Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: HIGGINSON
• Citation: Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2014)
• Decision Date: 13 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–20194.,12–20194.
• Parties: Donald ALLEN; Javier Bautista; Adam D. Crews, Sr.; Odell Godfrey; Jerome Johnson; et al, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. COIL TUBING SERVICES, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee. Joshua Babineaux; David Barras; Ross Wayne Boutte, William C. Broussard; William Daniel Brown, et. al., Plaintiffs–Appellants v. Coil Tubing Services, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee.

755 F.3d 279

Donald ALLEN; Javier Bautista; Adam D. Crews, Sr.; Odell Godfrey; Jerome Johnson; et al, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.COIL TUBING SERVICES, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee.

Joshua Babineaux; David Barras; Ross Wayne Boutte, William C. Broussard; William Daniel Brown, et. al., Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.Coil Tubing Services, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–20194.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 13, 2014.

Clyde J. Jackson, III, Esq., Randall O. Sorrels, Esq., Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto & Friend, Houston, TX, Clark Woodson, III, Esq., Law Offices of Clark Woodson, III, Angleton, TX, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Christopher Earl Moore, Esq., Jennifer Lynn Englander, Christine Marie White, Esq., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JONES, DENNIS and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs–Appellants alleged that they worked more than forty hours a week, and that their employer, Defendant–Appellee Coil Tubing Services, L.L.C. (“CTS”), wrongfully denied them overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The district court held, among other things, that the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) exempted certain CTS employees from the overtime-pay requirements of the FLSA based, in part, on the percentage of safety-affecting interstate activities these employees engaged in company-wide. Undertaking a limited interlocutory review, we AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

CTS services oil wells. From 2005 to 2008, the company divided itself into six geographic “districts.” The districts operated under a single U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”) number, and were not legal entities distinct from CTS. The districts sometimes borrowed personnel and equipment from each other. They also sometimes solicited and accepted projects outside their respective geographic boundaries.

Plaintiffs worked in four of the districts: Alice, Texas; Angleton, Texas; Bridgeport, Texas; and Broussard, Louisiana. Their positions included: Equipment Operator (“EO”), Service Technician I (“ST–I”), Service Technician II (“ST–II”), Service Supervisor Trainee (“SST”), Service Supervisor (“SS”), Service Coordinator (“SC”), and Field Engineer I (“FE–I”).

Plaintiffs' duties varied by position. SCs coordinated projects. FE–Is recorded the pressure of coil tubing units at well sites. EOs, ST–Is, ST–IIs, SSTs, and SSs helped transport materials to project sites.

Plaintiffs initiated this suit for overtime pay in November 2008. “To efficiently manage [the] case,” the district court ordered the parties to conduct discovery on a cross-section of fourteen Plaintiffs, known as the “Bellwether group.” On completion of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether exemptions to the FLSA, and, in particular, an MCA exemption allowing certain employers not to pay overtime to employees engaged in safety-affecting interstate activities, applied to Plaintiffs.

The district court initially denied, in part, summary judgment for CTS based, in part, on a district-by-district analysis of the employees' interstate activities. The district court explained: that EOs, ST–Is, ST–IIs, SSTs, and SSs, but not FE–Is and SCs,¹ had similar-enough job duties to be grouped together as “Field Service Employees,” or “FSEs”; that FSEs who worked on land-based, but not offshore, wells engaged in activities affecting motor vehicle safety; and that, measuring interstate activities by district, only land-based FSEs in certain districts had a reasonable expectation of engaging in sufficient interstate activities.

The parties filed motions for reconsideration. Observing that “[n]either party had argued for a district-by-district analysis,” the district court granted CTS' motion, and vacated its initial order.

The district court then granted, in part, summary judgment for CTS, using a company-wide analysis to find that the MCA exemption applied to many of the Plaintiffs. In a sixty-three page opinion issued January 11, 2012, the district court used the same individualized analysis to establish the class of FSEs, and to determine that only FSEs who worked on land-based wells engaged in activities affecting motor vehicle safety. The district court then reasoned that a company-wide analysis of these employees' interstate activities was appropriate because “[t]here is insufficient evidence or legal authority ... to treat the districts separately.” Measuring the interstate activities of land-based FSEs on a company-wide basis, the district court found: that 7 percent of projects required these employees to drive across state lines; that such trips were assigned indiscriminately; and that, therefore, land-based FSEs had a “reasonable expectation” that they “could be assigned to drive interstate.” The district court extended its rulings to all Plaintiffs, and not just those in the Bellwether group.

The district court granted Plaintiffs' request for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), explaining that its rulings, “particularly those involving application of the [MCA exemption], involve controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of option,” and that “an immediate appeal from those rulings is likely to materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.” This court then granted Appellants' motion for leave to appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Although we ordinarily review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo, our appellate jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(b) extends only to controlling questions of law, thus, we review only the issue of law certified for appeal.” Tanks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 417 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir.2005). The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the rulings in its January 11, 2012 order, “particularly those involving application of the [MCA exemption].” We therefore limit our review to these rulings, particularly whether the MCA exemption applies.

THE MCA EXEMPTION

Section 207 of the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to any employee working more than forty hours in a workweek. ²See29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 818 (5th Cir.2003). “Exemptions under the FLSA are construed narrowly against the employer, and the employer bears the burden to establish a claimed exemption.” Songer v. Dillon Res., Inc., 618 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.2010).

At issue on appeal is the MCA exemption, “which states that the FLSA's overtime requirement ‘shall not apply ... to ... any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49' of the MCA.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)). Section 31502, in turn, provides that the DOT “may prescribe requirements for ... qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of equipment of, a motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.” 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(2). The DOT may establish these requirements for employees who

(1) Are employed by carriers whose transportation of passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to his jurisdiction under section 204 of the [MCA] ... and (2) engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the [MCA].

29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a); see Songer, 618 F.3d at 472. “For the motor carrier exemption to apply ... [the employees] must meet both of these requirements.” Barefoot v. Mid–Am. Dairymen, Inc., No. 93–1684, 1994 WL 57686, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished).

To satisfy the first requirement—whether the employer is “subject to [the DOT's] jurisdiction,” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a)—an employer “must be engaged in interstate commerce.” Songer, 618 F.3d at 472. The MCA defines interstate commerce as commerce “between a place in ... a State and a place in another State.” 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A). However, this definition “has not been applied literally by the courts. In fact, we have defined it as the actual transport of goods across state lines or the intrastate transport of goods in the flow of interstate commerce.” Songer, 618 F.3d at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To satisfy the second requirement—whether the employees “engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles ... in interstate ... commerce,” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a)—“neither the name given to his position nor that given to the work that he does is controlling.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(2) (citing Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 707, 67 S.Ct. 954, 91 L.Ed. 1184 (1947)). Rather, “what is controlling is the character of the activities involved in the performance of [the employee's] job.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(2); see Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 674–75, 67 S.Ct. 931, 91 L.Ed. 1158 (1947) (observing that “[i]t is the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the employee'stime or of his activities” that controls). As a “general rule,”

if the bona fide duties of the job performed by the employee are in fact such that he is (or, in the case of a member of a group of drivers, driver's helpers, loaders, or mechanics employed by a common carrier and engaged in safety-affecting occupations, that he is likely to be) called upon in the ordinary course of his work to perform, either regularly or from time to time, safety-affecting activities ... he comes within the exemption in all workweeks when he is employed at such job.... Where this is the case, the rule applies regardless of the...