Allen v. Dackman

• Decision Date: 06 May 2010
• Citation: 413 Md. 132,991 A.2d 1216
• Parties: Monica ALLEN, Individually, etc., et al. v. Jay DACKMAN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

991 A.2d 1216

413 Md. 132

Monica ALLEN, Individually, etc., et al. v. Jay DACKMAN.

No. 46, September Term, 2009.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 22, 2010.

Reconsideration Denied May 6, 2010.

Brian S. Brown (Saul E. Kerpelman & Associates, P.A., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioners.

James R. Benjamin, Jr. (Hodes, Pessin & Katz, P.A., Towson, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Brief of Amici Curiae, Maryland Multi-Housing Ass'n, the Property Owners Ass'n of Greater Baltimore, Inc., the Property Owners Ass'n of Maryland, Inc., the Maryland Ass'n of Realtors, and the Apartment and Office Building Ass'n. Charles I. Joseph, Esquire Shaw & Morrow, P.A., Towson, MD

ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, BARBERA and ADKINS, JJ.

GREENE, Judge.

Petitioners, Monica Allen and Shantese Thomas, by their mother and next-friend, Monica D. Allen,¹ allege that they suffered injuries caused by lead paint while living at a property owned by Hard Assets, LLC ("Hard Assets"). We have been asked to determine whether Jay Dackman ("Respondent"), a member of Hard Assets when it owned the property,² may be held liable for these alleged injuries. Respondent's involvement with the property was limited, as he never visited the property and only dealt with the property through Hard Assets. In addition, Respondent and Hard Assets never intended to lease the property to anyone, were unaware that Petitioners were occupying the property until after Hard Assets acquired it, and successfully took legal action to remove Petitioners from the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that he could not be held liable as a matter of law, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that judgment.

Contrary to the position taken by the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals, we conclude that Respondent could be held liable on the basis of the facts alleged in this case. The Baltimore City Housing Code³ ("Housing Code") imposed liability on, among other entities, any individual who "owns, holds, or controls" the title to a dwelling. Under the facts of this case, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Respondent controlled the title to the property at issue. A reasonable trier of fact could also find that Respondent personally committed, inspired, or participated in the tort alleged in this case, which would make him personally liable for Petitioners' alleged injuries, even though he was acting as a member of a limited liability company ("LLC"). Finally, we hold that Respondent owed a duty to Petitioners under the Housing Code, even assuming that Petitioners had no legal right to possess the property and that neither Respondent nor Hard Assets intended to lease the property. We therefore conclude that the trial court should not have granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment.

I. Procedural History

This case originated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Monica D. Allen filed suit against Respondent, Hard Assets, and others⁴ on behalf of two minors, Monica Allen and Shantese Thomas ("Petitioners"). Petitioners alleged that they had been injured by lead-based paint while they lived at 3143 Elmora Avenue ("the property"). They further alleged that Respondent and Hard Assets, as owners of the property at some time when they lived there, had violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") and had negligently failed to maintain the property.⁵

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on June 20, 2005, arguing that he could not be held personally liable as a matter of law. The trial court granted Respondent's motion. Petitioners subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the grant of summary judgment as to Respondent. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Respondent could not be held liable for negligence, as a matter of law, because he was not an "owner" or "operator" of the property as defined by the Housing Code and because he could not be held liable for the negligence allegedly committed by Hard Assets, an LLC. The intermediate appellate court also concluded that Respondent could not be held liable under the CPA because neither he nor Hard Assets had entered into a lease with Petitioners or their family. In regard to the Housing Code issue, Petitioners subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. Allen v. Dackman, 408 Md. 487, 970 A.2d 892 (2009).

Facts

The events that led to this suit are not in dispute. We shall therefore adopt the statement of the facts set forth by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion below:

Monica Allen was born on September 8, 1996, and Shantese Thomas was born on January 23, 1998. Sometime in 1999, Petitioners moved into the property in question, where the children's grandmother, Tracy Allen ("Ms. Allen"), had been residing since the summer of 1998.

According to Ms. Allen, before she moved into the property, she entered into a lease with Mildred Thompkins, the owner of record at that time. Ms. Thompkins was still the owner of record when Petitioners moved into the property in 1999.

Ms. Thompkins later failed to pay taxes on the property and on March 16, 2000, Hard Assets acquired the property from Ms. Thompkins in lieu of the foreclosure. Respondent was one of two members of Hard Assets. Over the course of Respondent's 15 years in purchasing tax liens, it was his practice to sell the properties he acquired "as is," rather than keeping them as rental properties. Therefore, when Hard Assets obtained title, it did not intend to lease the property, nor were its members aware that Petitioners or Ms. Allen were living at the property.

Once Hard Assets became aware that Petitioners and Ms. Allen were residing at the property, Hard Assets advised them that they were not supposed to be there. Hard Assets informed Petitioners and Ms. Allen that they had 30 days to vacate the premises. After 30 days, Petitioners and Ms. Allen had not vacated the property. On June 27, 2000, Hard Assets filed a forcible entry and wrongful detainer complaint against Ms. Allen in the District Court for Baltimore City to have her and Petitioners removed from the property. Respondent signed the complaint on behalf of Hard Assets.

On August 18, 2000, judgment was entered in favor of Hard Assets when the district court found that Ms. Allen was wrongfully in possession of the property. Thereafter, Ms. Allen and Petitioners continued to stay in the property, and on September 28, 2000, a petition for warrant of restitution was filed. That petition was subsequently granted, and Ms. Allen and Petitioners were forcibly removed from the property on or about October 23, 2000.

Hard Assets sold the property on March 16, 2001. During the one-year period that it held title to the property, Hard Assets did not receive rent nor did it file collections for rent. Likewise, Ms. Allen did not pay rent to Hard Assets. Ms. Allen did not speak to Hard Assets or its representatives, and was not aware of who Hard Assets was. Similarly, Monica D. Allen did not know Hard Assets or Respondent.

From March 16, 2000 to March 16, 2001, Respondent was responsible for running the day-to-day business affairs of Hard Assets. The majority of the business involved the "as is" sale of properties that were purchased and acquired through tax liens. Respondent never set foot inside the property.

While residing at the property, each of the minor children suffered elevated blood-lead levels. Some of their elevated levels occurred before Hard Assets acquired the property, and some occurred after Hard Assets sold the property. Both minor children suffered from their highest blood-lead levels while Hard Assets held legal title to the property. As a result, Petitioners filed a complaint against Hard Assets and Respondent on June 11, 2002.

On June 20, 2005, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that he could not be held individually liable because: (1) he did not lease the property to Petitioners; (2) he was a member of Hard Assets, a limited liability company; (3) he had no knowledge of the alleged tort; and (4) he could not be held liable under the CPA.

Allen v. Dackman, 184 Md.App. 1, 2-6, 964 A.2d 210, 212-13 (2009) (footnote omitted).

The trial court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Respondent could not be held personally liable for any claims asserted by Petitioners and that there was no evidence showing that Respondent had a landlord-tenant relationship with Petitioners or their family. Petitioners noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Allen, 184 Md.App. at 10, 964 A.2d at 215. As to the request for certiorari filed in this Court, Petitioners present only one question, which we have reformulated:⁶

Was the lower court incorrect in affirming summary judgment in favor of Respondent because he did not own, hold, or control title to the property at issue in this case?

After receiving briefs and hearing arguments from both parties,⁷ we shall answer this question in the affirmative.⁸

II. Discussion

To decide this case, we must interpret the Housing Code and determine whether Respondent could be held individually liable for Petitioners' alleged injuries. The parties agree that Respondent was a member of, and managed the day-to-day affairs of, Hard Assets when it owned the property. The parties also agree that Hard Assets owned the property for some of the time when Petitioners lived there. Respondent argues, however, that he cannot be held liable for Petitioners' alleged injuries because he has no personal liability for those injuries and because he owed no duty to Petitioners. The trial court and the Court of Special Appeals both agreed with Respondent, holding that, as a matter of law, Respondent could not be held liable. We disagree. In...