Alim v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 19 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 79350-1-I,79350-1-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Omar Abdul ALIM, an individual; Michael Thyng, an individual; The Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., a Washington non-profit corporation; and National Rifle Association of America, Inc., a New York non-profit association, Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipality, Jenny Durkan, Mayor of the City of Seattle, in her official capacity; Seattle Police Department, a department of the City of Seattle; and Carmen Best, Chief of Police, in her official capacity, Respondents.

14 Wash.App.2d 838

474 P.3d 589

Omar Abdul ALIM, an individual; Michael Thyng, an individual; The Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., a Washington non-profit corporation; and National Rifle Association of America, Inc., a New York non-profit association, Appellants,

v.CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipality, Jenny Durkan, Mayor of the City of Seattle, in her official capacity; Seattle Police Department, a department of the City of Seattle; and Carmen Best, Chief of Police, in her official capacity, Respondents.

No. 79350-1-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED October 19, 2020

Eric A. Lindberg, Steven Walter Fogg, Corr Cronin LLP, 1001 4th Ave., Ste. 3900, Seattle, WA, 98154-1051, for Appellants.

Gary T. Smith, Seattle City Attorneys Office, 701 5th Ave., Ste. 2050, Seattle, WA, 98104-7095, Daniel J. Dunne Jr., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, 701 5th Ave., Ste. 5600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7045, Eric Tirschwell, Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund, 132 E 43 St. #657, New York, NY, 10017, Molly Thomas Jensen, Everytown for Gun Safety, 450 Lexington Ave #4148, New York, NY, 10017, for Respondents.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Andrus, A.C.J. ¶ 1 Two gun owners and two organizations concerned with firearms regulation challenge a Seattle municipal ordinance regulating the storage of firearms, contending it is preempted by state law. The superior court granted Seattle's CR 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding no justiciable controversy. We conclude that justiciability defects do not remove a superior court's subject matter jurisdiction and that the challengers have plausibly alleged a justiciable controversy under the appropriate CR 12(b)(6) standard. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Appellants Omar Abdul Alim, Michael Thyng, the National Rifle Association (NRA), and Second Amendment Foundation (SAF) brought this suit against the City of Seattle¹ under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), challenging the legality of Seattle Ordinance 12560 (the ordinance), adopted as Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) § 10.79.020-.060. The challengers claim that the ordinance, prohibiting the unsecured or uncontrolled storage of firearms, violates RCW 9.41.290, which preempts "the entire field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state." The ordinance provides in pertinent part:

It shall be a civil infraction for any person to store or keep any firearm in any premises unless such weapon is secured in a locked container, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inaccessible or unusable to any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for purposes of this Section 10.79.020, such weapon shall be deemed lawfully stored or lawfully kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user.

SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE 10.79.020. The ordinance also penalizes violations:

It shall be a civil infraction if any person knows or reasonably should know that a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person is likely to gain access to a firearm belonging to or under the control of that person, and a minor, an at-risk person, or a prohibited person obtains the firearm.

SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE 10.79.030. SMC 10.79.040 sets a minimum fine of $500 or community service if no unauthorized person accessed the gun, an intermediate fine of $1,000 for a violation if an unauthorized person gains access to the firearm, and a maximum fine of $10,000 if the unauthorized person uses the firearm to injure or cause a death or uses it in connection with a crime. Any person fined under the ordinance may challenge it in municipal court and appeal an adverse ruling to superior court. SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE 10.79.060.

¶ 3 RCW 9.41.290, the state statute on which the challengers base their complaint, provides:

The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge, and transportation of firearms, or any other element relating to firearms or parts thereof, including ammunition and reloader components. Cities, towns, and counties or other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law, as in RCW 9.41.300,² and are consistent with this chapter.

¶ 4 The City moved to dismiss the complaint under CR 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the challengers failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a justiciable controversy. The challengers argued that the lack of a justiciable controversy does not implicate the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, they had adequately alleged a justiciable controversy. The challengers also requested leave to amend their complaint to cure any pleading deficiencies identified by the City.

¶ 5 The trial court reasoned that, because the ordinance allowed Alim and Thyng to keep their firearms unlocked as long as the firearms remained in their possession or under their control and neither individual gun owner had alleged an intent to violate this provision of the ordinance, the challengers lacked standing to challenge the ordinance. The trial court concluded that without a justiciable controversy, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and granted the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Because the challengers proposed no curative amendments to the complaint, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied their request for leave to amend the complaint.

¶ 6 The challengers moved for reconsideration under CR 59(a)(8) (error of law) and attached a proposed amended complaint to the motion. The proposed amended complaint specifically alleges that Alim stores his firearms unlocked in his house in proximity to his minor children and while no lawfully authorized users are home. The City opposed reconsideration, arguing the challengers failed to comply with CR 15 in moving to amend the complaint and the amendment was still futile because the revised allegations also failed to establish standing. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

¶ 7 The challengers appeal the order granting the City's CR 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.³ Because the trial court erred in concluding that justiciability under the UDJA is jurisdictional and the challengers have adequately pleaded a justiciable controversy, we reverse.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The challengers maintain the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 9 We review de novo an order dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under CR 12(b)(1). Wright v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 159 Wash.2d 108, 111, 147 P.3d 1275 (2006). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's ability to entertain a certain type of case. In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wash.2d 438, 448, 316 P.3d 999 (2013). A superior court has subject matter jurisdiction "where it has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action." Boudreaux v. Weyerhaeuser, 10 Wash. App. 2d 289, 295, 448 P.3d 121 (2019) (quoting In re Marriage of McDermott, 175 Wash. App. 467, 480-81, 307 P.3d 717 (2013) ). "If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction." ZDI Gaming Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n, 173 Wash. 2d 608, 617-18, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) (citations omitted).

¶ 10 The Washington Constitution describes the original subject matter jurisdiction of our superior courts:

Superior courts and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in cases in equity. The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to three thousand dollars or as otherwise determined by law, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and other inferior courts, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; of actions of forcible entry and detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; of all matters of probate, of divorce, and for annulment of marriage; and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court ....

CONST. art. IV, § 6 (emphasis added). This provision sets out enumerated subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction in enumerated types of cases) and residual subject matter jurisdiction (all proceedings not vested exclusively in another court). State v. Posey, 174 Wash.2d 131, 135-36, 272 P.3d 840 (2012). The legislature thus cannot restrict the enumerated jurisdiction of a superior court, but may restrict the residual jurisdiction of a superior court by choosing to vest exclusive jurisdiction in an alternative forum. Id. at 136, 272 P.3d 840.

¶ 11 The challengers brought this action under the UDJA, which provides:

A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

RCW 7.24.020....