Allah v. O'Conner
| Decision Date | 08 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 18-4048 |
| Parties | MICHAEL M. ALLAH, Plaintiff v. DIRECTOR PAT O'CONNER et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Michael Allah bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his parole agent and various employees of Gaudenzia DRC, a privately owned company that provides outpatient and inpatient substance abuse and mental health services. Mr. Allah alleges that while he was on parole and participating in Gaudenzia DRC's inpatient program, Gaudenzia DRC employees (the "DRC Defendants") falsely accused him of cocaine use, refused to let him attend medical appointments, denied him access to his prescription pain medication, retaliated against him for filing grievances, and took his personal property without a hearing.
The DRC Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Allah opposes the motion.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion to dismiss.
A district court may properly grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) based on the legal insufficiency of the claim. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408 (3d Cir. 1991). "A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack." Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack challenges the legal sufficiency of the claim but does not dispute the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. A factual attack allows a court to consider evidence outside the pleadings and decide whether it does, in fact, have jurisdiction to hear the case. Id.
Dismissal under a facial challenge is proper "only when the claim 'clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or . . . is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Kehr, 926 F.2d at 1408-09 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). In this circumstance, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true, and must view them in the light most favorable to the non-movant. In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 2005). However, a party asserting that the court has jurisdiction always bears the burden of showing that the case is properly before the court. Packard v. Provident Nat. Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 188 (1936)).
Under a factual challenge, the trial court's very power to hear the case is at issue, and the court is therefore "free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the power to hear the case." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In such an attack pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Carpet Grp. Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Where a defendant attacks a court's factual basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must meet the burden of proving that jurisdiction is appropriate. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court notes that Mr. Allah's pro se pleading should be "liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Bieros v. Nicola, 839 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court may consider "only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). "Court dockets may be considered on a motion to dismiss because they are matters of public record." Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Nealey, 262 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Also, the Court must accept as true all reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations and view those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Revell v. Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount reality, even given the indulgent nature of the Court's review of pro se pleadings. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) () (citations omitted).
The DRC Defendants assert that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against them. They argue that to establish a Section 1983 claim, Mr. Allah must show that his constitutional rights were deprived by a person acting under color of state law. Because Gaudenzia DRC is a privately owned company, the DRC Defendants claim that Mr. Allah cannot make this showing.
In support of their arguments, the DRC Defendants submit an affidavit of Bisa Muhammad, the Operations Director for Gaudenzia DRC. The affidavit asserts that Gaudenzia DRC is a privately owned company that provides outpatient and inpatient services for individuals recovering from substance abuse or living with mental health issues. Muhammad Aff. ¶ 2. In part, the company's services "include providing specialized programs for prisoners paroled by the Pennsylvania Board of Probations and Parole, through a contract with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections." Id. at ¶ 3. Mr. Allah agreed to participate in the mental health program at Gaudenzia as a condition of his parole. Id. at ¶ 4. All of Gaudenzia DRC's clients, including those on parole like Mr. Allah, are not confined to the facility and are free to discharge themselves at any time. Id. at ¶ 5.
Mr. Allah responds that he need only plead facts from which the Court can infer that the DRC Defendants could be state actors subject to Section 1983 liability, not that he need prevail on his theory. He claims that Gaudenzia's contract with the Government and its receipt of state and local resources bring Gaudenzia and its employees under color of state law. See Eggert v.Tuckerton Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, 938 F. Supp. 1230, 1240 (D.N.J. 1996) (). Mr. Allah also argues that physicians who contract with the state to provide medical services to inmates have been held to act under color of state law.
In reply, the DRC Defendants submit a second affidavit from Bisa Muhammad stating that Gaudenzia's contract with the Department of Corrections, which is also attached as an exhibit, states, "In performing its obligations under the Contract, the Contractor [Guadenzia DRC] will act as an independent contractor and not as an employee or agent of the Commonwealth." Muhammad Suppl. Aff. ¶ 4. They argue that Mr. Allah has failed to show that, as employees of a private company, they were state actors or acting under color of state law, and accordingly subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.
Because the DRC Defendants have submitted evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, they can be said to have made a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), rather than a facial one. Accordingly, Mr. Allah's allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truthfulness, and it is Mr. Allah who carries the burden of persuasion to show that jurisdiction is proper in light of the evidence submitted. Therefore, for his case to proceed against the DRC Defendants under Section 1983, Mr. Allah must show that they acted under color of state law in depriving him of his constitutional rights. See Turner v. Spaley, 501 F. App'x 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ().
Despite the DRC Defendants' contentions, the fact that Gaudenzia DRC is a private company does not foreclose the possibility that they could also be state actors for the purposes ofSection 1983 liability. Answering the question of whether the DRC Defendants engaged in "state action requires an...
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