Allen v. Radack, No. CIV77-5001.
Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. District of South Dakota |
Writing for the Court | BOGUE |
Citation | 426 F. Supp. 1052 |
Docket Number | No. CIV77-5001. |
Decision Date | 10 February 1977 |
Parties | T. L. ALLEN, Petitioner, v. Darrel RADACK, Superintendent, South Dakota Human Services Center, Yankton, South Dakota, Respondent. |
426 F. Supp. 1052
T. L. ALLEN, Petitioner,
v.
Darrel RADACK, Superintendent, South Dakota Human Services Center, Yankton, South Dakota, Respondent.
No. CIV77-5001.
United States District Court, D. South Dakota.
February 10, 1977.
Ronald E. Brodowicz, Rapid City, S.D., for petitioner.
Judith A. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, S.D., for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOGUE, District Judge.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner in the above-entitled matter is presently in the custody of Respondent, having been first committed to such custody shortly after being acquitted by reason of mental illness of the charge of murder in the South Dakota Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit. Under South Dakota law, an acquittal by reason of mental illness means that the defendant has sufficiently raised the issue of his or her sanity at the time of the offense, and that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. State v. Waugh, 80 S.D. 503, 509, 127 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1964). See also State v. Graves, 83 S.D. 600, 609, 163 N.W.2d 542, 547 (1968); II South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions, 106 § 2-14-5c, e, f (1970).
Shortly after the jury returned its verdict on August 15, 1975, the presiding judge called petitioner herein and his counsel before the bench and orally made certain findings which provided the predicate for petitioner's commitment. The presiding judge began by stating that the jury verdict invoked a presumption that petitioner was insane, and then stated that the Court deemed petitioner to be dangerous to the public peace and to the safety of other persons, particularly in light of his addiction to alcohol. The judge further noted the Court's responsibility to ensure that petitioner received psychiatric care and treatment, and ordered petitioner
. . . committed forthwith to the Human Services Center at Yankton, South Dakota for psychiatric treatment and for treatment with respect to your addiction to alcohol, and there to remain until you are no longer mentally ill or addicted to alcohol and, additionally until you are no longer a danger to yourself, to the public peace or the safety of the people and the State of South Dakota, and then only are you to be released upon a determination by a Court in this state of competent
jurisdiction. Transcript of August 15, 1975, proceedings at page three.
On August 18, 1975, a written Order of commitment was entered by the trial judge. The written Order contained verbatim the operative language of the Court's oral commitment Order quoted above.
The State trial judge's findings were in conformity with the holding of the South Dakota Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 80 S.D. 370, 374, 124 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1963). His Order was authorized by S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 23-45-20, 21 (1967), which read:
The court may upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness . ., if the defendant is in custody and it deems his discharge dangerous to the public peace or safety, order him to be committed to a hospital for mentally ill persons . . . until he becomes sane.
On September 14, 1975, petitioner herein filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in South Dakota Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit. The petition challenged the trial Court's jurisdiction to commit petitioner for alcohol addiction, challenged the indefinite term of commitment, and alleged that the petitioner was presently sane and entitled to be released. An evidentiary hearing was held on the state habeas corpus application on September 25, 1975. Following the hearing, petitioner herein was released. His release was predicated upon findings of fact that he was neither psychotic nor dangerous to himself or others at the time of the state habeas corpus hearing, and a conclusion that S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 23-45-20, 21 (1967) do not authorize commitment for alcoholism upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.
The State of South Dakota appealed the judgment releasing petitioner, and the case was reversed and remanded on November 12, 1976. State of South Dakota ex rel. Allen v. Radack, S.D., 246 N.W.2d 661 (1976). In reversing the judgment and order of release, the South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the testimony received at the hearing, and concluded:
The thrust of this case is not whether addiction to alcohol is within the scope of S.D.C.L. § 23-45-20 and § 23-45-21. The real question in this case is whether or not petitioner has an abnormal mental condition that makes it probable that he would be a danger to himself or others. Obviously, not all alcoholics are a danger to other persons. Petitioner, however, apparently has an abnormal mental condition that when coupled with an excess of alcohol creates a propensity to commit violent crimes and makes him dangerous to society. Certainly this is an "abnormal mental condition." The trial court in committing petitioner made such a finding. Under the meager record in this case, it certainly had every right to do so, if for no other reason than the presumption that an accused acquitted by reason of insanity is in fact insane. 246 N.W.2d at 663.
The South Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for rehearing in accordance with the following list of guidelines:
1. The test to be applied is whether or not petitioner has an abnormal mental condition that renders him potentially dangerous to others and that all reasonable medical doubts and reasonable judicial doubts are to be resolved in favor of the public safety.
2. The burden of proof rests upon petitioner.
3. The quantum of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt."
4. To discharge petitioner from such commitment, the burden is upon him to show beyond a reasonable doubt that if discharged he would no longer be a danger to the public. 246 N.W.2d at 664.
The fundamental principle underlying the decision on appeal in petitioner's state habeas corpus was expressed by the South Dakota Supreme Court in the earlier case of State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 80 S.D. 370, 124 N.W.2d 179 (1963) as follows:
An accused acquitted by reason of insanity is presumed to be insane. This presumption goes beyond the familiar principle that a condition of insanity once established is presumed to continue. The reach of . . . S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 23-45-20, 21 is not whether a person, engaged in the ordinary pursuit of life, is committable to a mental institution under the laws governing civil commitments. This statute applies to an exceptional class of persons who have committed acts forbidden by law . . . and obtained a jury verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" and then found by the trial judge to be dangerous to the public peace and safety if left at large. 80 S.D. at 374, 124 N.W.2d at 181 (citations omitted).
In South Dakota, when a person (other than one acquitted by reason of mental illness and thus subject to S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 23-45-20, 21) is mentally ill, dangerous to self or others and in need of immediate treatment, that person may be civilly committed under the provisions of S.D.Comp. Laws §§ 27-7A-2 et seq. Under those provisions such a person may be ordered taken into custody immediately upon receipt and examination of a verified petition alleging the basis for commitment. A mental examination must take place within twenty-four hours after the person is apprehended. A hearing to determine whether there is a factual basis for commitment must be held within five days, and there must be five days' notice of the hearing. If the person is committed to the South Dakota Human Services Center, the administrator of the center may release him or her within the first ninety days he or she is in custody there if it is determined by the administrator that the person committed under S.D. Comp.Laws §§ 27-7A-2 et seq. is "no longer mentally ill and in need of treatment." § 27-7A-16.
The generally applicable definition of mental illness in South Dakota includes a behavioral standard of danger to self or others. S.D.Comp.Laws § 27-1-1(3). See also § 27-1-1.1(3), (4). Even in the absence of the emergency situation envisioned in S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 27-7A-2 et seq., supra, dangerous individuals may be committed under S.D.Comp.Laws §§ 27-7-1 et seq. Commitment under these provisions is initiated by the states attorney with the use of a verified petition, supported by a certificate of medical examination, which must state facts showing probable cause to believe that the person in question is mentally ill. If probable cause is demonstrated, notice and hearing will follow. If an individual is committed under these provisions, there must be periodic review of his or her mental condition. In some instances the administrator of the South Dakota Human Services Center is empowered to release committed persons, § 27-7-52; § 27-10-2, 2.2. Release is automatic if a review hearing is...
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Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
...casually in noncriminal cases." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). In Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052, 1058 (D.S.D.1977), the court rejected the reasonable doubt standard for release of BRI acquittees. The court there found, as do we, that t......
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Benham v. Edwards, No. 80-9052
...States v. Ecker, supra (rape and murder). See also Lee v. Kolb, 449 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y.1978) (murder) (dictum); Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052 (D.S.D.1977) (murder) (dictum). 37 The foregoing Page 534 cases have upheld such differences in release procedures on the grounds that the acq......
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..."Bolton rationale." See Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1978); Lee v. Kolb, 449 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y.1978); Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.S.D.1977) and cits; New Jersey v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975) and However, as recognized in Bolton v. Harris, supra, the t......
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Kellotat v. Cupp, No. 82-3518
...Finally, Kellotat argues that he need not seek Oregon post-conviction relief because the attempt would be futile. See Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052, 1056 (D.S.D.1977). The Oregon Circuit Court, Kellotat argues, would be unlikely to hold that the Court of Appeals had made a decision cont......
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Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
...casually in noncriminal cases." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). In Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052, 1058 (D.S.D.1977), the court rejected the reasonable doubt standard for release of BRI acquittees. The court there found, as do we, that t......
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Benham v. Edwards, No. 80-9052
...States v. Ecker, supra (rape and murder). See also Lee v. Kolb, 449 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y.1978) (murder) (dictum); Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052 (D.S.D.1977) (murder) (dictum). 37 The foregoing Page 534 cases have upheld such differences in release procedures on the grounds that the acq......
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Clark v. State, No. 35775
..."Bolton rationale." See Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1978); Lee v. Kolb, 449 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y.1978); Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.S.D.1977) and cits; New Jersey v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975) and However, as recognized in Bolton v. Harris, supra, the t......
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Kellotat v. Cupp, No. 82-3518
...Finally, Kellotat argues that he need not seek Oregon post-conviction relief because the attempt would be futile. See Allen v. Radack, 426 F.Supp. 1052, 1056 (D.S.D.1977). The Oregon Circuit Court, Kellotat argues, would be unlikely to hold that the Court of Appeals had made a decision cont......