Allen v. At Home Store, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 6:22-cv-03191-RK |
| Parties | JASMINE ALLEN, Leader of GIRL SCOUTS TROOP Individual Capacity; Plaintiff, v. AT HOME STORES, INC.; MARY JANE BROUSSARD, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, Individual and Corporate Capacity; and JUDD NYSTROM, Registered Agent D/B/A AT HOME STORE, LLC, Individual and Corporate Capacity; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court are (1) Defendants At Home Stores LLC and Mary Jane Broussard's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement (Doc. 17), and (2) Plaintiff Jasmine Allen's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 27). The Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint are fully briefed. (Docs. 18 24, 25, 26, 28, 37.) For the reasons below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is DENIED.
This lawsuit stems from an alleged agreement for a Girl Scout Troop to sell cookies on Defendant At Home Stores LLC's property. On February 17, 2019 at 11:30 am, Plaintiff Jasmine Allen and the Girl Scout Troop she leads arrived at Defendant At Home's Kickapoo Shopping Center location to sell Girl Scout cookies from 12:00 pm to 2:00 pm. (Doc. 3 at ¶ 1.) Defendant At Home's employees informed another leader of Plaintiff's Troop that, pursuant to a new policy, Girl Scout Troops were no longer permitted to sell cookies inside the store. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-29.) So Plaintiff and her Troop set up outside in subfreezing temperatures and high wind speed.
Plaintiff and her Troop left at 1:05 pm, 55 minutes earlier than planned, due to the weather. (Id. at ¶ 34.)
Plaintiff later returned to the store at 3:00 pm to “ensure the new regulation Agents were told about were being enforced for everyone.” (Id. at ¶ 58.) Plaintiff then witnessed a Caucasian Girl Scout Troop selling cookies inside. (Id. at ¶ 58.)
On February 25, 2019, At Home store manager “Blake” informed Plaintiff “he is calling now to Girl Scouts and putting an end to us ([Plaintiff's Troop]) selling Girl Scouts cookies there.” (Id. at ¶¶ 66-68.) Plaintiff “pointed out to At Home Store agent that” her Girl Scout Troop is a minority troop and the other Girl Scout Troop selling cookies inside the store was not. (Id. at ¶ 69.)
Plaintiff reported this incident to Defendant At Home's corporate office in April 2019. (Doc. 27-2 at ¶ 20.) Defendant At Home employee Traci Combs e-mailed Plaintiff, acknowledging the need for additional training of local employees. (Doc 27-2 at ¶¶ 15-18.)
In June 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”). (Id. at ¶ 21.) With assistance from MCHR personnel, Plaintiff completed and filed a charge of discrimination on August 3, 2020. (Doc. 27-2 at 72, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff communicated with MCHR Unit Supervisor Sandra Herring, Human Rights Officer Whitney Murphy, and Intake Officer Anna Siddiqui throughout the process. (Id. at 72-76, ¶¶ 24-51.) Ultimately, MCHR informed Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter was unavailable and provided a determination of no violation. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-48, 51.)
Plaintiff filed her “Petition Complaint” against Defendants Mary Jane Broussard (Chief Administrative Officer for At Home Store, Inc., corporate offices) and Judd Nystrom (officer, Garden Ridge Management, LLC, registered agent for At Home Store, LLC) in both their individual and corporate capacity on July 26, 2022. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on August 22, 2022, adding At Home Store, Inc. as a defendant. (Doc. 3.) The First Amended Complaint contains three counts: the first, “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, equal protection of law and civil rights to make and enforce public accommodation contracts and deprivation of . . . civil rights to sell girl scouts cookies[,]” (Doc. 3 at 13); the second, “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, equal protection of law and civil rights to make and enforce contract, as result defendants, employees and agents egregious retaliation for reporting race-based discrimination to At Home regional and corporate office[,]” (Id. at 20); and the third, “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, equal protection of law and civil rights to make and enforce public accommodation contracts and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Deprivation of civil rights [] to sell girl scouts cookies” and pursuant to the “US Constitution, below freezing temperature with wind gusting above normal, subjections to cruel and inhumane treatment[.]” (Id. at 31.) Defendants construe Plaintiff's first amended petition as bringing claims of (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (2) violation of the United States and Missouri Constitutions, and (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 18 at 6.)
On September 13, 2022, Defendants At Home Stores LLC and Mary Jane Broussard filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of standing, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. (Doc. 17.)
After the Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, requesting to join MCHR and/or MCHR employees and to add allegations that Defendants and MCHR acted in concert to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. (Doc. 27.) Defendants oppose the motion on grounds the amendment would be futile as the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege legally sufficient violations. (Doc. 28.)
Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss a party's claims for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plaintiff's obligation requires a pleading to contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. A complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, a district court should freely give leave to a party to amend its pleadings when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, the Court may properly deny a party's motion to amend its complaint for reasons “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
“Futility constitutes a valid reason for denial of a motion to amend.” Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 508 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “When evaluating futility, courts determine whether the proposed amended complaint is duplicative, frivolous, or could survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” United States ex rel. Dicken v. Nw. Eye Ctr., P.A., No. 13-CV-2691 (JNE/KMM), 2017 WL 2345579, at *1 (D. Minn. May 30, 2017) (citing Silva v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 711, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2014)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is barred from bringing suit on behalf of the individual Girl Scouts or the Girl Scout Troop pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(1). (Doc. 18 at 8; Doc. 28 at 3.) Rule 17(c)(1) permits only a general guardian, a committee, a conservator, or a like fiduciary to sue or defend on behalf of a minor or incompetent person. Defendants argue that although “the style of this case indicates [Plaintiff] brings this suit individually, the First Amended Complaint is littered with references to the troop as a whole, and references to damages suffered by the Troop's minor members as a result of the alleged discrimination.” (Doc. 18 at 8.) Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts establishing that she would be permitted to file suit on behalf of the individual minor Girl Scouts or the Troop under Rule 17(c)(1), Plaintiff's suit may only proceed if she has standing to bring the claim individually.
Standing is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In order for Plaintiff to have standing, three elements must be met: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and conduct complained of; and (3) “it must be ‘likely,' as opposed to merely ‘speculative,' that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.'” Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 462 U.S. 26, 38, 42-43 (1976)).
The Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied the Constitutional requirements to establish standing because Plaintiff does not allege an injury in fact.
An injury in fact under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires Plaintiff to “initially identify an impaired ‘contract' relationship, under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, ...
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