Allen v. Public Water Supply District No. 5 of Jefferson County, 5
| Decision Date | 23 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 5,5 |
| Citation | 7 S.W.3d 537 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . Floyd (Butch) Allen, and Yvonne D. Allen, his wife, Respondents, v. Public Water Supply Districtof Jefferson County, MO., Appellant. Case Number: ED75481 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Cirucit Court of Jefferson County, Hon. Timothy J. Patterson
Counsel for Appellant: Louis Jerry Weber
Counsel for Respondent: Kurt D. Breeze
Opinion Summary: Appellant, Public Water Supply District No. 5 of Jefferson County, MO., ("District") appeals from the judgment of the trial court allowing Floyd Allen and Yvonne Allen, ("landowners"), to detach their land from appellant pursuant to section 247.031, RSMo 1994.
AFFIRMED.
Division One holds: 1) The trial court did not err in ordering landowners' land to be detached and in finding the detachment will not adversely affect the remainder of the District. 2) The trial court did not err in allowing landowners to detach their land pursuant to the provisions of section 247.031 rather than the detachment provisions of section 247.170.
Appellant, Public Water Supply District No. 5 of Jefferson County, MO, ("District"), appeals from the judgment of the trial court allowing Floyd Allen and Yvonne Allen, ("landowners"), to detach their land from appellant pursuant to section 247.031, RSMo 1994.1 We affirm.
Landowners are owners of two tracts of real estate lying within District's territory. The two tracts comprise 26 acres of land. By two separate consent annexations, on June 16, 1997, and on April 20, 1998, the City of De Soto annexed landowners' two separate, but contiguous tracts of land. District did not provide water service to the land prior to the annexation. The
land contained no water works, water supply system, facilities, nor any tangible real or personal property belonging to the District. District has no outstanding general obligation or special obligation bonds that affected the land. The land was undeveloped and had no voters living within it.
On August 25, 1998, landowners filed a petition for detachment of their land from District pursuant to section 247.031. The court ordered publication of the notice of the petition for three consecutive weeks in the Jefferson County Watchman. After the filing of the petition, six voters and landowners, Board members of the District, filed objections to detachment of landowners' land from District's territory. On November 18, 1998, the trial court ordered the land to be detached from District's territory. District appeals.
District raises two points on appeal. District argues the trial court erred: 1) in ordering landowners' land to be detached and in finding that the detachment will not adversely affect the remainder of the District; and 2) in allowing landowners to detach their land pursuant to the provisions of section 247.031, rather than the mandatory detachment provisions of section 247.170.
Appellate courts will sustain the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo.banc 1976).
In its first point, District argues the trial court erred in ordering the detachment of landowners' land from it and in finding the detachment will not adversely affect the remainder of the District. District argues there was no substantial evidence to support the order and the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, in that the only evidence presented on the issue of adverse effect showed the District will suffer loss of future water revenue and a loss of land. We disagree.
Section 247.031.1 partially provides: "[t]erritory included in a district that is not being served by such district may be detached from such district provided that there are no outstanding general obligation or special obligation bonds. . . ." Section 247.031.4 partially provides; " if the court finds that the detachment will be in the best interest of the inhabitants and landowners of the territory to be detached and will not adversely affect the remainder of the district, it shall approve the detachment and grant the petition."
The trial court found that detachment would be in the best interests of the landowners because of the following:
A. The detachment would avoid duplication of services by consolidating the water service into the City, which provides police and fire protection for the tract in question.
B. The utilization of district water service, within the tract would cause difficulty concerning the measurement of costs for sewer service provided by the City in light of the lack of current metering agreement between the District and City.
C. The cost to connect to City facilities, taking into account additional development and engineering and permitting costs, which would have to be incurred by the land owner, is less than the connection cost to the District's adjacent facilities.
D. Based upon mandatory subdivisions restrictions in place for the tract as it lies within the City and for constructions costs to comply with City code would cause the owner to incur unnecessary developmental costs when compared to district connection requirement.
E. There would be no need to acquire private easements for connection purposes to City facilities.
F. That the cost of water to the landowner from the City would generally be lower than the cost of water from the District.
The trial court found that detachment would not adversely affect the remainder of the District because of the following:
A. The District is not currently supplying the area and has no physical facilities within the area present or proposed.
B. The District would lose no tax revenue by reason of the detachment.
C. The area to be attached is minuscule in comparison to the balance of the territory contained in the District and the impact on the District's ability to generate future revenues would be de minimus.
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. There are no residents or voters in the detached area. District did not have any customer and did not derive any tax revenue from the detached area. District did not have any outstanding general obligation or special obligations bonds. District had no facilities, water works, pipelines, and wells within the detached area. The detachment involved only 26 acres of District's territory of about 30 to 40 square miles approximately. District projected income from contingent future homeowners will not substantially affect its annual budget.2 Thus, we find sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's finding that detachment would be in the best interests of the landowners and would not adversely affect the remainder of the District.
In its second point, District argues the trial court erred in allowing landowners to detach their land from it pursuant to the provisions of section 247.031 because the trial court ignored the mandatory detachment provisions of section 247.170. Appellant argues that section 247.170 is the controlling statute in this case. We disagree.
In construing statutes, court determines legislative intent from the language used in the statute and considers words in their plain and ordinary meaning, recognizing the law favors a statutory construction that tends to avert an unreasonable result. Long v. Seely, 975 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998). Appellate courts presume the legislature does not enact meaningless provisions. State v. Moore, 952 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Mo.App.E.D. 1997). Courts presume the
legislature acts with the knowledge of statutes involving similar or related subject matters. Moore v. Missouri-Nebraska Exp., Inc., 892 S.W.2d 696, 712 (Mo.App.W.D. 1994). "When enacting changes to statutes, the legislature is presumed to understand the state of the law at the time of its enactment." Mills v. Director of Revenue, 964 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998). The term "shall" is used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory. U.S. Cent. Underwriters v. Hutchings, 952 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo.App.E.D. 1997). "Use of the word 'may' in a statute implies alternate possibilities and that the conferee of the power has discretion in the exercise...
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