Allen v. Illinois

• Decision Date: 01 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-5404,85-5404
• Citation: 92 L.Ed.2d 296,106 S.Ct. 2988,478 U.S. 364
• Parties: Terry B. ALLEN, Petitioner v. ILLINOIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

478 U.S. 364

106 S.Ct. 2988

92 L.Ed.2d 296

Terry B. ALLEN, Petitioner

v ILLINOIS.

No. 85-5404.

Argued April 30, 1986.

Decided July 1, 1986.

Syllabus

Petitioner was charged in an Illinois Circuit Court with committing the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault, and the State filed a petition to have him declared a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act). Pursuant to the Act, the court ordered petitioner to submit to two psychiatric examinations. At the bench trial on the petition, the State presented the examining psychiatrists' testimony, over petitioner's objection that they had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. Based on that testimony, as well as that of the victim of the sexual assault, the court found petitioner to be a sexually dangerous person under the Act. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the trial court had improperly relied on testimony in violation of petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that that privilege was not available in sexually-dangerous-person proceedings because they are "essentially civil in nature."

Held:

1. Proceedings under the Act are not "criminal" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. The Act's aim is to provide treatment, not punishment, for persons adjudged sexually dangerous. That the State cannot file a sexually-dangerous-person petition under the Act unless it has already filed criminal charges against the person in question, and thus has chosen not to apply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill persons who might be found sexually dangerous, does not transform a civil proceeding into a criminal one. The State must prove more than just the commission of a sexual assault. It must prove the existence of a mental disorder for more than one year and a propensity to commit sexual assaults, in addition to showing that propensity through sexual assault. The fact that the Act provides some of the safeguards applicable in criminal proceedings—rights to counsel, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the requirement that sexual dangerousness be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—cannot itself turn the proceedings under the Act into criminal proceedings requiring the full panoply of rights applicable there. And the fact that a person adjudged sexually dangerous under the Act is committed to a maximum-security institution that also houses convicts needing psychiatric care does not make the conditions of that person's confinement amount to "punishment" and thus render "criminal" the proceedings that led to confinement. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, distinguished. Pp. 368-374.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process does not require application of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to proceedings under the Act. That privilege is not designed to enhance the reliability of a factfinding determination but stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons. Pp. 374-375.

107 Ill.2d 91, 89 Ill.Dec. 847, 481 N.E.2d 690, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 375.

Verlin R. Meinz, Ottawa, Ill., for petitioner.

Mark L. Rotert, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this case is whether the proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act), Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 105-1.01 et seq. (1985), are "criminal" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination.

Petitioner Terry B. Allen was charged by information in the Circuit Court of Peoria County with committing the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. Shortly thereafter the State filed a petition to have petitioner declared a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the Act.¹ After a preliminary hearing on the information, the criminal charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause, and the petition was apparently dismissed as well. Petitioner was then recharged by indictment, and the petition to declare him sexually dangerous was reinstated.

Pursuant to the Act, with petitioner and counsel present, the trial court ordered petitioner to submit to two psychiatric examinations; the court explained the procedure as well as petitioner's rights under the Act, and petitioner indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings. At the bench trial on the petition, the State presented the testimony of the two examining psychiatrists, over petitioner's objection that they had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled that petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists were not themselves admissible, but allowed each psychiatrist to give his opinion based upon his interview with petitioner. Both psychiatrists expressed the view that petitioner was mentally ill and had criminal propensities to commit sexual assaults. Petitioner did not testify or offer other evidence at the trial. Based upon the testimony of the psychiatrists, as well as that of the victim of the sexual assault for which petitioner had been indicted, the trial court found petitioner to be a sexually dangerous person under the Act. Consistent with the requirements of Illinois case law, see People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 321-322, 342 N.E.2d 28, 29-30 (1976), the court made three specific findings: that at the time of trial petitioner had been suffering from a mental disorder for not less than one year; that he had propensities to commit sex offenses; and that by his actions he had demonstrated such propensities.

The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District reversed, over one dissent. Relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the court held that the trial court had improperly relied upon testimony obtained in violation of petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination. 123 Ill.App.3d 669, 78 Ill.Dec. 957, 463 N.E.2d 135 (1984).²

The Supreme Court of Illinois unanimously reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court's finding that petitioner was a sexually dangerous person. 107 Ill.2d 91, 89 Ill.Dec. 847, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985). It held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available in sexually-dangerous-person proceedings because they are "essentially civil in nature," the aim of the statute being to provide "treatment, not punishment." Id., at 99-101, 89 Ill.Dec., at 851, 852, 481 N.E.2d, at 694-695. The court also found support for its ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Observing that the State's interest in treating, and protecting the public from, sexually dangerous persons would be "almost totally thwarted" by allowing those persons to refuse to answer questions posed in psychiatric interviews, and that the privilege would be "of minimal value in assuring reliability," the court concluded that "due process does not require the application of the privilege." 107 Ill.2d, at 102-103, 89 Ill.Dec., at 853, 481 N.E.2d, at 696. Finally, the court held that "a defendant's statements to a psychiatrist in a compulsory examination under the provisions here involved may not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceedings." Id., at 104, 89 Ill.Dec., at 853, 481 N.E.2d, at 696. We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 979, 106 S.Ct. 380, 88 L.Ed.2d 333 (1985), and now affirm.

The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This Court has long held that the privilege against self-incrimination "not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also 'privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.' " Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924). In this case the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a person whom the State attempts to commit under the Act is protected from use of his compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in which he is the defendant. What we have here, then, is not a claim that petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists might be used to incriminate him in some future criminal proceeding, but instead his claim that because the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is itself "criminal," he was entitled to refuse to answer any questions at all.

The question whether a particular proceeding is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first of all a question of statutory construction. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-237, 93 S.Ct. 489, 492-493, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972). Here, Illinois has expressly provided that proceedings under the Act "shall be civil in nature," ¶ 105-3.01, indicating that when it files a petition against a person under the Act it intends to proceed in a nonpunitive, noncriminal manner, "without regard to the procedural protections and...