Allegany County Com'rs v. Union Min. Co. of Allegany County

Decision Date26 March 1884
Citation61 Md. 545
PartiesCOUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ALLEGANY CO. v. UNION MINING COMPANY.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in Equity.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

The cause was argued before Alvey, C.J., Stone, Robinson, Irving Ritchie, and Bryan, JJ., for the appellee, and submitted on brief for the appellants.

B A. Richmond, and William Brace, for the appellants.

Ferdinand Williams, for the appellee.

Stone J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill in this case is for an injunction to restrain the County Commissioners of Allegany County and the tax collector from selling the property of the appellee, who insists that a portion of the tax levied upon its property is illegal and void. A preliminary injunction was granted by the court below, and from this order an appeal has been taken.

The appellee assigns several reasons why the assessment is illegal and void.

1st. Because the property of the appellee so taxed, consists of several tracts of non-adjoining land lying in different parts of the county, and known by distinctive names, but the appellee was taxed for a number of acres in gross, without giving the name or number of acres in any one tract.

2nd. Because the assessment was made without notice to the appellee.

3rd. Because as to part of the land of the appellee, the land was assessed, and then the coal underlying the land was assessed.

4th. Because another company had an interest in the coal land of the appellee, and the appellee should not therefore be assessed for its full value.

5th. That the Commissioners changed the assessed value of the lands--when in fact they had not increased in value.

6th. And that the assessment was too high.

7th. That the land was assessed, and then the houses and improvements upon it.

The County Commissioners have the exclusive power to levy and collect taxes, and in some cases to value and assess property in the manner pointed out by law. While they constitute a tribunal with special and limited statutory powers, yet acting within the scope of such powers their action is conclusive, and cannot be reviewed by a court of equity. The collection of taxes will not be interfered with or restrained by a court of equity for mere irregularities in their proceedings, or for any hardship that may result from their collection. It is only when the tax itself is clearly illegal, or the tribunal imposing it has clearly exceeded its powers, or the rights of the tax-payers have been violated that the interposition of the special remedy by injunction can be successfully invoked, and only then when no appellate tribunal has been created with power to remedy the wrong. The bill in this case is a long one, and rather argumentative than specific in some of its statements. With the value put upon the lands by the Commissioners no court can interfere, as that is a matter confided to their discretion. The objection that the whole tax bill due by the appellee was placed in the hands of one collector, instead of several, is at most, a mere irregularity and cannot be inquired into by another court. As to the claim of the appellee, that the contingent royalty reserved to the Consolidation Coal Company, upon the coal that might be mined from its coal beds, should be taxed to the Consolidation Coal Company and the value of such royalty deducted from the property of the appellee, it is entirely unnecessary for us to express any opinion whatever, as there is nothing in these proceedings to show, that the Consolidation Company has ever derived any benefit from it, or that the contingency ever will happen that will give them the right to use the coal. Nor is there any force in the objections that the land was assessed and then the value of the coal underlying it, or that the land was assessed and then the improvements upon it. The latter is the very method pointed out in the general assessment law, and the former is based upon the same principle.

But there are some objections urged by the appellee that require a more extended notice. One of these is the fact alleged in the bill that the lands of the appellee consisted of half a dozen or more separate and distinct tracts of land, each having a well known name, and lying in different parts of the county, and having different values, while the only assessment made is upon 4245 acres of land which is valued at $10 per acre, making the whole valuation $42,450. This raises the question whether the law imposes upon the Commissioners the duty of assessing each tract separately, and whether a failure so to do is such an infringement of the rights of the appellee, as he is entitled to have redressed by a court of equity.

The lands of the appellee were required to be valued and assessed under the general assessment law of 1876, and we must presume that they were assessed and returned to the Commissioners according to law. No taxes however were then paid upon these lands, but the stock of the corporation representing all its property, and including these lands, was taxed. The Act of 1878, ch. 178, altered the law in that respect, and made the lands of this and other corporations, liable to direct taxation. That Act provided that the president or other proper officer of any corporation, that might own real property, should furnish to the County Commissioners "a true statement of such real property situate or located in such county; and such real property shall be valued and assessed by said County Commissioners to the incorporated institution so owning the same."

This appears to have been done, and the County Commissioners of Allegany proceeded to value and assess the real estate of the appellee.

It will be seen from this Act, that the president or other proper officer is required to furnish a true statement of the real property, and the Commissioners are then to value and assess it. If the appellee furnished the statement of its lands, that is now found on the books of the Commissioners, and which has been before referred to, then the appellee cannot complain of the assessment in gross. If the president of the appellee corporation merely described the lands as 4245 acres of land, in the statement, he furnished the Commissioners, then the appellee is estopped from saying that the assessment is improper and void, because such assessment is the consequence of its own act. But if the president did furnish in detail a proper statement, showing the names, number of acres, and location of the several tracts, then it was manifest error in the Commissioners to change it, and make the assessment that they did.

It is true that the Act of 1878, ch. 178, does not prescribe any particular mode of assessment, but being in pari materia with the Act of 1876, ch. 260, the general assessment law, they should be taken together, and we may conclude that the Legislature intended that the rules they had laid down for the assessment of all the real property should be observed, when the County Commissioners were called on to re-assess a part of it.

The Act of 1876, ch. 260, sec. 17, the general assessment law, points out, with great particularity, the mode and manner of assessing real estate. It says: "In valuing real estate in any county in this State, except in a city in such county, the assessors shall specify as far as may be practicable, the name or names of the tracts or parcels of land so valued and the number of acres or quantity of land in each, and the value per acre."

There are many obvious reasons why this particularity is required. The owner of several tracts of land, lying in different localities, and of different values, is entitled to the judgment of the assessors in the first instance, and of the County Commissioners, if they alter the first assessment of the value of each tract separately. It is a valuable and important right to the owner, as it enables him to compare the taxation of his own with adjoining property, and see that no injustice is done him by over-estimates. The community is also entitled to this knowledge, which is often an important factor in the sale and transfer of real estate. The law recognizes this right...

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