Allen v. Hunter, 936.
| Decision Date | 05 April 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 936.,936. |
| Citation | 65 F. Supp. 365 |
| Parties | ALLEN v. HUNTER. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Malcolm McNaughton, of Leavenworth, Kan., for petitioner.
Eugene W. Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan., for respondent.
Petitioner, an inmate of the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, was brought before the court, at Leavenworth, Kansas, on March 4, 1946 under a writ of habeas corpus theretofore issued upon his verified petition. The respondent filed a return, admitting petitioner's custody but denying that it is in any manner unlawful or illegal.
The basic facts, shown in part by the testimony of petitioner, in part by admissions in the pleading and in part by exhibits received in evidence, are as follows: Petitioner was indicted by a Grand Jury of the United States, duly impaneled in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Illinois at the September, 1937 term of said court, for a violation of Section 552, U.S.C.A. Title 38. The indictment contained four counts. The date of petitioner's arrest under the indictment has not been shown; but it appears inferentially that at the time the indictment was returned petitioner was then incarcerated in the Indiana State Prison. In any event he was so incarcerated for a period of time antecedent to January 24, 1944.1 On the date last-mentioned he, at his request, was taken before Judge Walter C. Lindley, at Danville, Illinois, where he entered a plea of guilty on each of the four counts of the indictment. Thereupon it was ordered and adjudged that the defendant in that action, petitioner here, be committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for the period of two years, said sentence to begin upon his discharge from incarceration from the Indiana State Prison at Michigan City, Indiana, or from such other training school, reformatory or penitentiary to which he may be transferred; said defendant to begin the service of sentence imposed herein upon his discharge from incarceration, regardless of whether he be released on parole and that said defendant stand committed to said institution until said defendant is otherwise discharged as provided by law.
On the same date that the proceedings shown above took place or immediately thereafter petitioner was returned to the Indiana State Prison. He remained there until sometime in January 1945. It appears2 that on or about December 12, 1944 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus assailing the legality of his confinement in the Indiana State Prison was filed but not acted upon. However that may be he was turned over to the United States Marshal for the District of Illinois on January 29, 1945, who delivered him to the Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, on February 12, 1945 where he is now confined.
The contentions made by the petitioner in his petition and at the hearing may be summarized as follows:
1. That he was misled by the United States Attorney into entering "an unwilling plea of guilty to the charges upon which he was indicted";
2. That he was not provided by the court with the services of a competent attorney;
3. That his plea of guilty "was obtained by deliberate fraud on the part of the United States Attorney, by coercion and by malpractice";
4. That inasmuch as he was never discharged from his sentence in the Indiana State Prison he still "is, in fact, * * * a prisoner of the State of Indiana and * * * as such * * * cannot legally nor lawfully be a prisoner of the United States Penitentiary";
5. That the Federal Government lost all jurisdiction over him when, after claiming jurisdiction of his body and person and transporting him into Illinois, it permitted him to be returned to Indiana;
6. That the sentence imposed upon him by Judge Lindley is void because "made to commence at the expiration of a separate term of imprisonment or at some future date"; and
7. That if the sentence was not void then it "commence (d) to operate and function on the 24th day of January, 1944, the day it was imposed" and petitioner was entitled to a conditional release on August 23, 1945 and to his unconditional release on January 24, 1946.
The first and third contentions may be considered together. The sole evidence adduced in support thereof consisted of the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner. He produced a letter from the then District Attorney for the Eastern District of Illinois, obviously written in response to a letter written by him, in which it was stated that the District Attorney was "not familiar with the rules and regulations of the Board of Pardons of Indiana" but was of the opinion that when petitioner had served his time there and had been brought into the District of Illinois and sentenced he would "not have to go back to that institution to serve any more time." In the document attached to his petition and labeled as "Exhibit A" — an unverified statement of petitioner himself — it is stated that other letters had been received by him from the District Attorney and that before he was taken into court for the purpose of entering his plea he had been taken to the office of the District Attorney where threats were made and coercion was exercised in an effort to have him enter a plea. There is no evidence to support these charges and the court specifically finds that they are groundless and without any foundation.
The second charge is likewise wholly unproved. The court records show that the defendant in the action in the District Court at Danville, Illinois, — petitioner herein — "having been advised of his constitutional right to counsel and having been asked whether he desired counsel assigned by the court, replied that he did not." The only other evidence on this phase of the controversy is petitioner's statement that he "entered a plea of guilty without any mention of representation by counsel being made." Cf. Beckett v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 1942, 131 F.2d 195.
The fourth charge is belied by petitioner's own Exhibit 2, introduced in evidence at the hearing, although it is but fair to state it had been received by him subsequent to the filing of the petition. It is a letter from the Supervisor of...
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Transportation of Federal Prisoners to State Courts Pursuant to Writs of Habeas Corpus
...transfers of physical custody also are matters of comity to be worked out between federal and state authorities. In Allen v. Hunter, 65 F.Supp. 365 (D. Kan. 1946), example, the court rejected the petitioner's claim that the federal government lost all jurisdiction over him when, after convi......