Allen v. Nicholson

• Decision Date: 27 August 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-0741 (RCL).
• Citation: 573 F.Supp.2d 35
• Parties: Caulton D. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. James R. NICHOLSON, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

573 F.Supp.2d 35

Caulton D. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v.James R. NICHOLSON, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07-0741 (RCL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 27, 2008.

Caulton D. Allen, Fort Washington, MD, pro se.

Michelle Nicole Johnson, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

Now before the Court comes defendant, James R. Nicholson's motion [8] to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint [1] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).Upon consideration of the motion, plaintiff's opposition [11], the reply [13], the entire record herein, and applicable law, the Court finds that defendant's motion [8] to dismiss will be GRANTED.

I.BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2003, plaintiff submitted a request for a leave of absence from March 21, 2003 to April 21, 2003, at the end of which he indicated he would resign from his position as an EEO investigator.(Compl.[1]¶ 8;Pl.'s Ex. 3[11]at 11.)Plaintiff proceeded to contact his supervisor on April 21, 2003, to request a thirty-day extension of his leave of absence, intending to delay the effective date of his resignation.(Compl. ¶ 9.)Plaintiff's supervisor denied this request.(Id.¶ 11.)Plaintiff further alleges that his supervisor, after denying his request, indicated that she had already processed plaintiff's resignation by issuance of a SF-52 on April 20, 2003.(Compl.¶ 11.)The plaintiff appealed the agency's decision to terminate his employment by filing an informal EEO complaint.(Def.'s Ex. 4 [13-5]at 2.)

The parties entered into a settlement agreement February 5th, 2004 resolving the informal EEO complaint.(Seeid. at 4.)As a result of mediation concerning these claims, plaintiff was reinstated to his former position.(Seeid. at 1.)("[Plaintiff] accepts the ORM position of EEO Specialist . . . offered in the discussion and actions taken as a result of this mediation session.He will be reinstated to this position effective February 8, 2004.")Moreover, this agreement resolved all issues involving the plaintiff's 2003 termination and bars civil lawsuits drawing on these issues.(Seeid.)("Upon execution of this settlement agreement, the parties agree that the issues raised in this informed complaint (EEO complaint number 200N-2004-2003103167) will not be used to initiate an EEO complaint, grievance and/or civil lawsuit.")

The 2007 settlement agreement that is the subject of defendant's motion was entered into to resolve subsequent claims that arose well after the first settlement was reached.(See Def.'s Ex. A. [8-2].)Plaintiff was again terminated from the Department of Veterans Affairs in 2007, three years after entering the 2004 settlement agreement.(Def.'s Reply [13]at 4 n. 5.)Plaintiff again contested the Agency's decision.

The 2007 settlement agreement was entered into to resolve plaintiff's claims relating to his subsequent termination effective May 27, 2007.(Def.'s Ex. A. [8-2]¶ 9.)Further, to resolve several administrative complaints and this current district court action, plaintiff accepted a settlement package in which he received, inter alia, payment of his attorney fees, cancellation of his removal from employment and reinstatement to permit plaintiff to resign, and removal of any information pertaining to the removal action from plaintiff's Official Personnel File.(See Def.'s Ex. A. [8-2].)In lieu of termination, plaintiff agreed to voluntarily resign from his position.(Id.¶¶ 2, 4.)

On April 19, 2007, plaintiff filed in this Court his complaint alleging that he has suffered discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.(Compl. ¶ 1.)Specifically, plaintiff, an EEO investigator with the Department of Veteran Affairs, contends that he was wrongfully terminated after he had submitted an email indicating that he was agreeing to resign from his employment effective April 22, 2003.(Compl. ¶ 8.)Plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully terminated and seeks retroactive back-pay with interest, as well as compensatory and "consequential" damages.(Id. at 2-3.)

Defendant, James R. Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs, filed a motion [8] to dismiss the complaint on October 12, 2007.Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Plaintiff, Caulton D. Allen, opposes this motion.

II.ANALYSIS

A.Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.Article III confines a court's power to "resolving real and substantive controversies admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character . . . ."Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.,494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400(1990)(internal citation omitted).Federal courts may decide only "actual, ongoing controversies."Clarke v. United States,915 F.2d 699, 700-01(D.C.Cir.1990)(en banc)(quotingHonig v. Doe,484 U.S. 305, 317, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686(1988))."Even where litigation poses a live controversy when filed, the doctrine [of mootness] requires a federal court to refrain from deciding it if `events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.'"Clarke,915 F.2d at 701(quotingTranswestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC,897 F.2d 570, 575(D.C.Cir.1990)).

When a party files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), "the plaintiff[] bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction."Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth.,310 F.Supp.2d 172, 176(D.D.C.2004);see alsoMcNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind.,298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135(1936)(indicating that plaintiffs have the burden of establishing jurisdiction).

A court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must construe plaintiff's complaint in plaintiff's favor, accepting all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,402 F.3d 1249, 1253(D.C.Cir.2005).Additionally, when assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may also consider any undisputed facts in the record.Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences,974 F.2d 192, 197(D.C.Cir.1992)(internal citations omitted).

But, "[i]f events outrun the controversy such that the court can grant no meaningful relief, the case should be dismissed as moot."McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States,264 F.3d 52, 55(D.C.Cir.2001)(internal citations omitted);see alsoFraternal Order of Police v. Rubin,134 F.Supp.2d 39, 41(D.D.C.2001).Further, Article III limits the federal courts to deciding "questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process."Flast v. Cohen,392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947(1968).Therefore, a case becomes moot when "the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."Albritton v. Kantor,944 F.Supp. 966, 974(D.D.C.1996)quotingCounty of Los Angeles v. Davis,440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642(1979).

"In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the [Court] must accept the complaint's well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor."Thompson v. Capitol Police Board,120 F.Supp.2d 78, 81(D.D.C.2000)(internal citations omitted)."The [Court] is not required, however, to accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations."Rann v. Chao,154 F.Supp.2d 61, 64(D.D.C.2001)(citingLawrence v. Dunbar,919 F.2d 1525, 1529(11th Cir.1990)).In addition, when determining whether jurisdiction is proper, the Court is at liberty to look beyond the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.SeeHaase v. Sessions,835 F.2d 902, 905(D.C.Cir.1987)("It seems clear . . . that the plain language of Rule 12(b) permits only a 12(b)(6) motion to be converted into a motion for summary judgment").

B.Plaintiff's Claims are Moot Because the Issues Presented Have Already Been Resolved

Plaintiffs claims against the defendant have been mooted by his execution of two separate settlement agreements."The general rule . . . is that complete settlement moots an action."Aulenback, Inc. v. Federal Highway Admin.,103 F.3d 156, 161(D.C.Cir.1997).Here, plaintiff has entered into two settlement agreements which completely resolve the claims the plaintiff raised in his complaint.Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims contained in plaintiffs complaint.Id. at 161("Because the consent agreements entered into . . . effectively settle the controversy relating to issuance of the out-of-service orders, we conclude that the challenges to those orders are moot.").

Dismissal is warranted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because plaintiff has already resolved the claims discussed in his complaint and therefore his complaint is moot.SeeAbu Ali v. Gonzales,387 F.Supp.2d 16, 17(D.D.C.2005)("As mootness creates a jurisdictional defect, respondents' motion will be treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)").

1.The Administrative Judge's Order Issued on September 7th, 2007, did not Void or Vacate the 2007 Settlement Agreement.

On September 7, 2007, plaintiff, represented by counsel, signed the most recent settlement agreement in which he resolved:

[A]ny and all actions (including but not limited to USDC of District of ColumbiaCivil No. 1:07-CV-00741) . . . against the Agency . . . which are now or here-after may...