Allen v. City of Yonkers

• Citation: 803 F. Supp. 679
• Decision Date: 15 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 84 Civ. 0639 (VLB).,84 Civ. 0639 (VLB).
• Parties: Wilbert ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. CITY of YONKERS; Yonkers Community Development Agency; Angelo R. Martinelli, Mayor; Dr. Sal Prezioso; Michael Edelman; Harold Peterson; Eleanor Kleine; All in their Individual Capacities and as Members of the Board of Directors of the Community Development Agency, Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York

803 F. Supp. 679

Wilbert ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. CITY of YONKERS; Yonkers Community Development Agency; Angelo R. Martinelli, Mayor; Dr. Sal Prezioso; Michael Edelman; Harold Peterson; Eleanor Kleine; All in their Individual Capacities and as Members of the Board of Directors of the Community Development Agency, Defendants.

No. 84 Civ. 0639 (VLB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 15, 1992.

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Michael H. Sussman, Goshen, N.Y., Sandra B. Durant, Durant & Isaacs, New York City, for plaintiff.

Christine Lomolino, Corp. Counsel, City of Yonkers, Yonkers, N.Y., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.

I.

This action arises from plaintiff Wilbert Allen's termination in October 1982 as director of the City of Yonkers Community Development Agency and as commissioner of the City of Yonkers Department of Community Development ("YCDA"). Plaintiff alleges that these terminations violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. and § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and also alleges breach of an employment contract entered into between him and the board of directors of the Yonkers Community Development Agency in November 1981.

Defendants are the City of Yonkers (the "City" or "Yonkers") and the YCDA (collectively sometimes the "institutional defendants"); and the following in their individual capacities and as members of the YCDA board in October 1982: Angelo Martinelli, Sal Prezioso, Michael Edelman, Harold Peterson and Eleanor Kleine (sometimes the "individual defendants").

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and those under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for a Title VII case by timely filing a charge with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which issued a right to sue letter on October 28, 1983. The plaintiff's state law claim is within the pendent jurisdiction of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The case was tried to the court without a jury and the following are my findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II.

I find that the institutional defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of race in contracting in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and in employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and in violation of plaintiff's civil rights under federal law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also breached plaintiff's contract, but find no liability on the part of the individual defendants.

There are various reasons for the differential treatment of the institutional and individual defendants.

As to the Title VII claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the institutional defendants are the employers under the statute and the individuals do not qualify as such in their individual capacities.

As to the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 claims, individuals may be held liable, and indeed culpability on the part of the ultimate policy makers is a prerequisite to municipal liability. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Respondeat superior does not apply to the liability of municipal entities under these provisions, in order to insure that only the actual policy of the entity and not violations of policy or independent actions at lower levels lead to recourse to the deep pockets of taxpayers of political subdivisions of the state.

Here, the ultimate policymaking authority rested, as to Yonkers, with the mayor, the city manager, and the city council, and as to the YCDA, with its board, as described in greater detail below, based on both written sources of legal authority under state law, and "`custom or usage' having the force of law," Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2723, quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924.

As also outlined in greater detail below, these ultimate policymakers or "decision-makers" acted intentionally in an unconstitutional and illegal discriminatory manner. However, pinpointing those with such authority is not the end of the road. As indicated in Praprotnik at 126, 108 S.Ct. at 925:

"We are also aware that there will be cases in which policymaking responsibility is shared among more than one official or body."

In the present case there was no video-tape of discussions between the mayor and city manager behind closed doors or between those officials and various council and board members; subsequent recollection and oral testimony about what was said in the course of numerous and at times acrimonious arguments is not particularly reliable at a sufficiently fine-tuned level of detail to permit a conclusion whether A and B agreed and conspired, A rather than B was the moving force acting deliberately while B acquiesced, or vice versa. This difficulty is increased because not merely the decisionmakers initiating an action but final policymakers embracing the council and board must be considered. Id. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. Those bodies as such acted deliberately and unconstitutionally, but it is as impossible to determine who had what share of the blame for this as it would have been had those bodies acted by secret ballot and no one remembered who said what during the debate.

In sum, from all the evidence it is clear that the authorized Yonkers city and Community Development Agency decisionmakers as a group acted deliberately and unconstitutionally and thus the institutional defendants are liable without resort to respondeat superior or cognate concepts, even though it is not possible by a preponderance of the evidence to subdivide the culpability of individuals within the group of decisionmakers or to say that all acted deliberately.

I find from all of the evidence including demeanor of the witnesses and absence of detail supporting the explanations given for plaintiff's treatment, that the discrimination was brought about because plaintiff's race, combined with his position in implementing city policy with regard to housing at the time involved in Yonkers history, made plaintiff a target for resentment against national policy in that field, which he would not have been but for his race.

Evaluating the asserted reasons for defendants' conduct and plaintiff's performance on the job necessitates a somewhat extended analysis of plaintiff's dealings with defendants.

III.

Before setting forth the particular facts surrounding plaintiff's termination, a brief explanation of the organization of the Yonkers city government, the Yonkers Department of Development ("DCD") and the YCDA is important.

The government of the city of Yonkers consists of a city council which is comprised of thirteen members. Twelve of these members are elected from the different city wards. The mayor of the city is the thirteenth member and is elected from the city at large. City council members are elected for a term of two years. A non-elected city manager is appointed by the city council and serves at the will of the city council. The city manager is the chief executive officer of the city.

The DCD is a city department, administered by a commissioner who is appointed by the city manager and serves at the manager's pleasure. The commissioner of DCD is responsible for coordinating community planning and development projects and for overseeing the functions of the Planning Bureau and the Bureau of Housing and Buildings.

The YCDA is an entity created under the laws of New York State by the Yonkers city council for the purpose of developing community projects. The YCDA has the power to plan, undertake, and effectuate urban renewal projects subject to the approval of the city council. The YCDA receives its funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") through the community development block grant ("CDBG") program.¹ It is run by a board which consists of seven members. The membership of the YCDA board is set by law; the city manager and mayor of Yonkers are the chairman and vice-chairman of the board. The other members of the board are the city planning director, the city corporation counsel, the city comptroller, and two citizens appointed by the mayor with the advice and consent of the city council.² The role of the YCDA director is to implement policy as set by the board. The director's duties primarily entail administering federal funds received through the CDBG and Urban Development Action Grant ("UDAG") Programs³ for housing and community projects, and administering the YCDA's leased housing programs.⁴ The director has no independent, ultimate or decisive powers and no policymaking authority or duties, but instead — as also confirmed by instances cited below — carries out the instructions of the manager, mayor and council, albeit at a high level of subordinate authority.

IV.

Plaintiff, who is black, had studied and worked in the fields of architecture and urban planning for over 20 years. Plaintiff holds a B.A. in architecture from Hampton Institute and a M.A. in urban and regional planning from the University of Illinois. Plaintiff also studied real estate development and architecture at Harvard University and New York University.

During the early 1970's, plaintiff worked as an urban planner for the city of Newark. In 1973 plaintiff was promoted to the position of special assistant to the executive director of the office of policy and development of the mayor of Newark. Some time later he became city planning director for the city of Newark, and in 1978 he was again promoted to the post of executive director of the office of policy and development of the mayor of Newark. In Newark, Allen secured ten...