Allen v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 August 1953
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 970.
• Citation: 114 F. Supp. 72
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: ALLEN et al. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al.

114 F. Supp. 72

ALLEN et al. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al.

Civil Action No. 970.

United States District Court W. D. North Carolina.

Argued July 28, 1953.

Decided August 15, 1953.

Whiteford S. Blakeney and Pierce & Blakeney, Charlotte, N. C., and W. S. Macgill, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

John M. Robinson, Charlotte, N. C., W. T. Joyner, Raleigh, N. C., for defendant Southern Ry. Co.

J. B. Craighill, Charlotte, N. C. (Tillett, Campbell, Craighill & Rendleman, Charlotte, N. C.), Lester P. Schoene and Milton Kramer, Washington, D. C. (Schoene & Kramer, Washington, D. C.), Clarence M. Mulholland, Toledo, Ohio, and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, Toledo, Ohio) for Union defendants.

Before PARKER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and WARLICK, District Judge.

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This is a suit instituted in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, by non-union employees of the Southern Railway Company to enjoin the enforcement against them of a union-shop contract made between that company and a number of labor unions, which required that employees join the union and pay dues or be dismissed from their positions. The railway company and these unions have been made defendants. The plaintiffs make no mention of any federal statute or of any rights arising out of the Constitution or laws of the United States but ask relief under the law of North Carolina. The defendant Southern Railway Company filed in the state court an answer in which it admits the execution of the union-shop contract and pleads the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152(11), as justification for making same, averring that it entered into the contract unwillingly and because of a threat of strike by the unions. It asked the court to declare its rights under the contract and under the laws of the State of North Carolina and of the United States. The unions have not yet answered but, on the ground that the case was one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, have filed a petition for removal and the case has been removed into this court. A petition for remand has been duly filed and the unions have made a motion for the convening of a court of three judges on the ground that the case brings in question the constitutionality of the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act. Upon certificate of the District Judge, a court of three judges has been constituted, and the case has been heard upon the motion to remand as well as upon a motion made by the defendant unions to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action.

We think that the case was improperly removed into this court as one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the motion to remand must be granted on the ground that the complaint does not set forth a cause of action so arising. The amendment to the Railway Labor Act of which we take judicial notice must unquestionably be considered in passing upon the case; but the complaint states no cause of action arising under that statute, the effect of which is to destroy any cause of action which plaintiff might otherwise have had under state law. In a very similar case where plaintiffs were asking injunctive relief under state law which conflicted with federal laws regulating interstate commerce and the argument was made that the case was removable because it was necessary that federal laws be considered in its decision, the Supreme Court held that the case should have been remanded on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of action did not arise under the federal laws. State of Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185, 190, 22 S.Ct. 47, 49, 46 L.Ed. 144. The court said:

"But even assuming that the bill showed upon its face that the relief sought would be inconsistent with the power to regulate commerce or with regulations established by Congress, or with the 14th Amendment, as contended, it would only demonstrate that the bill could not be maintained at all, and not that the cause of action arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States."

In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126, which was a suit for specific performance of an agreement to give free passes on a railroad in consequence of a settlement of a damage claim, it was held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction by reason of the fact that a federal statute rendered the agreement invalid. The court said, 211 U. S. at page 152, 29 S.Ct. at page 43:

"It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution."

In Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 582, at page 594, 30 S.Ct. 441, at page 445, 54 L.Ed. 625 which was a suit on a note claimed to be void because of the provisions of federal statutes, the court said:

"The contention that the cause of action arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States is plainly untenable. Recovery by the bank was in no wise predicated upon any right conferred upon it or its assignor to contract, as was done, and the fact that the makers of the note relied for their defense upon provisions contained in certain statutes as establishing that the transaction upon which the right to recover was based was prohibited by law `would only demonstrate that the suit could not be maintained at all, and not that the cause of action arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States.' Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185, 190, 22 S.Ct. 47, 46 L.Ed. 144."

The rule is thus stated by Mr. Justice...