Allan v. Piper

• Docket Number: 17-cv-152 (NEB/LIB)
• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Parties: Peter Allan, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Emily Johnson Piper, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

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Peter Allan, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Emily Johnson Piper, et al., Defendants.

No. 17-cv-152 (NEB/LIB)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

May 16, 2023

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Hon Leo I. Brisbois United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 25]; Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, [Docket No. 37]; and Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time. [Docket No 42]. The Court took the parties' Motions under advisement on the written submissions of the parties.

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, [Docket No. 37], is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time, [Docket No 42], is GRANTED.

Furthermore the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 25], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and the above captioned matter be DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. Background ^[1]

Plaintiff Peter Allan, a patient civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (hereinafter “MSOP”), proceeding pro se, initiated this action on January 6, 2017,^[2] naming as Defendants Emily Johnson Piper, David Herman, Nancy Johnston, Janine Hebert, Peter Puffer, Susan Johnson, Katherine Lockie, Nancy Stacken, Elizabeth Peterson, Kevin Moser, Scott Sutton, Terry Kniesel, Gene Anderson, Scott Benoit, Jerry Fjerkenstad, Steve Sadjak, Dana Osborne, Tara Osborn, Megan Miller, Jenna Younker, and Ross Peterson. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are all employees of the Minnesota Department of Health and Human Services and responsible for overseeing the operations of the MSOP. (Id.). Plaintiff sues each Defendant in their individual and official capacity. (Id.).

The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint center around the MSOP's “End of Life Care” policy and the MSOP's “Helping Hands Volunteers” policy. (See Id.). The MSOP's “End of Life Care” policy's stated purpose is to “establish a standard of care for MSOP clients at end of life” while the clients remain in the care of the MSOP. (End of Life Care Policy [Docket No. 28-1]). The “End of Life Care” policy generally provides that the MSOP will attempt to honor the client's preferences in dealing with end-of-life decisions, such as living arrangements and advanced directives; outlines a policy for outside visitors and telephone calls; and includes a description of the end-of-life care related duties of various members of the MSOP staff. (Id.).

Relatedly, the MSOP's “Helping Hands Volunteer” policy establishes “a process for MSOP clients to provide support to and receive personal cares from their peers.” (Helping Hands Volunteer Policy [Docket No. 28-1]). The Helping Hands Volunteer Policy defines a Helping Hands Volunteer as “a client participating in the Helping Hands Volunteer program who provides hands on personal cares to clients facing end of life.” (Id.).

Plaintiff does not take issue with the content of these policies. (See Id.). Instead, Plaintiff take issue with any person who becomes eligible for end-of-life care being required to remain in the MSOP. (See Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the MSOP subjects clients to the “End of Life Care” policy who “cannot help themselves” and who “obviously don't meet any commitment criteria.” (Id. at 18). Plaintiff asserts that “[i]t is obvious the dying humans meet the special conditions stated in the . . . discharge statute yet not one person has ever been even petitioned for discharge and will remain until death in a hopeless, heartless infirmary under guard.” (Id.). In other words, Plaintiff asserts that if a MSOP client meets the qualifications to become subject to the MSOP's “End of Life Care” policy, then said client also necessarily meets the criteria for discharge from the MSOP. (See Id.). Plaintiff further asserts that the MSOP is not “supposed to be a hospice facility,” (Id. at 26) (capitalization corrected), and Defendants violate their “standard of professional judgment” by continuing to civilly committee any client who is on said client's “death bed.” (Id. at 25-26).

On the basis of the allegations in his Complaint, Plaintiff purports to assert three causes of action. (Id. at 32-42). In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a claim he entitles, “Denial of Right to be Free from Punishment in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.” (Id. at 32-34). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the allegations in the Complaint demonstrate that Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to be free from inhumane treatment. (Id. at 35-38). In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' alleged conduct denied Plaintiff equal protection under the laws as secured by the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. (Id. at 32-42).^[3] Each of Plaintiff's purported causes of action is based on his claim that the existence of the end-of-life protocols at the MSOP is unconstitutional because any person who qualifies for such care also necessarily qualifies for discharge from the MSOP.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the form of actual, compensatory, and punitive damages. (Id. at 48).

II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [Docket No. 25].^[4]

Defendants seek an Order of this Court having all of Plaintiff's claims dismissed with prejudice. (See Defs.' Mot. [Docket No. 25]; Def.'s Mem. [Docket No. 27] at 1; Proposed Order [Docket No. 31]).^[5] Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because the Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue some of the claims asserted in the present case, because Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (Defs.' Mem. [Docket No. 27] at 1-2). In the alterative, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.).

Before the Court may consider the merits of Plaintiff's claim, the Court must ensure it has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claim. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2009); Pomerenke v. Bird, No. 12-cv-1757 (DSD/JJG), 2014 WL 30363, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2014) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3)); S Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). It is the burden of the party asserting the existence of jurisdiction, in the present case Plaintiff, to establish the existence of the requisite subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2009).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Article III's limitation on the federal courts' jurisdiction is commonly referred to as the “case or controversy” requirement. Schanou v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. No. 160, 62 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Arkansas AFL-CIO v. F.C.C., 11 F.3d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals defines “case or controversy” to require “a definite and concrete controversy involving adverse legal interests at every stage in the litigation.” McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1992). “Federal courts must always satisfy themselves that this requirement has been met before reaching the merits of a case. Courts employ a number of doctrines to determine justiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.” Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Schanou, 62 F.3d at 1042).

As relevant to the present case, the Court must ensure that Plaintiff has standing to pursue the present claim and that Plaintiff's claim is ripe for this Court's consideration. If a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim or a claim is not ripe for adjudication, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. See, e.g., S. Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 591 (8th Cir. 2003); Gray, 567 F.3d at 982-83. If the Court is without the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, then the claim must be dismissed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

To demonstrate “Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) that he or she suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision.” S. Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2012). The injury alleged may not be speculative or conjectural in nature. See Id.

Similarly,

[r]ipeness is demonstrated by a showing that a live controversy exists such that plaintiff[] will sustain immediate injury from the operation of the challenged provisions, and that the injury would be redressed by the relief requested. In other words, “[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute [or policy] must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.”

Emps. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am AFL-CIO-CLC, 32 F.3d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'” Minnesota Pub. Utilities Comm'n. v. F.C.C., 483 F.3d 570, 582 (8th Cir. 2007); see Emps. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC, 32 F.3d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994). A prospective plaintiff...