Allen English v. Territory of Arizona Victor Griffith
| Decision Date | 01 June 1909 |
| Docket Number | No. 180,180 |
| Citation | 53 L.Ed. 1030,29 S.Ct. 658,214 U.S. 359 |
| Parties | ALLEN R. ENGLISH and Honora English, His Wife, Appts., v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA at the Relation and to the Use of VICTOR S. GRIFFITH, * Treasurer and Ex Officio Tax Collector in and for the County of Pima, in the Territory of Arizona |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. A. C. Baker, Marcus A. Smith, and James Reilly for appellants.
Mr. Samuel L. Kingan for appellee.
This suit was brought in the district court of Pima county, Arizona, by the territory of Arizona, to collect a delinquent special assessment levied by the city of Tucson on the property of appellants for the payment of the improvement of Congress street in that city. The assessment was levied under the provision of chapter 2 of title 11 of the Revised Statutes of the territory. The territory obtained judgment for the amount of the assessment, $12,533.75, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory.
The contentions that appellants made in the supreme court of the territory, as far as appears from its opinion, were: (1) That the territory, at the relation of the treasurer and ex officio tax collector of Pima county, had no right to bring this suit, but that such right was in the city tax collector; (2)(a) that the assessment was erroneous because the cost of the improvement was divided 'by the arbitrary front foot rule,' and that the assessment was made upon that basis, and not the basis of benefits derived from such improvement: (b) the committee appointed under the act to make the assessment took into consideration the value to appellants of a certain narrow strip of land lying between the lot of appellants and Congress street, left open and unoccupied in the widening and improvement of the street; (3) that the appellants had no notice, actual or constructive, when the common council would act upon the report of the committee; (4) that the property was not subject to special assessment, because appellants' property was not contiguous to the improvement made. The supreme court of the territory decided all of the contentions against appellants, the last one on the ground that the complaint alleged that appellants' property was contiguous to the im- provement, which allegation was not denied by the answer. That contention, therefore, we may take no further notice of.
The first contention is repeated here, and it invokes our construction of the statutes of the territory against that made by the supreme court. If there were doubt, we should certainly lean to the construction given by the supreme court. Copper Queen Consol. Min. Co. v. Territorial Bd. of Equalization, 206 U. S. 474, 479, 51 L. ed. 1143, 1146, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 695. But we think there is no doubt. There is no dispute as to the proceedings taken, so far as they could vest authority in the relator Bogan, as county tax collector, to bring this suit. The dispute turns upon the law. Paragraph 483 of the Revised Statutes of the territory, as amended in 1897, provides that 'it shall be the duty of the collector of special assessments, within such time as the common council may provide, but in no event later than the 21st of December of the year in which such assessment was made, to make a report in writing to the general officer of the county authorized by the general revenue law to sell for taxes due the county and territory, of all the lands, town lots, and real property upon which he shall be unable to collect special assessments, with the amount due of special assessments and unpaid thereon, together with his warrant or a brief description of the nature of the warrant received by him, authorizing the collection thereof; . . . that he is unable to collect the same or any part thereof, and that he has given notice required by law that said warrants have been received by him for collection.' It is further provided that the report, when made, shall be prima facie evidence that all of the forms and requirements of the law have been complied with, and that the special assessments mentioned in the report are due and unpaid. 'And in any action before any court, wherein the question of the validity of such assessment is an issue, no defense or objection shall be made or heard which might have been interposed in the proceedings for the making of usch assessment or the application for the confirmation thereof.' It is provided in the next section that the county collector shall incorporate said list with the county delinquent list, and 'shall sell such delinquent city property at the same time and in the same manner for such city delinquent special assessment as real property is required to be sold by law for county and territorial delinquent taxes.' The supreme court siad that 'this section, construed alone, might well be considered as excluding any other method of collecting delinquent special assessments.' But the court further said that paragraph 488 should be considered. That paragraph reads as follows:
'The general revenue laws of this territory in reference to proceedings for the collection of delinquent taxes on real property, the sale thereof, the executions of certificates of sale and deeds thereon, the force and effect of such deeds and sales; and all other laws in relation to the enforcement and collection of delinquent taxes and redemption of tax sales, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be applicable to proceedings to collect such special assessments.'
The court pointed out that the act 92 of the Laws of 1903 repealed the general revenue law of the territory in reference to proceedings for the collection of delinquent taxes, and substituted for a sale of the property by the tax collector a suit by that officer in the name and for the use of the territory. The court said: 'Unless, therefore, the act of 1903 applies to delinquent special assessments, there would be no method provided by the existing statutes for the sale of delinquent city property for delinquent special assessments.' And the court concluded that §§ 84 and 96 of the Acts of 1903 make 'the method of collecting delinquent taxes provided for in the act applicable to all delinquent...
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