Allen v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1:02-cv-902-RLY-TAB |
| Parties | GREG ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION, n/k/a/ NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff, Matthew Whitfield, was a former Named Plaintiff in a class action Complaint filed on October 16, 2001. The twenty-six Named Plaintiffs were current or former employees of defendant, International Truck and Engine Corporation, n/k/a Navistar International Corporation's Indianapolis, Indiana, facility, who alleged that Navistar discriminated against them by subjecting them to racial harassment, improper testing, denial of on-the-job training, and denial of overtime and seniority.1 Whitfield, the twenty-seventh Named Plaintiff, was an unsuccessful job applicant, who alleges Navistarsubjected him to "continual racial discrimination with respect to hiring" from 1996 to 1999, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). Because Whitfield was the sole plaintiff asserting failure-to-hire claims, and his claims were not certified as part of the class action, the court ordered his claims tried separately. See Order denying Defendant's Motion for Severance and granting Defendant's Motion for Separate Trial, JAMS Docket # 251. The parties tried this case before the court on June 20, June 21, and September 13, 2012. Being duly advised, the court finds that Whitfield failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Navistar discriminated against him by failing to hire him for open positions in its Indianapolis facility.
Before addressing the court's findings of fact, the court must address two preliminary issues: (1) the timeliness of Whitfield's claims; and (2) evidentiary issues and objections the court took under advisement at trial.
While the same substantive standard for liability applies to claims under Title VII and Section 1981, Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 940 (7th Cir. 1996), there are different limitations and restraints on bringing the claims. Before bringing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), or comparable cooperating state agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatoryconduct. Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2007). Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC leaves a plaintiff without recourse in the courts for a Title VII claim. Beamon v. Marshall & Isley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff is under no such exhaustion requirement when bringing a cause of action under Section 1981, but he must bring the claim within two years of the alleged discriminatory conduct if it arises out of the pursuit of employment or within four years if the claim is based on post-hire conduct. Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2007); Dandy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 269 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004).
In the present case, Whitfield filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC on May 16, 2000. For purposes of his Title VII claim, no discriminatory conduct prior to July 21, 1999, would be actionable, and for purposes of his failure to hire claim under Section 1981, the statute of limitations would bar any action based upon Navistar's failure to hire him prior to May 16, 1998. Because the substantive liability standards are the same, proof of discriminatory conduct by Navistar from May 16, 1998, forward would sustain a claim for damages.
Whitfield's Exhibit 1032 was offered into evidence during the direct examination of Whitfield, and Navistar objected to its admission on the basis of lack of authentication. Exhibit 1032 is a one page undated exhibit of handwritten notes made bysomeone who was apparently attempting to verify and calculate the past work experience of Whitfield. It was listed on Whitfield's Exhibit List (Docket # 420) as "Union Notes regarding Whitfield's Experience." The term "Union" in that exhibit refers to the United Auto Workers ("UAW" or "Union"), the local bargaining unit for Navistar's hourly employees. Counsel for Whitfield represented that it was a document provided to the EEOC by Navistar, and was obtained by Whitfield when he pursued the EEOC investigative file during discovery in this matter. Counsel for Navistar did not deny that the document came from the EEOC's files, but stated for the record that there is confusion as to whether the document was provided to the EEOC by the company or by the Union.
The same document is listed as an exhibit on "Defendant's Final Exhibit List" (Docket # 379), filed on September 30, 2011, and is described by Navistar as "Handwritten computation of Journeyman years/months." On June 13, 2012, Navistar filed its objections to Plaintiff's listed exhibits (Docket # 433), and no objection was made to Whitfield's "Union Notes" exhibit. However, on June 18, 2012, Whitfield filed his Supplemental Objections to Defendant's Final Exhibit List (Docket # 435), objecting to Navistar offering this same exhibit, claiming the contents are hearsay statements without probative value and no identifiable author. To sum up this peculiar situation, Whitfield offered into evidence an exhibit that both he and Navistar listed on their exhibit lists, but to which he posed a written objection prior to trial. Navistar has objected to the admissibility of this same exhibit under circumstances similar to Whitfield's.
Because, as will be discussed in more detail later, the Union was acting as an agent of Navistar when it took steps to verify the past experience of Whitfield, the court will admit Exhibit 1032 as relevant evidence that either someone from the Union or Navistar made notes of their attempt to calculate Whitfield's verifiable work experience as an electrician. Navistar's objection is overruled.
At trial, the court took under advisement Navistar's hearsay objection to the testimony of Willie Jones, a Navistar electrician foreman, regarding a discussion he had with the Union's Skilled Trades Committeeman, George Bunton, over the Union's verification of Whitfield's past work experience. Whitfield argued that the testimony should be allowed because it is an admission of a party or its agent under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Navistar contends that the Union is a separate entity that has not been named as a party. It further contends that its agreement with the UAW required it to allow the Union Committeeman to verify the experience level of any new skilled trades hire. Whitfield argues that the labor agreement does not require the Company to defer to the Union with respect to verifying the work experience of a skilled trades candidate.
The court does not read the labor agreement to require that the Company defer to the Union's determination of a candidate's past work experience. In relevant part it states:
An employee must provide proof to the satisfaction of the Company of his journeyman status prior to his date of entry into the skilled trades classification. This proof shall be reviewed with the Skilled TradesCommitteeman prior to the employee's entry into the skilled trades classification.
According to the plain language of the labor agreement, it is the Company which must be satisfied with regard to an employee's journeyman status. Moreover, the problem with Navistar's argument is that, regardless of why it allowed the Union to be ultimately responsible for verifying a candidate's experience, Navistar, as the employer, has voluntarily given or negotiated away this part of the hiring process to the Union. Consequently, the Union is Navistar's agent for purposes of determining a skilled trades candidate's level of experience for hiring purposes.
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement made by a party's agent concerning a matter within the scope of that agency, is not hearsay. Accordingly, Navistar's hearsay objection to Jones's testimony with regard to what Bunton told him about Whitfield's work experience is overruled.
Following the first day of the bench trial, Whitfield filed what he titled "Plaintiff's Trial Submission Regarding Evidence from the Allen, et al. vs. International Trucking Trial September 19-22, 2006." The submission asks the court to allow the admission into evidence of fifty-nine exhibits from the class action trial as well as the testimony of nineteen witnesses. Navistar objects for numerous reasons, but most particularly on grounds that the class action was a separate trial. Whitfield argues that while he is not a member of the class that was certified under this cause number, his claim is still part ofthe same "case," and he is offering the evidence to establish the existence of a hostile racial environment within the Navistar engine plant during the time period he was seeking employment.
Whitfield has provided the court with no authority which would support his request for the admission of exhibits from a previous trial, which, in fact, was settled prior to completion. The court's order of July 20, 2005, explicitly provides that the continued inclusion of Whitfield's claim under the same cause number was for the purpose of allowing discovery to continue efficiently with respect to all claims. (See Docket # 251). In that Order, the court also specifically stated that Whitfield's claim would be tried separately and that "[i]t...
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