Allandale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Committee

• Decision Date: 22 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1396,87-1396
• Citation: 840 F.2d 258
• Parties: 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,075 ALLANDALE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AUSTIN TRANSPORTATION STUDY POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 258

840 F.2d 258

18 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,075

ALLANDALE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AUSTIN TRANSPORTATION STUDY POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-1396.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 22, 1988.

Philip Durst, Richards & Durst, David Frederick, Austin, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

William T. Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., James W. Collins, Co. Atty., Austin, Tex., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before BROWN, JOHNSON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs contend that the defendant Austin Transportation Study Policy Advisory Committee of Austin, Texas, a planning group at the local level, violated federal statutes codified at 23 U.S.C. Sec. 134 and 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1607 chiefly by failing to give due consideration to social, economic, and environmental goals when the Committee devised and endorsed an overarching transportation plan. The Committee challenges Plaintiffs' right of action. After considering issues of standing and ripeness, we reject Plaintiffs' contention that these sections supply an implied private right of action under the instant circumstances and affirm the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint.

I. Facts and Procedural History

A. The Parties

Six plaintiffs bring this action. First, the Allandale Neighborhood Association is allegedly a corporation comprising as members both individuals and businesses in the Allandale neighborhood of Austin, Texas. Second, the Koenig Lane Business Association allegedly has as members the owners and employees of small businesses in the area of Koenig Lane in Austin. Third, the Save Barton Creek Association is alleged to be a corporation active in the preservation of water quality in the Austin area. Fourth, the Sierra Club is alleged to be a corporation active in the preservation of the natural environment with members in the Austin area. Fifth, the Texas Association for Public Transportation is alleged to be a corporation that conducts research and educational activities concerning public transportation in Austin. The sixth and final Plaintiff, the Tonkawa Springs Homeowners Association, is not a party to this appeal.

The sole defendant is the Austin Transportation Study Policy Advisory Committee (Committee). The Committee is alleged to be a metropolitan planning organization called into being by the Governor of Texas. The Committee is allegedly charged with developing a transportation plan for an area covering parts, including Austin, of four Texas counties.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims

Plaintiffs allege that, in March 1986, the Committee formally endorsed a new Transportation Plan for the Austin Metropolitan Area (Austin Transportation Plan). According to Plaintiffs, the Committee's process for developing the Austin Transportation Plan was deficient in two respects. First, the process allegedly was not cooperative and comprehensive; was not formulated on the basis of transportation needs; and most important, did not give due consideration to comprehensive long-range land use plans, to development objectives, to the Plan's probable effect upon the future development of the Austin urban area, and to overall social, economic, environmental, system performance, and energy conservation goals and objectives. Second, some of the Committee members allegedly showed prejudgment and substantial bias. Plaintiffs assert that these allegations of fact show violations of the federal statutes codified at 23 U.S.C. Sec. 134 and 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1607 and, further, that these allegations state a claim or claims for relief under these statutes. Finally, Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring the Austin Transportation Plan in violation of these statutes and enjoining the Committee to refrain from endorsing programs or projects inconsistent with the transportation plan that preceded the Austin Transportation Plan of March 1986.

C. The District Court

The Committee moved the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint and, alternatively, for summary judgment. The Committee tended to state these alternative grounds in support of its motion: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) their claim or claims are not ripe; (3) Plaintiffs have no right of action to assert their claims; and (4) even if they do have a right of action then, on the merits of their claims, Plaintiffs' factual allegations show no violation of 23 U.S.C. Sec. 134 and 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1607.

The district court granted the Committee's motion to dismiss, ruling that Plaintiffs have no right of action and, further, that Plaintiffs lack standing and that their claim or claims are not ripe. Five of the six Plaintiffs appeal. For the reasons assigned below, we affirm the dismissal.

II. Discussion

This appeal potentially presents for decision a familiar cluster of preliminary issues: standing, in both its constitutional dimension and its prudential or subconstitutional dimension; ripeness, likewise in both its constitutional and its prudential or subconstitutional dimensions; and the right of action issue. We endeavor, not only to decide the issues as necessary, but to establish a principled sequence for decisionmaking.

For reasons given below, we decide first the issue or issues of standing and ripeness in their constitutional dimensions. Having determined constitutional standing and constitutional ripeness, we next decide the right of action issue. Finally, determining the right of action issue against Plaintiffs, we need not reach any remaining issue of subconstitutional standing or subconstitutional ripeness.

A. Constitutional Standing and Constitutional Ripeness

1.

Constitutional standing, sometimes called Article III standing, is said to form "part" of "the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." ¹ Similarly, to "the extent that 'ISSUES OF RIPENESS INVOLVE, AT LEAST IN part, the existence of a live "case or Controversy," ' " ² ripeness too presents a jurisdictional question. ³

On the other hand, the subconstitutional standing ⁴ and right of action issues are facets of the same inquiry "whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." ⁵ In other words, they ask whether, assuming the claim on the merits is valid, this plaintiff has a right to assert the claim in court. Similarly, the subconstitutional ripeness issue asks whether the plaintiff has a right to assert the claim now or only later. ⁶ These issues do "not [present] a question of jurisdiction." ⁷

We turn then first to the jurisdictional issues of constitutional standing and constitutional ripeness. The Supreme Court has stated that circumstances satisfying the constitutional standing requirement also "would appear to satisfy [the ripeness] requirement" to the extent the ripeness requirement derives from the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. ⁸

Accordingly, we may turn then to the requirement of constitutional standing. In order to have constitutional standing, a "plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." ⁹ In other words, the plaintiff must allege injury, causation, and redressability.

2.

Plaintiffs in the present case allege that the Austin Transportation Plan foresees the conversion of Koenig Lane in Austin into a six-lane highway. Plaintiffs make two sets of allegations (a. & b.) concerning this planned highway in order to show constitutional standing.

a.

First, the two Plaintiffs Allandale Neighborhood Association and Koenig Lane Business Association allege that the mere existence of the Austin Transportation Plan with its provision for the highway at issue has already depressed the market values of properties ¹⁰ owned by members ¹¹ of these Plaintiffs. The causation and redressability elements would seem to be satisfied. The Committee's assertedly unlawful procedures produced the Austin Transportation Plan and its provision for the highway. The existence of the provision for the highway has caused the market to reassess at a lower level the values of properties in neighborhoods through which the planned highway will pass. Moreover, Plaintiffs' requested relief, by disrupting the Austin Transportation Plan (and its provision for the highway) and by restraining the Committee from acting upon the Plan, would cause the market once again to reassess property values and this time to place them at their former higher levels. Remaining is the question whether these Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury.

We accept the allegation of presently depressed property value as a sufficient injury for the purposes of constitutional standing. As a "pocketbook" injury, it is akin to the "direct dollars-and-cents injur[ies]" routinely accepted as sufficient for constitutional standing purposes. ¹² To be sure, such a loss remains in one sense unrealized until the property is sold. Nevertheless, a market devaluation has present adverse consequences short of realization through sale. The knowledge that sale of the property may bring in fewer proceeds will influence and restrict the willingness to sell. Further, a market devaluation will lessen the property owner's eligibility for loans secured by the property. Finally, we acknowledge that other courts have accepted depressed property value as a sufficient injury for constitutional standing purposes. ¹³

We conclude therefore that these two Plaintiffs have satisfied the constitutional standing requirement (and, with it, any constitutional ripeness requirement ¹⁴).

b.

Second, all five Plaintiffs on appeal allege to varying degrees that the construction and operation of the six-lane highway will have deleterious...