Allen v. Heys

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.
• Citation: Allen v. Heys, 204 Ga. 635, 51 S.E.2d. 417 (Ga. 1949)
• Decision Date: 10 January 1949
• Docket Number: 16431.
• Parties: ALLEN et al. v. HEYS.

51 S.E.2d 417

204 Ga. 635

ALLEN et al. v. HEYS.

No. 16431.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 10, 1949

Claude N. Morris, of Americus, for plaintiffs in error.

H B. Williams and Fort & Fort, all of Americus, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

DUCKWORTH Chief Justice.

1. The caveators having admitted a prima facie case as to the proper execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of the testator, assuming the burden of sustaining the grounds of their caveat--that a named legatee, executor under the will and a friend and business associate of the testator for more than forty years, conspired with two other beneficiaries under the will and the mother of one of them to substitute his will for that of the testator, that the said parties, to enforce their will, practiced upon the alleged fears of the testator that his habit of using certain drugs would be exposed, and fraudulently prevented a destruction and revocation of his will, refusing to submit it upon demand, and that at the time of executing the instrument the testator was, by reason of senile dementia, and the use of drugs, wholly incompetent to make a will and one was made for him by the aforesaid parties--and having failed to sustain the caveat by any evidence as to the truth of the allegations, the verdict in favor of the will was fully authorized.

2. 'Courts hold themselves bound to the observance of rules of extreme caution, when invoked to declare a transaction void, on grounds of public policy; and prejudice to the public interest must clearly appear before a court will be warranted in pronouncing the transaction void on this account. It is not to be lightly inferred from facts and circumstances of doubtful import and meaning, or which may admit of different construction, one consistent with and the other opposed to unquestioned policy.' Smith v DuBose, 78 Ga. 413(g), 3 S.E. 309, 6 Am.St.Rep. 260; Virginia Bridge & Iron Co. v. Crafts, 2 Ga.App. 126(4) 58 S.E. 322; Kiser Company v. Padrick, 30 Ga.App. 642(3), 118 S.E. 791. See also Bankers' Trust &c. Co. v. Farmers' &c. Bank, 163 Ga. 352, 354, 136 S.E. 143; Simmons v. Newton, 178 Ga. 806, 813, 174 S.E. 703.

3. Under the foregoing rule, the verdict in favor of the will here involved was not contrary to public policy because the evidence showed the following facts: Devises and bequests were made respectively to one who had served as deputy clerk or otherwise in the office of the testator, to a half first cousin, who was his nurse and housekeeper, and to a niece, the daughter of one who was a sister-in-law of the testator's wife. The mother of the last-named devisee, upon the statement to her by the testator that he wanted to make a will and naming his lawyer, summoned such person to the testator's home. From notes taken down in consultation with the testator, he prepared the testator's will and became one of the witnesses thereto. The first-mentioned devisee occupied towards the testator, as his deputy clerk in the clerk's office of Sumter Superior Court, a fiduciary relationship. As executor under the will he was represented by the lawyer who prepared the will, as aforesaid, and the two had in succession prior to the testator's death held a power of attorney from him for the management of his personal affairs. They paid to a doctor who witnessed the will a certain sum for professional services rendered the testator before and after the execution of the will and also paid salaries of nurses who attended the testator in his last illness. The layer and witness to the will procured, at the request of the testator, the said doctor as a witness thereto. The third witness was summoned by the mother of a beneficiary under the will. After the execution of the will, it was first delivered to the testator and then by him directed to be placed in a small tin box by his half first cousin, his nurse and housekeeper, and later, upon the testator's removal to a hospital, was placed in a bank in a safety deposit box owned by the mother of one of the beneficiaries under the will. There was testimony that the testator had stated to one or two persons that he was dissatisfied with the will and wished to change or destroy it, that it was made while under the influence of dope, and he wanted to talk to his lawyer about it, but it was not shown that he sought to repossess it from its custodian or asked his lawyer to assist him in making another. It was admitted by the caveators that they evidence was not conclusive that a fraud had been perpetrated upon the testator, but urged that the facts and circumstances above mentioned strongly suggested fraud, and that the verdict in favor of the will should be held as being against public policy.

3. Testimony of the executor that the testator told him, on the day following the execution of the will, that he had made his...