Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec., Radio & Machines Workers of Am. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1941
• Citation: 237 Wis. 164,295 N.W. 791
• Parties: ALLEN-BRADLEY LOCAL NO. 1111, UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINES WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

237 Wis. 164

295 N.W. 791

ALLEN-BRADLEY LOCAL NO. 1111, UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINES WORKERS OF AMERICA et al.

v.WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 7, 1941.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1941.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Otto H. Breidenbach, Judge.

Affirmed.

Labor relations. This action was begun on March 14, 1940, by Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Fred Wolter, Esther Kusmierek, Esther Greenemeier, Sophie Koscierski, Frances Chandek, Agnes Tanko, Harry Rose, Dan Roknich, Tony Calabresa, Edward Okulski, Peter Blazek, Eilif Tomte, Edward Larson and Mike Demski, plaintiffs, against Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and Allen-Bradley Company, a Wisconsin corporation, defendants, to review an order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, dated February 1, 1940. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, answered the petition and filed a cross-petition praying that the order sought to be reviewed should be enforced as provided by law. The Allen-Bradley Company answered the petition and concurred in the prayer that the order sought to be set aside should be enforced. There was a trial, and judgment of the circuit court was entered on September 3, 1940, from which the plaintiffs appeal.

The Allen-Bradley Company is engaged in the business of manufacturing in the city of Milwaukee and it was stipulated by the parties that the company is subject to the National Labor Relations Act. The Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, is a labor organization composed of the employees of the Allen-Bradley Company working in the city of Milwaukee.

Prior to the 1st day of May, 1939, there had been in force a contract between the company and the union governing the terms and conditions of employment which contract was cancelled by the union, cancellation to take effect as of the 30th day of April, 1939. On May 10, 1939, the union by a secret ballot ordered a strike, pursuant to which a strike was called by the union. After the strike was called on May 11, 1939, the company continued to operate its plant for the duration of the strike which lasted about three months. Differences arose between the striking employes and the company and those who continued to serve it. The company thereupon filed a petition with the Board on July 27, 1939, charging the union and certain of its officers and members with unfair labor practices. Notice of hearing was served, which hearing was to be held on June 19, 1939. The union answered, objecting to the jurisdiction of the Board, claiming that the matters in controversy were solely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. It was then answered generally reserving its objection to the jurisdiction. Hearing was had before the Board in which testimony was taken, and on the 1st day of February, 1940, the Board made its final order. The findings of fact made by the Board upon which its final order is based are not attacked on this appeal. Briefly, from the findings the following facts appear:

(a) Appellants engaged in mass picketing at all entrances to the premises of the company for the purpose of hindering and preventing the pursuit of lawful work and employment by employees who desired to work.

(b) They obstructed and interfered with the entrance to and egress from the factory and obstructed and interfered with the free and uninterrupted use of the streets and sidewalks surrounding the factory.

(c) They threatened bodily injury and property damage to many of the employees who desired to continue their employment.

(d) They required of persons desiring to enter the factory, to first obtain passes from the union. Persons holding such passes were admitted without interference.

(e) They picketed the homes of employees who continued in the employment of the company.

(f) That the union by its officers and many of its members injured the persons and property of employees who desired to continue their employment.

(g) That the fourteen individual appellants, who were striking employees, had engaged in various acts of misconduct. The facts relating to those were found specifically. The acts consisted of intimidating and preventing employees from pursuing their work by threats, coercion, and assault; by damaging property of employees who continued to work; and as to one of them by carrying concrete rocks which he intended to use to intimidate employees who desired to work.

Based upon these findings the Board found as conclusions of law, that the union was guilty of unfair labor practices in the following respects:

(a) Mass picketing for the purpose of hindering and preventing the pursuit of lawful work.

(b) Threatening employees desiring to work with bodily injury and injury to their property.

(c) Obstructing and interfering with entrance to and egress from the factory.

(d) Obstructing and interfering with the free and uninterrupted use of the streets and public roads surrounding the factory.

(e) Picketing the homes of employees.

As to the fourteen individual appellants, the Board concluded that each of them was guilty of unfair labor practices by reason of threats, assaults and other misdemeanors committed by them as set out in the findings of fact.

Based upon its findings of fact and conclusions of law the Board ordered that the union, its officers, agents and members

(1) Cease and desist from:

(a) Mass picketing.

(b) Threatening employees.

(c) Obstructing or interfering with the factory entrances.

(d) Obstructing or interfering with the free use of public streets, roads and sidewalks.

(e) Picketing the domiciles of employee.

The order required the union to post notices at its headquarters that it had ceased and desisted in the manner aforesaid and to notify the Board in writing of steps taken to comply with the order.

As to the fourteen individual appellants, the order made no determination based upon the finding that they were individually guilty of unfair labor practices.

As already stated, the controversy was brought before the circuit court on a petition to review. After hearing and argument in the circuit court, judgment was entered September 3, 1940, sustaining, confirming and enforcing the order of the Board, from which judgment plaintiffs appeal.

Max E. Geline, of Milwaukee, for appellant.

Lines, Spooner & Quarles, of Milwaukee (Leo Mann, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for respondent Allen-Bradley Co.

John E. Martin, Atty. Gen., James Ward Rector, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Newell S. Boardman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.

Padway, Goldberg & Tarrell, of Milwaukee, amicus curiae.

ROSENBERRY, Chief Justice.

Upon this appeal no question is raised as to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, St.1939, § 111.01 et seq., pursuant to which the proceeding under consideration was had, except that it is in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. Stated in the language of the brief, the appellants contend “That the Wisconsin Act and the National Act both regulate the same subject; that the Wisconsin Act is so inconsistent with and in conflict with the National Act, in the public policy each Act seeks to enforce and in their major terms and provisions, that the two acts cannot consistently stand together, in so far as applicable to interstate commerce.”

Appellants further contend that the finding of the Board, that the fourteen strikers were guilty of unfair labor practices, is unconstitutional because it is so in conflict with regulations of the National Act governing the employe status of the fourteen strikers that the employe sections of the two acts cannot consistently stand together. While appellant used the term “unconstitutional,” their argument is that the state law can have no application to a manufacturer subject to the National Labor Relations Act because the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act has pre-empted the field of labor relations in cases where the employer is carrying on an industry in interstate commerce.

We enter upon an examination of the contentions of the plaintiffs and the arguments made in support thereof fully aware that we are dealing with one of the most difficult as well as delicate questions presented to the courts of this country, to-wit: the delimitation of the power of the state and the federal government over a matter which is subject to some extent to their concurrent jurisdiction. The line of demarcation between the federal and state power is not a straight line. It is not only irregular, but it is subject to change. The extent of state jurisdiction in some fields depends upon whether the field has been occupied by federal authority. Areas not thought to be within the scope of federal power originally may be brought within it by economic and social changes. Neither the State nor the Federal Constitutions change but the subject matter to which they are applied changes and so a new and different result is reached by the application of constitutional principles. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 1933, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1519, Note, Governmental powers in peace-time emergencies.

Yet “that distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system.” Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 1936, 301 U.S. 1, 30, 57 S.Ct. 615, 621, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352.

[1] We shall first consider the purpose and scope of the National Labor Relations Act for the reason that wherever it applies, it excludes state action from the occupied field. Upon this proposition there is no disagreement. We shall also endeavor to determine when and under what circumstances it applies in a particular case.

[2][3] While appe...