*

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Abdulhalim Ali was a seaman aboard a tanker ship owned by the United States Maritime Administration, an agency of the federal government, but operated by a private company under a contract. At all material times, the ship was in navigable water. Ali alleges that the human resources director of the company operating the ship ordered the ship's captain to fire him because he is of Yemeni origin. Ali brought a civil rights lawsuit naming as defendants the H.R. director and the captain of the ship, but not the United States. We hold today, as the district court did, that the conduct complained of had such a sufficient maritime connection that the plaintiff's complaint includes at least one claim that could have been brought as a “civil action in admiralty” against the private wrongdoers, and therefore, pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, should have been brought against the United States. These statutes, which are analogous to the Federal Torts Claim Act, waive the government's sovereign immunity in admiralty actions involving U.S. government-owned vessels, and in doing so provide the exclusive remedy for such actions. Because Abdulhalim Ali sued the H.R. director, rather than the United States, his complaint was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (The captain was never served.)

Mohamed Ali alleges that the day after Abdulhalim Ali was fired, he (Mohamed) was present in the hiring hall of the Seafarers International Union and saw a listing for a job aboard the same government-owned ship from which Abdulhalim Ali was fired. Mohamed Ali alleges that he was not hired on the orders of the H.R. director because of his religion and national origin, violating both his constitutional rights and his union's collective bargaining agreement with the company. He named only the H.R. director as a defendant. We also hold today that because Mohamed Ali could have brought suit in admiralty for breach of the collective bargaining agreement relating to the crewing of this U.S.-owned vessel, his exclusive remedy—including for his civil rights claims, which he could have alleged as being closely linked to the putative breach of contract claim—was against the United States. Therefore, his complaint, too, was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

In reviewing an order dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, we “take as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.2011).

Plaintiffs Abdulhalim Ali and Mohamed Faisal Ali alleged the following: They are both Yemen-born Muslims who are now United States citizens. Both belong to the Seafarers International Union. In January 2010, Abdulhalim Ali was on the crew of the SS PETERSBURG, a vessel owned by the United States Maritime Administration, an agency of the United States Department of Transportation. Interocean American Shipping Corporation had contracted with the United States to provide civilian personnel to operate the PETERSBURG. Interocean also has a collective bargaining agreement with the union, under which Abdulhalim Ali was employed on the PETERSBURG.

Robert Rogers is a Vice President of Interocean and Director of its human resources department. On January 23, 2010, Rogers, “acting under color of law,” ordered the captain of the PETERSBURG, William Bartlett, to terminate the employment of anyone on the ship “who appeared to be of Yemanese [sic] origin and/or of Arabic descent and/or a follower of Islam.” In compliance with that order, Captain Bartlett fired Abdulhalim Ali and ordered him to leave the ship, which was in navigable waters, and Ali left. The following day, Mohamed Ali, who was in the union hiring hall in Oakland, California, saw a listing for a position on the PETERSBURG. His seniority in the union ranks meant that he had first choice of jobs, and he applied for the position. However, Rogers directed that Ali should not be hired, and that the job should instead be given “to another union member who was apparently not of Yemanese [sic] origin, Arabic descent and/or a follower of Islam.”

Abdulhalim Ali and Mohamed Ali sued Rogers exactly two years after the date on which Abdulhalim Ali's employment was terminated, each bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Abdulhalim Ali described his claims as being for “Wrongful Termination—Discrimination,” while Mohamed Ali's claims were for “Discrimination in Contracting” and “Discrimination in Hiring.” The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Noting that there was no dispute that the PETERSBURG is a “public vessel owned by the United States ... [and] operated by Interocean” as the United States' agent, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were required, by the terms of both the Clarification Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 1291, and the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SIAA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901 et seq., to sue only the United States for admiralty claims. The district court concluded that both plaintiffs' claims satisfied the location and nexus tests for admiralty jurisdiction, so since the claims were filed against Rogers, rather than the United States, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Abdulhalim Ali and Mohamed Ali now appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court's final decision.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's order dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir.2007).

B. Statutory Framework

The SIAA waives sovereign immunity for the United States in cases where “a civil action in admiralty could be maintained” against a private person in the same situation. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a).¹ That is, if a vessel is owned by the United States, and someone is harmed by the vessel or one of its employees, and the harm is one for which, if the vessel were privately owned, the harmed individual could have sued its owner in admiralty, then the person can bring—indeed, must bring—that admiralty claim against the United States. Id.; see Dearborn v. Mar Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 996 (9th Cir.1997) (through the SIAA, government is subject to “the same liability ... as is imposed by the admiralty law on the private shipowner”). This makes the SIAA “the maritime analog to the FTCA.”Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir.1988). In plain terms, the SIAA applies when (1) a vessel is owned by the United States or operated on its behalf, and (2) there is a remedy cognizable in admiralty for the injury. See Williams v. Central Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1061–62 (5th Cir.1989) (framing SIAA inquiry in two parts: first, whether the vessel is owned by United States or an agent, and second, whether the claim stated is a “traditional admiralty claim”). The SIAA provides no cause of action; it just waives sovereign immunity where an admiralty remedy is available. Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 996 n. 1.

The SIAA has a two-year statute of limitations. 46 U.S.C. § 30905. Further, any remedy available under the SIAA is exclusive of any other remedy “arising out of the same subject matter” that the plaintiff might bring against the individual who actually caused the harm at issue. 46 U.S.C. § 30904.² That is, “where a remedy lies against the United States, a suit against an agent of the United States ‘by reason of the same subject matter’ is precluded.”

Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 997. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “a remedy is provided” within the meaning of the SIAA when, “one, the underlying maritime law would permit the seaman to state the same claim against a private party, and two, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to that claim.” Martin v. Miller, 65 F.3d 434, 442 (5th Cir.1995). Moreover, the remedy available against the United States need not be the same as that available against a private party for this provision to apply. See id. at n. 4. After an extensive review of the legislative history and case law surrounding the SIAA, the Fourth Circuit explained that the exclusivity provision's language was intended to enshrine a Supreme Court case holding that the SIAA “furnish[es] the exclusive remedy in admiralty against the United States ... on all maritime causes of action arising out of the possession or operation” of vessels. Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253, 1257 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson v. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320, 327, 50 S.Ct. 118, 74 L.Ed. 451 (1930), overruled in part on other grounds by Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 578, 63 S.Ct. 425, 87 L.Ed. 471 (1943) ). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this may lead to a “harsh result” in some cases, because of the resulting lack of certain remedies for seamen, but explained that the exclusivity language “clearly dictates this result.” Id. at 1260.

Also relevant to this case is another statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity in the admiralty context, the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”). 46...