Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.

Citation157 F.Supp.2d 1291
Decision Date07 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 91-0986-CIV.,91-0986-CIV.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
PartiesALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC., et. al., Plaintiffs, v. EXXON CORPORATION, Defendant.

Eugene E. Stearns, Esq., Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler, Alhadeff & Stitterson, P.A., Miami, FL, Gerald M. Bowen, Esq., Oakhill, VA, Sidney Pertnoy, Esq., Pertnoy Solowsky Allen & Haber, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Robert G. Abrams, Esq., Howrey Simon Arnold & While, LLP, Washington, DC, Larry S. Stewart, Esq., Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER ON PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION AND ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

GOLD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 20, 2001, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of the Class Dealers [D.E. # 1395].1 Following the rendition of the Special Verdict, the Court held a status conference with the parties on March 1, 2001, to discuss post-verdict procedures, the entry of judgment, and the claims administration process. At the direction of the Court, the parties have filed a series of motions and memoranda addressing complex and novel matters of first impression since, as recognized by the parties, few class matters of this magnitude have proceeded to trial and verdict.2 On June 7, 2001, the Court held oral argument and further directed the parties to file additional memoranda on certain specific issues [D.E. # 1427]. All such memoranda have been received and reviewed.3

In brief, the Plaintiffs contend that, based on the jury's verdict, they are entitled to entry of a final judgment for the total amount of the compensatory damages suffered by the class as a whole, plus prejudgment interest calculated in accordance with the laws of the 35 political jurisdictions in which the Dealers purchased motor fuel from Exxon during the class period (March 1, 1983, through August 31, 1994) ("Class Period"). According to Plaintiffs, the final judgment would reserve jurisdiction to establish and implement a claims administration procedure by which class members would claim their share of the purported common fund. Plaintiffs contend that Exxon would have no role or standing to participate in the claims administration process or to seek recovery of any unclaimed portion of the purported common fund created by the final judgment.

Exxon, on the other hand, views the form the final judgment would take and its participation in the claims process quite differently. First, Exxon claims that the Plaintiffs' proposed procedure would constitute a judicial taking of Exxon's property in violation of basic due process rights because it would necessarily result in a final judgment for more than the actual compensatory damages due to class members who may pursue their individual breach of contract claims. According to Exxon, Plaintiffs' proposal would accomplish this by reversing the process for entering a final judgment so that an aggregate amount of class-wide damages would be immediately entered before the total amount of actual compensatory damages claimed by individual class members on their separate breach of contract claims is determined. Exxon raises again its argument, based on recent case law, that the Court cannot enter an award of class-wide damages because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of many class members.

Second, Exxon disputes Plaintiffs' contention that, after an aggregate damage award is entered, Exxon would not be entitled to recover any portion of the proposed award that is not claimed as actual compensatory damages by individual class members. Exxon also disagrees with the suggestion that it would not be permitted to participate in the claims administration process. According to Exxon, to require it to pay additional sums or to prevent it from recovering any sums that remain after a claims process is completed serves no compensatory purpose and, therefore, constitutes punitive relief that is expressly prohibited by the Uniform Commercial Code. For the same reason, Exxon claims it is entitled to participate in the claims administration process to ensure that, through duplicate claims or otherwise, no class member receives more than the compensatory damages to which he or she is entitled. In addition, Exxon claims that it is entitled to assert rights of set-off against class members who file claims.

Third, Exxon claims that Plaintiffs' proposed procedure does not address the issues involved in attempting to award prejudgment interest under the laws of different states on the basis of the Special Verdict rendered in Plaintiffs' favor. According to Exxon, there is no basis in the jury's verdict (or the trial record) for determining the amount of damages suffered by dealers in any particular state against which to apply the state's rate of prejudgment interest.

By this Order, the Court has endeavored to decide all issues posed by the parties and also to approve the form of the judgment to be entered on the Special Verdict in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Although not a final judgment, the Court shall utilize the procedures in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to authorize an interlocutory appeal. For this reason, the Court has ordered Exxon to file its Rule 50 and 59 motions so that, if denied, those rulings could be considered as part of the § 1292(b) review. Each substantive issue is addressed below.

II. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AGGREGATE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CLASS AS A WHOLE?
1. Plaintiffs' Further Contentions.

As stated above, Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to entry of a final judgment for the total amount of the compensatory damages suffered by the class a whole, plus pre-judgment interest for the class as a whole calculated in accordance with the laws of the 35 political jurisdictions in which the Dealers purchased motor fuel from Exxon during the Class Period. Plaintiffs further claim that compensatory damages may be "ministerially computed" by the court by simply multiplying the jury's annual cents per gallon damage awards times the annual gallons of motor fuel purchased by the Class Dealers as reported in the electronic database of motor fuel volumes produced by Exxon, which Plaintiffs have accepted as correct. Plaintiffs next assert that the same annual cents per gallon damage figures also provide the means to accurately calculate pre-judgment interest by state, by year, in accordance with the laws of the 35 political jurisdictions. Finally, because Exxon's Dealer Volume Database reports Class Dealer motor fuel purchases on a store level basis, the Plaintiffs contend that the jury's cents per gallon damage award also provides a precise means of allocating damages among individual class members in the claims administration process.

2. Analysis.

In analyzing Plaintiffs' contentions, it is first necessary to determine what the jury did, then whether, and under what authority, the Court may enter an aggregate judgment for both compensatory damages and prejudgment interest, and, finally, to consider the propriety of entering such a proposed final judgment given the facts and circumstances of the case.

a. What Did the Jury Decide by its Special Verdict?

In Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1342 (S.D.Fla. 1999), this Court stated that, "the ultimate question for the jury is whether Exxon initially gave, and then `took back' the [DFC] adjustment in total as of March 1, 1983 through August, 1994?" By its Special Verdict, the jury determined that Exxon was liable to the Class Dealers for the "take back," and that it had failed to reduce the wholesale price of motor fuel for the Class Period. The jury then determined the time period by year in which the failure to reduce the wholesale price occurred and the amount, in cents per gallon, by which Exxon failed to provide the reduction [See D.E. # 1395].

As is self-evident from the Special Verdict, the jury did not award aggregate compensatory damages in favor of the Plaintiffs. To do so and derive a true aggregate award, the jury would have had to further reduce the total number of gallons of motor fuel sold during the Class Period to account for "opt outs," as well as to make further reductions based upon Exxon's valid affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations in Ohio. Obviously, the Plaintiffs recognize the necessity for such reductions because, in their proposed procedure, Plaintiffs request the Court to do what the jury did not do; that is, to "ministerially" undertake such an analysis and render an aggregate damage award for the class in the form of a final judgment.

If the jury did not render an aggregate compensatory damage award, what did the jury do by its Special Verdict? Besides finding for Plaintiffs on issues of liability and causation, the jury, in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a), determined class damages in the form of a common guideline or factor [cents per gallon on a year to year basis during the Class Period]. Otherwise stated, the jury did not itself award aggregate class damages or a "fluid verdict"4; rather, the jury decided the applicable factor or guideline that will apply to determine the measure of damages of each Class Dealer during the claims administration process without resort to an aggregate fund.

b. Given the Jury's Special Verdict, Under What Authority May the Court Now Ministerially Enter An Aggregate Final Judgment for Compensatory Damages and Prejudgment Interest?

Plaintiffs' briefs did not initially address this question. At oral argument, and in subsequent briefs, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that such authority is provided by virtue of the parties' own stipulation and by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, 49, and 58. Exxon vigorous denies any such stipulation, or that any rule of civil procedure authorizes the Court to act as Plaintiffs' request.

i. Stipulation between the parties

Plaintiff argues that, while Exxon did not stipulate to a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • July 6, 2006
  • Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • May 18, 2005
  • Red Cloud v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • March 9, 2022
    ... ... Department of Health and Human Services' Office of ... Inspector General, and by Wall Street ... Inc. v. United States , 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir ... See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind. , ... 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Taylor v ... 2009) (copyright infringement); ... Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp. , 157 ... F.Supp.2d 1291 ... ...
  • Perez v. S. Fla. Landscape Maint., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • January 22, 2014
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • The Case Against Counterclaim Class Actions
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • May 14, 2012
    ...May 13, 2008) (citing Roberts v. Heim, 1994 WL 675261, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 1994)); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1323–24 (S.D. Fla. 2001). If plaintiff class members can use Rule 13 defensively to preclude counterclaims against them, it should follow ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT