Allen v. Christensen
| Decision Date | 11 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00015-DCN |
| Parties | ZACHARY ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. JAY CHRISTENSEN; JOSH TEWALT; EVAN PAGE; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; TIM McKAY; GABRIELLA PEREZ; KATE BELTRAN; DANEL HUDON; STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION; TAYLOR WILSON; CPL. SHAPPEL MORRISON; LT. ALOU; LT. HUST; CPL. DRIGGS; DEFENDANT FRAUS; JILLIAN SCHLESTE; SARA HART; and OFFICER MULENEX, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Plaintiff Zachary Allen is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. The Court previously reviewed Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. The Court determined that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because its allegations were overly vague and did not link any particular action to any particular Defendant. See Initial Review Order, Dkt. 8, at 3. The Complaint also contained claims that appeared to be barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971), or Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.
Plaintiff proceeded to file six amended complaints, the last of which the Court will now review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Having screened the Sixth Amended Complaint,1 the Court enters the following order allowing Plaintiff to proceed on some of his claims.
As the Court explained in its Initial Review Order, the Court must dismiss a prisoner or in forma pauperis complaint—or any portion thereof—that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(d)(2) & 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but a plaintiff must offer "more than ... unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability," thecomplaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff states that, in April 2020, he overheard Defendant Shappel Morrison speaking with non-defendants Sergeant Taylor and Lieutenant Greenland. Defendant Morrison allegedly stated, "Allen still refuses to drop the lawsuits as ordered and its [sic] costing us, he's getting way to [sic] comfortable in PC [protective custody] on his walk." Sixth Am. Compl., Dkt. 19, at 1. Sergeant Taylor responded, "I suggest we move him down to A-walk from where he's at, it'll create tension in the dorm as he is on a political walk." Id. Greenland then stated, "Well we've already had a few fights on this tier ..., if he gets beat down, it may persuade him to do as ordered." Id. Morrison then said, "I can't wait to see him get beat down, it'll be entertaining." Id.
Before Plaintiff was moved to the new housing unit, Plaintiff was hit in the mouth and shoved around by another inmate, who threatened Plaintiff and stated, "You leave this walk ... we'll get you and beat your ass, remember what happens to pussies Rat." Id. at 2. Plaintiff informed Greenland that Plaintiff would be in danger if he was moved to another housing unit. Greenland responded, "Get over it Mr. Allen and man up, theirs [sic] nothing we can do, go back to the dorm, Nigger." Id. Plaintiff also informed non-defendant Taylor, non-defendant Lieutenant Lau, and Defendant Morrison of his fear of being attacked if he had to move to another unit, but he "was continuously ignored." Id.
The next day, non-defendant Officer Dodge told Plaintiff that he had to move to A-walk or he would receive a Disciplinary Offense Report ("DOR"). Plaintiff pressed theemergency button and was taken to Morrison's office. Morrison stated that Plaintiff needed to "accept the consequences," and Defendant Corporal Driggs told Plaintiff, "By god Allen just drop the lawsuit or we can't help you." Id. at 3.
Plaintiff then "asked for SS Watch," which may be a form of suicide watch, because Plaintiff was "depressed from harassment." Id. Plaintiff spoke with Defendants Lieutenant Hust and Sergeant Taylor Wilson, who asked Plaintiff questions before taking him to SS Watch. Plaintiff later asked about his property, which is restricted on suicide watch. Non-defendant Taylor told Plaintiff, "You can't have your property until you learn how to live in that dorm." Id.
Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Clinician Sara Hart, apparently for mental health treatment. Plaintiff told Hart "what was going on." Hart allegedly told Plaintiff, "According to Warden Tim McKay until you drop the lawsuits there's nothing I can do for you accept [sic] bring you anxiety handouts." Id.
Plaintiff was "hit a few more times by an inmate." Id. Plaintiff informed Defendant Corporal Fraus about the attacks and that Plaintiff was afraid for his safety. Fraus responded, "Cut the bullshit Mr. Allen its [sic] P.C. this has never happened before in the 9 odd years I've been in this unit, go back to your damn dorm sue happy nigger, that's an order." Id. Plaintiff did not return to his dorm and, as a result, received a DOR. Plaintiff was taken back to A-Block "and thrown into [a] door" by non-defendant Gambell. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff had a hearing on his DOR and met with Defendants Alou, Hust, Wilson, and Perez, who "approved [Plaintiff] to go back" to general population. Id. However, at the time Plaintiff filed the Sixth Amended Complaint, he was still being housed insegregation.
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To be liable under § 1983, "the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). Negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because a negligent act by a public official is not an abuse of governmental power but merely a "failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from entertaining a suit brought by a citizen against a state or state entity absent a waiver of state sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Section 1983 does not constitute such a waiver. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1979). Nor has Idaho itself waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional claims. Esquibel v. Idaho, No. 1:11-cv-00606-BLW, 2012 WL 1410105, at *6 (D. Idaho Apr. 23, 2012) (unpublished). Finally, only a "person" may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a "person" under that statute. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Idaho Department of Correction and the State Board of Correction will bedismissed.
Within the prison context, most constitutional claims are subject to the deferential analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In that case, the Court examined a First Amendment issue in the context of prison officials prohibiting correspondence between inmates residing at different state institutions and held that, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 89.
The Turner Court identified four factors to consider when determining whether a prison regulation is valid: (1) whether there is a "rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; (2) whether "there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; (3) what "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and (4) whether "ready alternatives" at a "de minimis cost" exist, which "may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns." Id. at 89-93.
The Turner analysis appropriately allows prison officials substantial leeway in the management of their prisons. "Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. at 89. Federal courts must apply the Turner test so as to "accord greatdeference to prison officials' assessments of their interests." Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988).
The First Amendment includes the right to be free from retaliation for exercising constitutional rights. An inmate asserting a retaliation claim must show the following: "(1) ... that a state actor took some adverse action against the inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, ... that such action (4)...
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