Allen v. Gerard

• Citation: 21 R.I. 467,44 A. 592
• Parties: ALLEN v. GERARD.
• Decision Date: 06 November 1899
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

44 A. 592

21 R.I. 467

ALLEN

v. GERARD.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 6, 1899.

Exceptions from district court, Providence county.

Action by Joseph E. Allen against Samuel J. Gerard. Frederick Rueckert was discharged as garnishee, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Wm. A. Morgan, for plaintiff.

Dexter B. Potter, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The only question raised by the exceptions in this case is whether the ruling of the district court of the Sixth judicial district in discharging Frederick Rueckert, who is the clerk of said court, as garnishee in the above-entitled action, was correct. The facts, in so far as they are necessary for the determination of the case, are these: An action was brought in said court whereby certain personal property was attached. This property, being perishable, was subsequently sold by order of the court, under the provisions of Gen. Laws R.I. c. 254, §§ 2, 3, and the net proceeds of the sale, amounting to $156.04, were paid into the registry of said court. Said section 3 reads as follows: "If, after reasonable notice, no person appear, or no sufficient cause to the contrary be shown, said justice may direct the officer to sell the same in such manner, on such notice, and at such time, as said justice may prescribe; and such officer shall immediately pay the proceeds of such sales, after deducting therefrom the necessary charges therefor, into the registry of such court, there to be held as security to satisfy such judgment or decree as the attaching creditor or complainant may recover." The plaintiffs in the action referred to recovered judgment, and obtained execution thereon, for the sum of $57.29, which sum was paid to them by said Rueckert, clerk, out of the fund in the registry of the court, leaving a balance therein of $98.75. Thereupon the plaintiff commenced the present action, and served his writ upon said Rueckert, for the purpose of attaching said balance in his hands.

The plaintiff's contention is that, the clerk of the court having paid and satisfied the execution in the original action, the defendant therein became entitled to have and receive from him the balance remaining in his hands, and hence that it was subject to the process of garnishment at the suit of the present plaintiff. While there is some conflict of authority upon the question of the liability of public officials to the process of garnishment (see 2 Wade, Attachm. § 347). we think the decided weight thereof, as well as the better reason, is against such liability, and that a public officer who has money in his hands to satisfy a claim or demand which one has upon him merely as a public officer cannot for this reason be adjudged a garnishee. The reason is obvious. Public officials are charged with certain well-defined duties, and the law prescribes the manner in which they shall be performed. If, while in the discharge of these duties, the officer is interfered with by some person who is a stranger to the proceedings, confusion and inconvenience will necessarily be the result, new complications will arise, and a multitude of suits be made possible where there should have been but one. And in order to avoid such inconvenience and confusion the principle has very generally been established that "no person leriving his authority from the law, and obliged to execute it according to the rules of law, can be holden by process of this kind." Brooks v. Cook, 8 Mass. 240; Thayer v. Tyler, 5 Allen, 94. See, also, cases collected in note to Curtis v. Ford (Tex. Sup.) 10 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 529 (s. c. 14 S. W. 614), and Tefft v. Sternberg (C. C.) 5 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 221 (s. c. 40 Fed. 2); Shewell v. Keen, 2 Whart. 332.

But plaintiff's counsel argues that although an officer of the court, having funds...