Allen v. Addi

• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-cv-01650 (TSC)
• Decision Date: 21 July 2023
• Parties: BENJAMIN P. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. MARY P. ADDI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

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BENJAMIN P. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. MARY P. ADDI, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-01650 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 21, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant TRT World's Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 49, pursuant to Federal Civil Rules 12(b)(1), 41(b), and D.C. Local Civil Rule 83.23, and its Memorandum in Support (“MTD Mem.”), ECF No. 49-1. For the reasons explained below the court will grant the Motion, dismiss all claims against TRT World without prejudice, and close this case.

LEGAL STANDARD Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Article III of the Constitution prescribes that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction' and ‘ha[ve] the power to decide only those cases over which Congress grants jurisdiction.'” Bronner v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Al-Zahrani v Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,' possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.'”) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S 375, 377 (1994)). Federal courts have an obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). Absent subject matter jurisdiction over a case, a court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim at issue. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1103 (2016); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942). When considering such a motion, a court must accept as true all uncontroverted material factual allegations contained in the complaint and “‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged' and upon such facts determine jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). A court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff, however, if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint or amount merely to legal conclusions. See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

When reviewing a challenge under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), a court may consider documents outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). By considering documents outside the pleadings a court does not convert the motion into one for summary judgment; “the plain language of Rule 12(b) permits only a 12(b)(6) motion to be converted into a motion for summary judgment” when documents extraneous to the pleadings are considered by a court. Haase, 835 F.2d at 905.

Failure to Prosecute

Pursuant to D.C. Local Civil Rule 83.23, “[a] dismissal for failure to prosecute may be ordered by the Court upon motion by an adverse party, or upon the Court's own motion.” “A Rule 41(b) dismissal is proper if, in view of the entire procedural history of the case, the litigant has not manifested reasonable diligence in pursuing the cause.” Bomate v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam). “A lengthy period of inactivity may . . . be enough to justify dismissal,” at least when “the plaintiff has been previously warned that [she] must act with more diligence, or if he has failed to obey the rules or court orders[.]” Smith-Bey v. Cripe, 852 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2370, at 205-07 (1971); citing Romandette v. Weetabix Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 309, 312 (2d Cir. 1986); Cherry v. Brown-Frazier-Whitney, 548 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).

The authority to dismiss suits for failure to prosecute has long been recognized as “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion” in the courts. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962). Further, “[t]he court's authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to follow the court's orders is not discarded simply because a plaintiff is proceeding pro se.” Allen v. United States, 277 F.R.D. 221, 223 (D.D.C. 2011). Although a pro se plaintiff is afforded some latitude in prosecuting her case, “such leeway does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” a court's local rules, or a court's orders. Moore v. Robbins, 24 F.Supp.3d 88, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)).

DISCUSSION

First the court agrees that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See MTD Mem. at 12-16. Plaintiff Benjamin P. Allen, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, purports to bring this defamation action based on diversity jurisdiction. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1. A district court may exercise diversity jurisdiction in a case involving an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, involving parties of diverse citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Relevant here, parties enjoy diverse citizenship when they are “citizens of different States,” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,” or “citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(a)(3).

While initially screening this matter, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), another court in this District found that the citizenship of the parties was unclear, and questioned whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Show Cause Order, ECF No. 3. That court ordered Allen to show cause why the case should not be dismissed outright for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. On August 27, 2022, Allen filed a Response (“RSC”), ECF No. 8, to the Order to Show Cause, and, having reviewed the response, another screening court found that while the citizenship of the parties was “still unclear,” because the case was at an “early pleading stage,” the court must “take Allen's supplemental assertions” regarding subject matter jurisdiction “at face value[,]” and it therefore discharged the Show Cause Order, see Order, ECF No. 8, at 2. Shortly thereafter, this matter was assigned to this court.

Per his own attestations, Allen is a United States citizen who, sometime in 2018 and well before he filed this case, left the United States and moved to Turkey, for fear of retribution by his estranged wife. He has resided in Turkey with extended family members, for the entire duration of this case. See RSC ¶ 4; Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 12-16; see also Declaration of Defense Counsel, Efe Poturoglu, Esq. (“Poturoglu Decl.”), ECF No. 49-3 ¶ 12; Reply Exhibits, ECF No. 45-1 (Emails b/t Allen & Defense Counsel), at 2; Ct. Docket at address of record.

Although Allen is a United States citizen, he was not domiciled in any U.S. state at the time he filed the Complaint, therefore he cannot be considered “citizen of a State” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828-30 (1989). The Supreme Court has mandated that “[i]n order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State.” Id. at 828 (emphasis added) (citing Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1878); Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. 112, 115 (1834)); see CostCommand, LLC v. WH Adm'rs, Inc., 820 F.3d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (same). As in Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828, “[t]he problem in this case is that [Allen], although a United States citizen, has no domicile in any State.” That renders him “stateless” for purposes of § 1332(a), destroying diversity under any applicable subsection of the statute. See id. at 828-29; see also Janvey v. Proskauer, 59 F.Supp.3d 1, at 5-6 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because “[a]n American citizen domiciled abroad, while being a citizen of the United States is, of course, not domiciled in a particular state, and therefore such person is stateless for purposes of diversity jurisdiction[,]” and that a stateless party destroys complete diversity) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 183-184 (3rd Cir. 2008); Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 829); Core VCT Plc v. Hensley, 59 F.Supp.3d 123, 125 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that a “United States citizen who has no domicile in any State . . . is stateless and cannot sue or be sued in federal court on the basis of diversity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828; citing Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir.1990) (“Though we are unclear as to Congress's rationale for not granting United States citizens domiciled abroad rights parallel to those it accords to foreign nationals, the language of § 1332(a) is specific and requires the conclusion that a suit by or against United States citizens domiciled abroad may not be premised on diversity.”)); Jankovic v. Int'l Crisis Grp., No. 04-01198, 2005 WL 3276227, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2005) (same).

A person's “[d]omicile is...