Allen v. Dovell

• Decision Date: 09 June 1949
• Docket Number: 175.
• Parties: ALLEN v. DOVELL et ux.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

66 A.2d 795

193 Md. 359

ALLEN v. DOVELL et ux.

No. 175.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 9, 1949

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Prince George's County; John B Gray, Jr., Judge.

Suit in equity to annul tax deed by Clara Allen against Ernest P Dovell and Catherine V. Dovell, his wife. From the decree the complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Submitted on brief by W. Carroll Beatty, Hyattsville, for appellant.

Submitted on brief by Albert R. Hassall, Hyattsville, for appellees.

Submitted to MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON, and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

This suit in equity was brought by Clara Allen, a resident of the City of Washington, against Ernest P. Dovell and wife to annul a tax deed executed by the Treasurer of Prince George's County conveying to Dovell a parcel of land situated between Glen Arden and Ardmore.

Complainant alleged that she acquired title to the land in 1930, and that she paid the taxes levied upon it until 1933, when her husband died and she became ill and was confined in a hospital and was unable to pay her taxes, and thereupon Thomas N. Magruder, Treasurer of Prince George's County, advertised the property for sale for nonpayment of the 1933 tax. The advertisement of sale contained the following description: 'Allen, Clara--5.2 acres, Liber 354, Folio 195, taxes, interest, penalty and costs, $10.39.' The property was sold on March 5, 1934, to the County Commissioners of Prince George's County for $10.39. It was subsequently advertised for sale for the County Commissioners, and was sold on September 14, 1936, to Dovell for $40.93. The new County Treasurer, R. Ernest Smith, executed a deed for the property on June 7, 1937, and delivered it to the purchaser.

Complainant further alleged that the property was assessed at the time of sale for $525, and that its estimated market value was between $1,200 and $1,500; but, because of insufficient description of the property in the advertisement of sale, prospective purchasers were not interested and would not offer a fair price, and she was deprived of her property without just compensation. Dovell erected a dwelling upon the property, where he is now residing, but complainant says she is willing to make any adjustment necessary to reimburse him for the money he has invested in the property.

Complainant prayed (1) that the tax deed be declared null and void, (2) that a trustee be appointed to collect the rents from the property; (3) that complainant be permitted to reimburse the purchaser for the taxes, interest, penalties and costs accrued against the property, subject to an accounting of the investment in and income from the property; (4) that an accounting be made of the investment by the purchaser, and (5) that a trustee be appointed to convey to complainant any right, title or interest the purchaser and his wife may have acquired in the property.

Defendants filed a combined demurrer and answer to the bill of complaint. The chancellor, after testimony was taken, dismissed the bill, holding that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. From the decree dismissing the bill complainant brought this appeal.

It is undisputed that the property was first sold in 1934 to the County Commissioners, and then for them in 1936. The question before the Court is whether complainant's suit, which was not instituted until 1945, was barred by the Prince George's County statute of limitations. This Act, which took effect June 1, 1937, provides: 'All actions at any time hereafter to be brought for any lands heretofore sold for any taxes or special assessments, whether the same are levied by the County Commissioners of Prince George's County or by any other municipal or governmental agency having authority to levy taxes or assessments for any territory within the limits of Prince George's County wherein any person now has any title or cause to have or pursue such action, shall be taken within three (3) years after the passage of this Act, provided such right of action is not now, or will not then be barred by the now existing Statute of Limitations; and after three (3) years after the passage of this Act no person or any of his heirs, devisees or assignees shall have or maintain any action for any land so sold. All actions for any land hereafter so sold shall be taken within seven (7) years after the date of sale to the purchaser and at no time after seven (7) years * * *.' Laws of 1937, ch. 275, sec. 359A; Code P.L.L. of Prince George's County, 1943 Ed., sec. 459.

First. Complainant contends that the Act of 1937 violates the due process clause of the Fourtenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. We find no merit in this contention. The wisdom of statutes of limitations as statutes of repose is now fully appreciated in our jurisprudence. It is thoroughly understood that a statute of limitations, which does not destroy a substantial right, but simply affects remedy, does not destroy or impair vested rights. Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 144, 36 A.2d 544. It is true that the Legislature cannot cut off all remedy and deprive a party of his right of action by enacting a statute of limitations applicable to an existing cause of action in such a way as to preclude any opportunity to bring suit. However the Legislature has the...