Alkebulanyahh v. Byars
| Decision Date | 18 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 6:13-cv-00918-TLW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Abdiyyah Ben Alkebulanyahh (fka Tyree Alphonso Roberts), Petitioner, v. William Byars, Jr., Commissioner South Carolina Department of Corrections; Wayne C. McCabe, Warden of Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondents. |
This is a capital habeas corpus action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Abdiyyah Ben Alkebulanyahh ("Petitioner") filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 13, 2014, (ECF No. 31) and Respondents moved for summary judgment on April 17, 2014, (ECF No. 45). On November 5, 2014, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), DSC, United States Magistrate Judge Kevin McDonald issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") on Respondents' motion. (ECF No. 75).
The Report recommends dismissing the petition as procedurally barred. However, to aid the court, the Report also reviews the merits of Petitioner's claims. Based on that merits review, the Report recommends that, should the Court not find the petition procedurally defaulted, the Court should grant Respondents' motion for summary judgment as to all of Petitioner's habeas grounds, except one portion of Ground Ten, in which Petitioner alleges that he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury because one juror consultedwith a minister regarding the case. Both parties filed objections to the Report (ECF Nos. 76, 79), and Petitioner responded to Respondents' objections (ECF No. 85).
As to Ground Ten, specifically, Respondents objected to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Petitioner made a sufficient showing to warrant additional evidentiary development regarding a juror's alleged contact with a minister. To further its review of Ground Ten, the District Court allowed Petitioner to submit an affidavit from the juror providing more detail as to the alleged contact. (ECF No. 81). Petitioner supplied an affidavit on December 19, 2014. (ECF No. 87). Based on that affidavit, filings by the parties, and the relevant case law, the Magistrate Judge then conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 29, 2015. (ECF No. 95). Following the hearing, counsel briefed the issue. (ECF Nos. 106, 107). On March 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Supplemental Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 110), recommending summary judgment also be granted on Ground Ten. Petitioner timely objected to the Supplemental Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 112).
On November 21, 2014, Petitioner mailed a second application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") to the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas1 and moved to stay these federal proceedings. (ECF No. 77). The motion to stay has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's review. (See ECF Nos. 83, 86, 88).2
Petitioner was indicted in March 2002 for two counts of murder. The State timely served notice of intent to seek the death penalty and notice of evidence in aggravation pursuant to South Carolina Code §§ 16-3-20(B) and 16-3-26(A). Initially, Gerald Kelly and Sean Thornton of theBeaufort County Public Defender's Office represented Petitioner. However, Petitioner moved to represent himself and the trial court granted his motion. Kelly and Thornton stayed on as standby counsel. Solicitor Randolph Murdaugh and Assistant Solicitors Duffy Stone and Angela Tanner - all of the Solicitor's Office for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit - represented the State.
The Honorable Daniel F. Pieper, Circuit Court Judge, presided over the trial, which began on October 10, 2003. On October 20, 2003, the jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of murder, and on October 22, 2003, the jury recommended a sentence of death. Judge Pieper adopted the jury's recommendation.
Petitioner - then represented by Acting Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, and Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudeck - timely filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of South Carolina. On July 24, 2006, after considering full briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence. See State v. Roberts, 632 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. 2006). Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Rehearing, which the South Carolina Supreme Court denied on August 11, 2006. Remittitur issued the same day.
On November 9, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, which the Court denied by letter order on March 19, 2007.
On March 12, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR application. The Honorable Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge, was assigned to Petitioner's PCR action on May 4, 2007. Judge Young appointed Carl B. Grant and Glenn Walters to represent Petitioner on PCR. On February 8, 2008, PCR counsel filed an amended PCR application. On October 12-13, 2008, after the application was fully briefed, Judge Young held an evidentiary hearing. On December 17, 2008, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rescinded its order assigning Judge Young and transferredthe PCR action to the Honorable Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge. Judge Mullen dismissed the PCR action with prejudice on September 7, 2009.
Thereafter, Petitioner - represented by John Blume3 - timely appealed and filed a motion to remand the case for additional post-conviction proceedings. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied the motion on October 20, 2010. In response, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and a state habeas petition on February 18, 2011. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied both petitions in one-sentence orders on February 22, 2013. Petitioner's state petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus raised the same grounds Petitioner raises in his federal habeas petition.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. However, Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mereallegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In addition, in accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), claims adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding cannot be a basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). When reviewing a state court's application of federal law, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Accordingly, a federal habeas court must (1) determine what arguments or theories supported or could have supported the state court's decision; and then (2) ask whether it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding of a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
Further, under the AEDPA, a state court's decision "must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation" when the case is being considered on direct review. Id. at 785. Thus, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctionsin the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
In conducting this review, the Court applies the following standard:
The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the Court, to which any party may file written objections . . . . The Court is not bound by the recommendation of the magistrate judge but, instead, retains responsibility for the final determination. The Court is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which an objection is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the...
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