Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Company of Tennessee

Decision Date02 May 1986
Docket NumberNo. 3-85-0031.,3-85-0031.
Citation636 F. Supp. 1090
PartiesFletcher ALLEN v. ALLIED PLANT MAINTENANCE COMPANY OF TENNESSEE; International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL CIO; Local 912, International Union of Operating Engineers.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

George E. Barrett, Barrett & Ray, P.C., Brad Rayson, Henry Haile, Haile and Buffaloe, Nashville, Tenn., for Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.

Charles Hampton White, Cornelius & Collins, Nashville, Tenn., Robert I. Gosseen, Gallagher & Sullivan, New York City, for Allied Plant Maintenance Co. of Tennessee.

Cecil D. Branstetter, C. Dewey Branstetter, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., Branstetter, Kilgore, Stranch & Jennings, for Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO and Local 912, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.

MEMORANDUM

WISEMAN, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are motions for summary judgment by each of the defendants and a motion by defendant Local 912 to strike plaintiff's jury demand and request for punitive damages. This case arises out of Allen's discharge by Allied Plant Maintenance Company ("Allied") which the plaintiff alleges was effectuated by a conspiracy among the defendants. Plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 157; section 101 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 411; and the duty of fair representation ("DFR") under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, as a result of the conspiracy to terminate his employment and to provide him ineffective grievance proceedings. Plaintiff also seeks pendent jurisdiction over a state claim for breach of an employment contract in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-50-109. Upon review of the facts and law of the case, the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate on all claims except the DFR claim. The Court also denies the motion to strike plaintiff's jury demand, and grants the motion to strike plaintiff's request for punitive damages.

Facts

In resolving defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir.1985). Plaintiff Allen was an employee of defendant Allied from 1975 until his discharge on July 11, 1984. Allied performs maintenance services at the Bridgestone Tire and Rubber Company ("Bridgestone") Plant in Lavergne, Tennessee. Allen also was a member of defendant International Union of Operating Engineers ("IUOE" or "International") and defendant Local 912 of the IUOE ("Local 912"), as well as chairman of the Allied Workers Committee, a group of Allied employees who were dissatisfied with the representation received from Local 912 and sought to replace Local 912 as the collective bargaining representative for Allied's production and maintenance employees. On July 11, 1984, Allen was discharged by Allied. Defendants contend the reason for his discharge was the theft of company property by his unauthorized use of an Allied photocopying machine in apparent disregard for previous warnings not to use the machine. Allen claims that the photocopying machine, which he had used previously for Allied Worker Committee business, belonged to Bridgestone and that he had permission to use it. Local 912 thereafter conducted grievance proceedings as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.1 When these proceedings proved unsuccessful, Local 912 submitted the dispute to arbitration. On October 2, 1985, an arbitration was held between Local 912 and Allied, and on October 5, 1985, the arbitrator issued an opinion upholding the discharge of the plaintiff. On January 11, 1985, Allen filed this action.

As Allen properly points out, "this is a discharge case."2 Plaintiff limits his claims to those arising from his discharge and the alleged abuses which occurred during the grievance process and arbitration. Allen makes no claim involving any of the defendants' actions which occurred more than six months before the filing of the suit.3

State Contract and Civil Rights Claims

The Court earlier dismissed plaintiff's claims alleging violations of T.C.A. § 47-30-109 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) as to defendant International on International's motion to dismiss. See Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co., No. 3-85-0031, slip op. (M.D.Tenn. July 19, 1985). The state contract claim was dismissed as preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, because plaintiff's contract claim depends almost wholly on the labor agreement's interpretation. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Plaintiff does not dispute this ruling or challenge the arguments of Local 912 and Allied that they are likewise entitled to disposition of this issue in their favor. Summary judgment therefore must be granted to defendants Local 912 and Allied on the plaintiff's state contract claim.

The Court also dismissed the plaintiff's civil rights claim as to defendant International on the grounds that he had made no allegations of a nexus between the alleged conspiracy and a federal court proceeding, nor had he alleged any class-based discriminatory animus. In his responses to defendants' motions, the plaintiff argues that the Court erred in this ruling. The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to discharge the plaintiff in retaliation for his filing of a lawsuit in federal court a month before his discharge seeking a representation election to replace Local 912 with the Allied Workers Committee. This allegation, plaintiff contends, states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The Court takes this opportunity to expand upon and affirm its earlier ruling that there was no allegation of any nexus.

The first part of section 1985(2), which is at issue in the instant case, states:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror ... an action for damages will lie.

The Court has very little guidance in interpreting section 1985(2). See Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir.1976) (construing the "perfidious syntax of § 1985(2) with some reserve" given the "dearth of authority to light the way"). Most of the decisions arising under section 1985 have involved section 1985(3). The proportionately few cases arising under section 1985(2) usually have focused on what is required to state a cause of action under the two parts of section 1985(2).4 It is well settled that no specific allegation of a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus is required in order to state a claim under the first part of section 1985(2), which prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the administration of justice in federal courts. See, e.g., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726-27, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 1488, 75 L.Ed.2d 413, 420 (1983); Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1984). Such an allegation is necessary, however, to sustain an action under the second half of section 1985(2), which prescribes conspiracies to deny or interfere with equal protection rights. See, e.g., Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir.1985); Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 125, 70 L.Ed.2d 106 (1981). Plaintiff makes no allegation of a classbased animus.

In order to state a cause of action under the first part of section 1985(2), a plaintiff must allege a nexus between an alleged conspiracy and a federal court proceeding. See Bradt, 634 F.2d at 801; Brawer, 535 F.2d at 840. The plaintiff in the instant case fails to satisfy this threshold requirement. Of the few cases arising under section 1985(2), most have involved claims based on interference with a federal juror, or intimidation of a party or witness for the purpose of deterring him from appearing or testifying in federal court. See, e.g., Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 518, 83 L.Ed.2d 407 (1984) (allegation that defendants conspired to commit perjury and conceal evidence did not state a claim under section 1985(2) because the alleged actions did not seek to influence a federal juror by force, intimidation, or threat); Chahal v. Paine Webber Inc., 725 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1984) (allegation that an expert witness had been threatened with loss of employment if he continued his participation in a federal securities case sufficient to state a claim under section 1985(2)); Brawer, 535 F.2d 830 (allegation that prosecutor and witness conspired to "influence" the jury by precluding them from considering complete and accurate evidence did not state a claim under section 1985(2) because the "influence" was too remote to fit within the scope of section 1985(2)). Almost no cases have involved the clause in the first part of section 1985(2) which creates a cause of action against individuals who conspire to injure a party or witness for having "attended or testified" in any court of the United States. This scarcity of authority is surprising in light of such a seemingly common claim as discharge in retaliation for having attended or testified in a federal action opposed by the employer.

Fortunately, one circuit has examined this clause at length and defined the term "attended" which...

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