Ali v. Stephens

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge
• Citation: Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2016)
• Decision Date: 02 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–41165.,14–41165.
• Parties: David Rasheed ALI, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Defendant–Appellant.

822 F.3d 776

David Rasheed ALI, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–41165.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 2, 2016.

Eric M. Albritton, Michael Aaron Benefield (argued), Shawn Alexander Latchford, Albritton Law Firm, Longview, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Celamaine Cunniff, Assistant Attorney General, Leah O'Leary (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.

April J. Anderson, Esq. (argued), Mark Lenard Gross, Esq., Deputy Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Daniel Mach, American Civil Liberties Union, Derek L. Shaffer, Victoria Fishman Maroulis, Esq., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, L.L.P., Washington, DC, Carolyn Homer Thomas, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, L.L.P., Redwood Shores, CA, for Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before PRADO, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff–Appellee David Rasheed Ali is an observant Muslim and in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). This appeal concerns his suit seeking permission to grow a “fist-length” (i.e., four-inch) beard and wear a kufi, a knit skullcap, as required by his religious beliefs. Ali alleges that, as applied to him, TDCJ's grooming policy, which bans four-inch beards, and religious headwear policy, which prohibits kufis to be worn outside of an inmate's cell or religious services, violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. After a five-day bench trial, the trial court granted declaratory and injunctive relief enabling Ali to grow a four-inch beard and wear his kufi throughout TDCJ's facilities. Defendant–Appellant William Stephens, in his capacity as TDCJ Director, appealed. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Ali is confined to TDCJ's Michael Unit, a maximum security prison. He is a “trusty” inmate, which is the lowest security level classification, and lives in a dormitory outside of the Michael Unit's fence line. Ali is also an observant Muslim. According to Ali, his faith requires him to have a beard that is not shorter than a fist's length, which is approximately four inches, and to wear his kufi at all times.

A. Procedural Background

In March 2009, Ali brought this suit, proceeding pro se, against the Director of TDCJ.¹ Ali asserted that TDCJ's grooming and religious headwear policies violated RLUIPA to the extent they prevented him from growing a fist-length beard and wearing his kufi in accordance with his religion.² At the time he filed suit, TDCJ's grooming policy required male inmates to be clean shaven. The sole exception was for inmates who had been diagnosed with certain dermatological conditions. This medical exemption allowed an inmate to shave with clippers rather than a razor and, depending on the nature of the condition, grow a quarter-inch beard. TDCJ did not provide any exemption to its grooming policy for religious reasons. Inmates that violated the grooming policy were subject to disciplinary action. In addition, TDCJ's religious headwear policy permitted male inmates to wear religious caps, such as kufis, only when they were within their housing area, such as a cell or dormitory, or at religious services.

In his suit, Ali sought declaratory judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring TDCJ to exempt Ali from its beard and kufi restrictions. In 2010, the district court denied Ali's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Ali v. Quarterman, 434 Fed.Appx. 322, 324 (5th Cir.2011). This Court, however, vacated the dismissal of Ali's RLUIPA claims concerning both the grooming and headwear policies and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 325–26. It also vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the grooming policy but held that Ali had abandoned his appeal of the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the headwear policy. Id. at 326.

In February 2014, the trial court³ granted in part a preliminary injunction that allowed Ali to grow a quarter-inch beard, relying on our intervening decision in Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir.2013). See Ali v. Stephens, No. 9:09–CV–52, 2014 WL 495162, at *2 (E.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 2014). In Garner, a Muslim inmate brought a RLUIPA challenge seeking to grow a quarter-inch beard and wear his kufi while traveling to and from services. 713 F.3d at 241. After a bench trial, the district court in that case granted an injunction permitting the inmate to grow a quarter-inch beard but denied his kufi request. Id. TDCJ appealed, and we affirmed.⁴ Id. at 240.

In this case, the trial court cited Garner to explain why it was denying Ali a preliminary injunction to grow a fist-length beard. As it noted, “the record in this case is different than the record in Garner ” in part because Ali was requesting a longer beard than the one sought in Garner. Ali, 2014 WL 495162, at *3. The court also explained that TDCJ had submitted evidence that it had not in Garner, such as estimates regarding the cost of changing its grooming policy. Id.

In July 2014, the trial court held a five-day bench trial. Ali called three expert witnesses, including George Sullivan and Roy Timothy Gravette, who between them had over 60 years of experience working for and auditing correctional facilities. They testified about the impact of beards and kufis based on their experience with prisons that already permitted them. TDCJ's expert witness, Ronald Angelone, testified primarily about his experience with beards in the prison systems in which he had served as the director. Robert Eason, TDCJ's Deputy Director, testified about TDCJ's security interests associated with Ali's requested exemptions and his findings related to his tours of other prisons that allow inmates to have beards and wear kufis throughout their facilities.

In September 2014, the trial court granted an injunction allowing Ali to have a beard not to exceed four inches and to wear his kufi throughout TDCJ's facilities. See Ali v. Stephens, 69 F.Supp.3d 633, 654–55 (E.D.Tex.2014). Among its findings of fact, it concluded that Ali's expert witnesses were “more credible” than TDCJ's witnesses because Ali's witnesses “both have significant experience working in prisons where beards are allowed and [kufis] are allowed to be worn at all times.” Id. at 642. TDCJ timely appealed.

B. Post–Trial Developments

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Holt v. Hobbs, –––U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 853, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). The Court in Holt held that the grooming policy of Arkansas's prison system violated RLUIPA to the extent it prevented a Muslim inmate from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. Id. at 859. The policy at issue—like TDCJ's policy at the time of trial—banned inmates from growing beards, with the sole exception that inmates with dermatological needs could grow facial hair no longer than a quarter-inch. Id. at 860. In response to Holt, TDCJ moved to stay its appeal while it developed a new grooming policy. We denied the stay, and TDCJ implemented its new policy prior to oral argument. Under its current grooming policy, inmates “with religious belief who want to grow a beard” are permitted, subject to TDCJ's approval, to have a beard that is not longer than “one-half (1/2) inch in length.”⁵ There is no evidence that TDCJ has changed its religious headwear policy in any pertinent respect.

C. The Statutory Scheme

Section 3 of RLUIPA, which concerns institutionalized persons, states:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). RLUIPA, which provides a private cause of action, id. § 2000cc–2(a), implements a burden-shifting framework, Chance v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir.2013). The plaintiff's initial burden is two-fold: he or she must show that (1) the relevant religious exercise is “grounded in a sincerely held religious belief” and (2) the government's action or policy “substantially burden[s] that exercise” by, for example, forcing the plaintiff “to ‘engage in conduct that seriously violates [his or her] religious beliefs.’ ” Holt, 135 S. Ct at 862 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) ). If the plaintiff carries this burden, the government bears the burden of proof to show that its action or policy (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) ; Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 863.

The Supreme Court recently emphasized that “[s]everal provisions of RLUIPA underscore its expansive protection for religious liberty.” Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 860. Courts must construe RLUIPA “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g) ). In addition, RLUIPA “may in some circumstances require [a] [g]overnment to expend additional funds to accommodate [inmates'] religious beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2781 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(c) ); see also Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 860. Finally, the law defines “ ‘religious exercise’ capaciously to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’...