Allen II, LLC v. Alqatabi

• Decision Date: 18 February 2020
• Docket Number: NBH-CV19-6005627-S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: ALLEN II, LLC v. ABDO ALQATABI

ALLEN II, LLC v. ABDO ALQATABI

No. NBH-CV19-6005627-S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session

February 18, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Dated February 19, 2020

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Hon Rupal Shah, J.

The plaintiff, Allen II, LLC, brings this summary process action in three counts: (1) right or privilege terminated; (2) nonpayment of rent; and (3) lapse of time under a commercial lease. The plaintiff and the defendant’s counsel appeared before this court for trial on the complaint on October 31 2019, November 8, 2019 and December 18, 2019. The defendant never appeared, despite a lack of any request by the defendant to be absent and a direct order from the court to be present. Both parties were represented by counsel. The defendant alleges the following special defenses: (1) that no rent was due based on the condition of the premises specifically the problems created by the roof leaks and problems with the HVAC system; (2) that the plaintiff had submitted a nearly final lease to the defendant in February 2019, despite trying to acknowledge Mr. Alqatabi as the new owner, and failed to execute the lease; and (3) discriminatory behavior. The plaintiff seeks to recover possession of 224 Allen Street, New Britain, Connecticut. The parties filed post-trial briefs, through which the defendant tried to assert another special defense - that he is not in possession of the premises and is the wrong party defendant^[1] . After a review of all the claims, the pleadings, and the evidence presented, the court finds that judgment shall enter for the plaintiff.

I FINDINGS OF FACT

"The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony.... It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence ...." (Internal, quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded their testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977).

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and finds the following facts:

1. The plaintiff is the owner of the premises located at 224 Allen St., New Britain, Connecticut.

2. The defendant operates a business, known as the Almadina Halal Supermarket, at the premises.

3. The parties had a month-to-month verbal lease, after the original written lease had expired between the plaintiff and the prior owner of the market, Khassim Gahmi, which is now run by the defendant. The defendant agreed to pay monthly rent in the amount of $1, 750 on the first day of the month.

4. The defendant had purchased the market from Mr. Gahmi and has been operating it with his family since May 2018 at the premises. Mr. Gahmi notified the plaintiff of the sale and indicated the defendant would continue on a month to month basis at the premises.

5. The parties began negotiating a new, written lease agreement for a period of three years on or about February 2018, but the lease was never fully executed because the parties never had a meeting of the minds.

6. By March 14, 2019, the plaintiff communicated with the defendant that it had decided to cease negotiating a new lease.

7. The defendant has not paid rent for April 2019.

8. The verbal month lease has lapsed and any right or privilege to occupy the premises has terminated.

9. While the parties had entered into negotiations to enter into a new lease agreement, the lease agreement was never finalized.

10. On April 13, 2019, the plaintiff had a notice to quit served on the defendant to leave the premises by April 30, 2019, but the defendant remains at the premises.

II LEGAL STANDARD

The courts of this state have consistently held that "[s]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007). "Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Summary process "is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 658, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995). "The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tinaco Plaza, LLC v. Freebob‘s, Inc., 74 Conn.App. 760, 766-67, 814 A.2d 403, cert. granted on other grounds, 263 Conn. 904, 819 A.2d 840 (2003).

"Summary process ... enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms ... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 733, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12-A.3d 1002 (2011).

"While a plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992). "The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove ail the essential, allegations of the complaint." Id. Failure to do so results in judgment for the defendant. Id. "[W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pamela B. v. Merit, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

In a summary process action based on a claim that the defendant’s right or privilege to occupy the premises has terminated, the plaintiff must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the case: (1) the plaintiff is the owner of the property; (2) the defendant originally had a right or privilege to occupy the premises but such right or privilege has terminated; (3) the plaintiff caused a proper notice to quit possession to be served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or before a certain date; and (4) although the time to vacate has passed, the defendant remains in possession of the premises. See General Statutes § § 47a-23 (a) (3), 47a-23a, 47a-23b, 47a-26d.

In a summary process action based on a claim of lapse of time, the plaintiff must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements: (1) a rental agreement; (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises and the defendant is the lessee; (3) the address of the subject premises; (4) the date the lease terminated; (5) whether the lease is residential or commercial; (6) the service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date; and (7) that the defendant is still in possession of the premises. See General Statutes § § 47a-23 (a) (1) (A), 47a-23a, 47a-23b, 47a-26d.

"[T]o prevail in a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements: (1) a rental agreement; (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises; (3) the address of the subject premises; (4) the amount of rent due to the plaintiff from the defendant; (5) when the rent was due to the plaintiff; (6) the date of nonpayment; (7) the service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date; and (8) that the defendant is still in possession of the premises." Housing Authority of Hartford v . Poteat, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-17-6006625 (February 26, 2018, Shah, J.). See General Statutes § 47a-15a et seq.

III DISCUSSION

A Summary Process

The court finds that the plaintiff has met its burden on the right or privilege terminated and lapse of time counts of its complaint. The court does not find the plaintiff has met its burden on the nonpayment of rent claim. The plaintiff is the owner of...