Allen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-11828,17-11828 |
| Parties | AHMAD RASHED ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00644-JES-CM
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Ahmad Rashed Allen, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the following issues: (1) whether Allen's counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a judgment of acquittal on his second-degree murder charge; (2) whether Allen's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his life sentence; and (3) whether the cumulative error of counsel's alleged ineffective assistance undermined the fairness of Allen's convictions and sentences. After careful review, we affirm.
In December 2005, Allen was charged with one count of second-degree murder (Count 1) and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (Counts 2 and 3). The evidence presented at trial established the following. On November 5, 2005, Joe Bradley (Joe) and Manny Quintero agreed to meet at an apartment complex to discuss jewelry and money that Joe allegedly stole from Quintero. Joe's mother, Gloria Bradley (Gloria), and sister, Latoya Bradley (Latoya), as well as Latoya's 1-year-old son, accompanied Joe to the apartment complex. Allen accompanied Quintero.
Upon arrival, Joe and Quintero began arguing. The argument escalated into a physical altercation wherein Joe jumped on Quintero and started punching him. At this point, Gloria, holding her grandson, approached the men and attempted to separate them. Allen then emerged from a nearby car and discharged his weapon, killing Gloria after shooting her in the head. Upon hearing the gunshots, Joe stopped fighting and started running away. Allen continued firing, shooting Joe several times. Joe recovered after several months in the hospital.
At the close of the State's case, Allen moved for a judgment of acquittal on Count 3, which the state court granted. The jury then found Allen guilty of Counts 1 and 2. As to Count 1, the court sentenced Allen to life in prison without parole under Florida's prison release reoffender statute. See Fla. Stat. § 775.082. As to Count 2, the court sentenced Allen to a concurrent life sentence with a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years based on the 10-20-Life statute. See Fla. Stat. § 775.087. The sentencing order indicated that Allen was sentenced as a habitual felony offender, see Fla. Stat § 775.084, and prison release reoffender on both counts.
On direct appeal, Allen raised four grounds for relief. In relevant part, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second-degree murder. Specifically, he argued that the state failed to prove that he acted out of ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. In support of this argument, Allen noted that Quintero's girlfriend, a witness, had testified that it did not appear that Allen shot anyone on purpose. Florida's Second District Court of Appeals (DCA) rejected each argument and affirmed.
On August 5, 2009, Allen, proceeding pro se, filed his first post-conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Allen argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him as both a habitual felony offender and a prison release reoffender. The court agreed and entered a new sentence. The new sentence lacked the habitual felony offender designation but was otherwise the same as the original sentence.
On March 14, 2011, Allen, again proceeding pro se, filed a post-conviction relief motion under Rule 3.850. He raised five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on: (1) counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments during closing argument regarding transferred intent; (2) counsel's failure to object to the court's justifiable use of a deadly force jury instruction; (3) counsel's failure to object to the excusable homicide jury instruction; (4) counsel's failure to objectto the manslaughter jury instruction; and (5) the cumulative effect of counsel's errors deprived him of a fair trial.
The state post-conviction court denied Allen's Rule 3.850 motion. Allen moved for a rehearing, which was also denied. Allen appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, which the Second DCA affirmed.
On December 3, 2012, Allen, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. His amended petition asserted ten grounds for relief, including, in relevant part, that counsel was ineffective for: (1) not moving for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of second-degree murder on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Allen acted with a depraved mind; (2) not asserting that Allen's life sentence under the 10-20-Life statute for aggravated battery was impermissible; and (3) not objecting to Allen's life sentence for aggravated battery when the trial court imposed a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence under the 10-20-Life statute. Allen also argued that the cumulative effect of counsel's ineffective assistance undermined the fairness and reliability of his convictions and sentence.
The district court denied relief on all grounds. Because he did not raise it in the state court proceedings, the district court determined that Allen's claim that hiscounsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal was unexhausted. According to the court, the claim was also procedurally defaulted under Florida law. The court held that the procedural default could not be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), because the claim was not "substantial." Alternatively, the court concluded that the claim was meritless.
Regarding Allen's argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his life sentence, the court concluded that such an argument raised a sentencing issue exclusively concerning Florida law for which federal habeas relief was not appropriate. Accordingly, the court determined that the claim was not cognizable.
As to the cumulative error claim, the court held that because Allen had not shown error of constitutional dimensions on any of his individual ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he could not show that he was entitled to habeas relief based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors. We granted a COA as to those three issues.
Section 2254 provides a remedy for a state prisoner who claims that he is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To warrant relief under § 2254, a petitioner must show that the state court rendered a decision on the merits that "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Before filing a habeas petition in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). A failure to exhaust occurs "when a petitioner has not fairly presented every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review." Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
If a petitioner fails to exhaust state remedies, the district court must dismiss the claims without prejudice to allow the petitioner to present the claims before a state court. Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007). If it is obvious that the unexhausted claim would be procedurally barred in state court, however, the federal court should treat the unexhausted claim as procedurally defaulted. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ().
If a state prisoner has "defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation." Lambrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). To demonstrate cause, the petitioner must show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his ability to raise his claim properly in state court. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. To show prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
In general, the lack of an attorney or an attorney error that led to the default of certain claims in state court cannot serve as cause to excuse a procedural default in federal habeas review. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991). In Martinez v. Ryan, however, the Supreme Court recognized that, in limited circumstances, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding may constitute cause to...
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