Allen v. Eastman Kodak Co.

Decision Date03 February 1976
Citation4 O.O.3d 179,362 N.E.2d 665,50 Ohio App.2d 216
Parties, 4 O.O.3d 179 ALLEN et al., Appellants, v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY et al., Appellees. *
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

The workmen's compensation law of Ohio, as enacted in the state Constitution and statutes, does not violate individual protections afforded by the United States Constitution.

Bradley & Farris and Walter Kaufmann, Columbus, for appellants.

Lane, Alton & Horst, Columbus, for appellees Eastman Kodak Co. and Eastman Chemical Co.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert E. Leach and Edgar A. Strause, Columbus, for appellees Borden Inc., Edward L. Mahoney and Dewey Bennett.

Wright, Harlor, Morris & Arnold, Columbus, for appellee William T. Paul, M. D.

Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt and William T. McCracken, Columbus, for appellee Ashland Chemical Co.

Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt and Theodore D. Sawyer, Columbus, for appellee Arco Chemicals.

Young & Alexander and Thomas E. Jenks, Dayton, for appellee Celanese Chemical Co.

Alexander, Ebinger, Holschuh, Fisher & McAlister, Columbus, for appellee Exxon Chemical Co. Glander, Brant, Ledman & Newman, Columbus, for appellee Texaco, Inc.

Power, Jones & Schneider and S. Noel Melvin, Columbus, for appellee Union Carbide Co.

Wright, Harlor, Morris & Arnold and Charles C. Warner, Columbus, for appellees Shell Chemical Co. and Tag Chemical Co.

HOLMES, Judge.

This matter involves the appeal of a summary judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County as granted to certain of the defendants in an action brought by these plaintiff employees of the defendant Borden, and its Columbus Coated Fabrics Division, against such employer, as well as a member of manufacturers and distributors of certain chemicals used by the Columbus Coated Fabrics company in its manufacturing process, which chemicals were alleged to have occasioned serious and crippling injuries to the plaintiff employees.

The complaint also named as defendants Mr. Edward L. Mahoney, the president of Columbus Coated Fabrics, Mr. Dewey Bennett, the safety director of such company, and Dr. William T. Paul, the physician of Columbus Coated Fabrics.

The defendant employer, as well as Mr. Mahoney, Mr. Bennett, and Dr. Paul, filed motions for summary judgment. Such motions were based upon Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 4123.74, which provisions preclude an action for damages by an employee against his own employer, and upon R.C. 4123.741, which precludes an action for damages by 'any other employee' as against any 'employee of any employer.'

Upon granting summary judgment for these defendants herein named, the claims as against the manufacturers and distributors of the complained of chemicals were left pending for further proceedings.

The assignments of error of the plaintiffs, appellants herein, are as follows:

'1. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendants' Borden, Inc., Edward L. Mahoney, Dewey Bennett, and William T. Paul's Motion for a Summary Judgment on the basis of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation laws, Article II, Section 35, Ohio Constitution; and Sections 4123.74 and 4123.741, Revised Code, for these Sections unconstitutionally deprived the Plaintiffs of their 5th Amendment, U. S. Constitution, right to property without due process.

'2. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendants' Borden, Inc., Edward L. Mahoney, Dewey Bennett, and William T. Paul's Motion for a Summary Judgment on the basis of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation laws, Article II, Section 35, Ohio Constitution; and Sections 4123.74 and 4123.741, Revised Code, for these Sections unconstitutionally deprived the Plaintiffs of their 5th Amendment, U. S. Constitution, right to life and liberty without due process of law.

'3. The trial court erred in sustaining the Defendants' Borden, Inc., Edward L. Mahoney, Dewey Bennett, and William T. Paul's Motion for a Summary Judgment on the basis of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation laws, Article II, Section 35, Ohio Constitution; and Sections 4123.74 and 4123.741 Revised Code, for these Sections unconstitutionally deprived the Plaintiffs of their 14th Amendment, U. S. Constitution, right to equal protection of the laws.'

Basically, such assignments of error, and the rather voluminous brief filed by the plaintiffs in support thereof, argue that the workmen's compensation law of the state of Ohio, as provided for by the Ohio Constitution and statutory enactment, is contrary to the Constitution of the United States in that such law denies these and other Ohio employees the due process of law as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and denies such employees the 'equal protection' of the law as provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

We must reject all of the plaintiffs' assignments of error.

Much of the plaintiffs' argument in support of their claim of the unconstitutionality of the workmen's compensation law is based upon their premise that the courts must review the purposes and the legislative intent of such state laws in the light of the changing patterns of manufacturing processes, and the increased use of new, exotic, and potentially physically dangerous types of chemicals and synthetics.

The argument takes the form that such new and dangerous chemicals could not have been in the minds of the framers of the Constitution of Ohio and the minds of the legislature when the code sections were enacted, as such would relate to the right of action that employees should be ever granted where personal injuries have been received. Plaintiffs further emphasize that the continuing right to bring an action for injuries sustained in the course of one's employment should particularly not be denied where it is shown that the employer has not complied with certain safety standards for the protection of such employees.

A number of cases cited by the plaintiffs in support of the aforestated propositions were decided prior to the adoption of the fountainhead for the authority of the original workmen's compensation provision, Section 35, Article II, of the Ohio Constitution, as adopted in 1912.

This constitutional provision provided generally for the elimination of rights of action by employees against employers for injuries received by the employees. It initially provided that rights of action could still be maintained where 'lawful requirements' for the protection of lives, health and safety of employees had not been met.

However, effective January 1, 1924, this latter reference to rights of action where 'lawful requirements' had not been met was amended to specifically preclude a suit for damages by an employee against an employer covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, such amendment being in the following terms:

'* * * Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law, passed in accordance herewith, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease. * * *' This constitutional provision has been implemented by the Workmen's Compensation Act which prohibits negligence actions by employees against a covered employer for injuries received while in the course of their employment, but provides for compensation for injuries or death in conformity with the procedures, findings, and schedules of the Industrial Commission pursuant to the authorization of such chapter of law.

Also, if there be a violation of specific safety requirements as established by the commission, an additional recovery may be awarded pursuant to the following provisions of this constitutional section:

'Such board shall have full power and authority to hear and determine whether or not an injury, disease or death resulted because of the failure of the employer to comply with any specific requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety of employes, enacted by the General Assembly or in the form of an order adopted by such board, and its decision shall be final; and for the purpose of such investigations and inquiries it may appoint referees. When it is found, upon hearing, that an injury, disease, or death resulted because of such failure by the employer, such amount as shall be found to be just, not greater than fifty nor less than fifteen per centum of the maximum award established by law, shall be added by the board, to the amount of the compensation that may be awarded on account of such injury, disease, or death, and paid in like manner as other awards * * *.'

In conformity with such constitutional authority, the General Assembly created the Industrial Commission of Ohio and enacted volume 41 of the Ohio Laws, and sections of law providing for the general standards and duties of care owed by an Ohio employer to his employees, and to those known as 'frequenters,' who regularly come upon the premises of the employer.

The Supreme Court of Ohio, prior to the 1924 amendment of section 35, Article II, held that these workmen's compensation laws, 'embodying in general terms duties and obligations of care and caution,' were lawful requirements within the meaning of the Ohio Constitution, and thence held that an action could be brought by an employee as against an employer. Ohio Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Fender (1923), 108 Ohio St. 149, 141 N.E. 269. This interpretation of the workmen's compensation laws was again followed in the case of Winzeler v. Knox (1924), 109 Ohio St. 503, 143 N.E. 24.

However, as stated, the adoption of the amendment to Section 35, Article II, specifically precluded such a suit by an employee, and the language of the amendment stated in effect that the compensation received by an employee pursuant to laws provided for the compensation of employee injuries, ...

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