Allen v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 22 November 1892
• Citation: Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777 (Ala. 1892)
• Parties: ALLEN ET AL. v. BUCHANAN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

11 So. 777

97 Ala. 399

ALLEN ET AL. v. BUCHANAN.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 22, 1892

Appeal from city court of Birmingham; H. A. SHARPE, Judge.

Bill by W. R. Buchanan against Claude A. Allen and others. The demurrer to the bill was overruled, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Lane & White, for appellants.

Noble Smithson, for appellee.

MCCLELLAN J.

The bill in this case is filed by W. R. Buchanan, who is a resident citizen of Alabama, against Claude A. Allen, William Redd, and H. Lee Brown, who are also resident citizens of this state, doing business as partners under the firm name of Allen, Redd & Co., and against the Traders' Insurance Company of New Orleans, which is alleged to be a citizen of the state of Louisiana. Its purpose is to restrain the prosecution of a suit by said Allen, Redd & Co. in a civil court of the parish of Orleans, in the state of Louisiana against the complainant, the object of which is to collect from said insurance company certain $600 which said company owes complainant; the company being also before that court by process analogous to a summons in garnishment under our laws. The abstract equity of the present bill is rested on the fact that the fund thus sought to be subjected to the debt of Allen, Redd & Co. is exempted to the complainant under the laws of Alabama, where all the parties reside, and is so claimed in the bill; and it is, moreover, averred that, prior to the institution of the proceeding in Louisiana, Allen Redd & Co. sued said Buchanan on the same cause of action in this state, and summoned said insurance company to answer whether and in what sum it was indebted to the defendant in that action; that the garnishee appeared, and answered indebtedness in the sum of $600; that thereupon the defendant claimed the same as exempted to him; and that, plaintiffs having failed to contest said claim of exemption, the Birmingham city court, in which the case was pending, "adjudged that complainant was entitled to the amount so due as exempt, and discharged the same from said garnishment." This is the fund which is now involved in the proceeding in Louisiana.

It cannot be doubted that on the averments of the bill the complainant is legally and equitably entitled to the fund. Under the laws of Alabama, he has the same right to demand and receive the sum due him from the insurance company, as against Allen, Redd & Co., as if they had no claim whatever against him. Nor is it material what effect, or whether any effect, is accorded to the judgment of the city court of Birmingham, discharging the garnishee and holding this money to be exempted to Buchanan, the defendant in that suit and the complainant here. If there had been no previous suit involving the question of exemption, and no attempt to adjudicate that question, in the courts of Alabama, the complainant, on the facts he avers, would be and is still entitled, under our laws, to this fund, over any claim Allen, Redd & Co. can have to it, if the averments of the bill as to complainant's not having waived his exemptions against their debt be true. And the case may in this respect stand, on the averments of the bill, on the claim of exemption therein brought forward, wholly regardless of whether any previous claim had been advanced and adjudged in favor of complainant or not. Zelnicker v. Brigham, 74 Ala. 598. Complainant's right to this money exists; however, only by force of the local law of Alabama, which has no extraterritoral operation, and which will not be enforced in the courts of Louisiana. But the fact that this legal right of his cannot be asserted in the courts of that state, since one jurisdiction does not enforce the exemption statutes of another, so far from militating against the equity of this bill, is essentially the basis of its equity. It can make no difference, as respects the abstract rights of these parties in and under the law of Alabama, whether they are cognizable in foreign courts or not. Whether so or not, they are the same here, and the parties are the more entitled to have them declared and effectuated here, so far as our courts are capable of declaring and effectuating them, because they cannot be asserted in the foreign court which is undertaking to deal with the subject-matter through its judgments inter partes, regardless of the rights of the parties under our laws. In other words, the complainant has a right to this money, which, though it is a legal right, he cannot assert in the forum where the respondents are seeking to foreclose it, and where it will be foreclosed, unless he can invoke the powers of the chancery court to restrain their efforts to that end. This being his only remedy to effectuate his legal rights, the demurrers to the bill, which go upon the ground that complainant has an adequate remedy at law, were properly overruled.

The main question presented on this appeal, however, is as to the power of the court of chancery of one state, having jurisdiction of the parties, to grant relief inter partes in respect of a matter which is situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, in another state or country. The authorities overwhelmingly support such jurisdiction. Mr. Pomeroy, upon this subject, says "Where the subject-matter is situated within another state or country, but the parties are within the jurisdiction of the court, any suit may be maintained and remedy granted which directly affect and operate upon the person of the defendant, and not upon the subject-matter, although the subject-matter is referred to in the decree, and the defendant is ordered to do or to refrain from certain acts towards it, and it is thus ultimately, but indirectly, affected by the relief granted. As examples of this rule, suits for specific performance of contracts, for the enforcement of express or implied trusts, for relief on the ground of fraud, actual or constructive, for the final accounting and settlement of a partnership, and the like, may be brought in any state where jurisdiction of the defendant's person is obtained, although the land or other subject-matter is situated in another state, or even in a foreign country." 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1318. And Judge Story says: "In general, the fact that the property is not within the jurisdiction constitutes no bar to a proceeding in a court of equity, if the person is within the jurisdiction, for a court of equity acts upon the person; or to use the appropriate phrase, æquitas ægit in personam." Story, ...