All Star Enterprise, Inc. v. Buchanan, 14-08-01064-CV.

Citation298 S.W.3d 404
Decision Date08 October 2009
Docket NumberNo. 14-08-01064-CV.,14-08-01064-CV.
PartiesALL STAR ENTERPRISE, INC. a/k/a Bernard Well Service, Antero Resources Corporation, Antero Resources Piceance Corporation, and Frontier Drilling, L.L.C., Appellants v. Erin BUCHANAN, Individually, as Representative of the Estate of Joseph Buchanan, Jr., and as Next Friend of Christopher D. Buchanan and Taylor N. Buchanan, Minors, Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, GUZMAN, and BOYCE.

OPINION

EVA M. GUZMAN, Justice.

In this wrongful-death and survival action, four nonresident defendants appeal the denial of their respective special appearances. Because the Texas contacts of All Star Enterprise, Inc., Antero Resources Piceance Corp., and Frontier Drilling, L.L.C. are insufficient to establish general or specific jurisdiction, we reverse the trial court's rulings as to them and remand the claims against them for severance and dismissal. The Texas contacts of Antero Resources Corporation, however, are sufficient to support general jurisdiction, and the exercise of such jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of its special appearance.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2007, Joseph "Jay" Buchanan, Jr. was killed by a piece of falling equipment while working at a drilling rig known as Rig No. 3 in the Piceance Basin of Garfield County, Colorado. At the time of his death, Jay, his wife, and his minor children were citizens of Louisiana temporarily residing in Colorado, but by the time his wife, individually and on behalf of the children and her late husband's estate (collectively, "Buchanan"), filed this wrongful-death action in Harris County, Jay's survivors again resided in Louisiana. On August 30, 2007, Buchanan sued (a) Halliburton Company, (b) All Star Enterprise, Inc. d/b/a Bernard Well Service ("All Star"), and (c) Antero Resources Corporation ("Antero"). On October 12, 2007, Buchanan added Frontier Drilling, L.L.C. ("Frontier") as a defendant, and on March 7, 2008, Antero Resources Piceance Corporation ("Piceance") was added to the suit. All Star, Antero, Piceance, and Frontier each filed a special appearance, and each was denied by the trial court. In this interlocutory appeal, each presents a single issue challenging the trial court's denial of its special appearance.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the long-arm statute. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex.2002). The nonresident defendant then bears the burden of proof to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction asserted by the plaintiff. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.2007).

The determination of whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction is a question of law. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. If a trial court must resolve disputed questions of fact before resolving the jurisdictional issue but renders no findings of fact, the trial court's implied factual findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency where, as here, the appellate record includes both the reporter's record and the clerk's record. Id. at 794-95. On appeal, we consider all of the jurisdictional evidence before the trial court. Fish v. Tandy Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). If the special appearance is based upon undisputed or established facts, the appellate court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's order. Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

III. GOVERNING LAW

It is well-established that our state courts may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant only if federal due process requirements and the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Because the personal jurisdiction of Texas courts extends "`as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit,'" we rely on precedent from both federal and state courts in determining whether a nonresident defendant has met its burden to negate all bases of jurisdiction. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (quoting U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.1977)). State statutory and federal due-process requirements are satisfied if (a) the nonresident corporation has certain minimum contacts with Texas, and (b) our exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 412-13, 104 S.Ct. 1868; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

A. Minimum Contacts

The first of these requirements, that of sufficient minimum contacts, is satisfied if the nonresident defendant has "`purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). The "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a nonresident corporation will not be haled into a foreign jurisdiction based on "`[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship'" with the defendant or as the result of "`random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts." Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984).

To determine whether the nonresident corporate defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting business within the State of Texas, three factors are relevant here. See Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). First, we consider only each defendant's own actions. Id. Second, the acts of each defendant must be "purposeful," rather than random, isolated, or fortuitous. Id. Third, each "defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by `availing' itself of the jurisdiction." Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). Because "all contacts [must] be carefully investigated, compiled, sorted, and analyzed for proof of a pattern of continuing and systematic activity," we do not consider any of a defendant's contacts in isolation, but instead apply these factors to all of each nonresident defendant's contacts with Texas. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex.1990). "[I]t is not the number, but rather the quality and nature of the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state that [are] important." Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 230 n. 11 (Tex.1991).

B. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

The plaintiff bears the initial burden to show that assertion of personal jurisdiction fulfills the second due-process requirement, i.e., that it comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 85 (Tex.1992). But as we have previously noted, "[s]ometimes the exercise of jurisdiction may not be reasonable even if the nonresident defendant has purposely established minimum contacts with the forum state." Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 411 (citing Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 228). If the defendant has established such minimum contacts, then it is the defendant who bears the burden to present a compelling argument establishing that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. (citing Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 231). In making this determination, courts may consider factors such as the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174; Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 231. Such factors may establish the reasonableness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than otherwise would be required, but rarely will support a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction is contrary to the principles of fair play and substantial justice. Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, 833 S.W.2d 716, 722-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). Most fairness considerations instead may be accommodated without finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction unconstitutional. Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 231 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174).

C. Specific Jurisdiction

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. Specific jurisdiction is dispute-specific, and it attaches when the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or relates to the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state. Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 410. To invoke a state's specific jurisdiction, the defendant's activities must have been "purposefully directed" to the forum, id., and there must be a substantial connection between the defendant's forum contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585.

In her live pleadings, Buchanan contends the trial court has jurisdiction...

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