Allen v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:13–cv–13331.,2:13–cv–13331.
• Citation: 981 F.Supp.2d 688
• Parties: Brenda ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

981 F.Supp.2d 688

Brenda ALLEN, Plaintiff,

v.SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:13–cv–13331.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Southern Division.

Nov. 12, 2013.

Christina D. Davis, Romano Law, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

Scott R. Torpey, Jaffe, Raitt, Southfield, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

GERALD E. ROSEN, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this one-count negligence action, Plaintiff Brenda Allen claims that Defendant Spirit Airlines is responsible for her injuries resulting from a blood clot that formed in her left leg after her flight experienced a two-plus hour flight delay on the tarmac at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. After removing this case from Michigan state court, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having reviewed and considered Defendant's Motion and supporting brief, Plaintiff's response thereto, and the entire record of this matter, the Court has determined that the relevant allegations, facts, and legal arguments are adequately presented in these written submissions, and that oral argument would not aid the decisional process. Therefore, the Court will decide this matter “on the briefs.” See Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). The Court's Opinion and Order is set forth below.

II. PERTINENT FACTS

Plaintiff was a passenger on a June 19, 2010 Spirit Airlines flight from Detroit, Michigan to Atlantic City, New Jersey. (Plf.'s Compl., Dkt. # 1, ¶ 4). She boarded the flight at approximately 6:00 a.m. for its scheduled 6:45 a.m. departure. ( Id. at ¶ 8). The flight did not take off at 6:45. Rather, the flight was delayed for more than two hours waiting for the pilot to arrive due to a strike by Defendant's employees. ( Id. at ¶¶ 9–10). During this delay, “Defendant's employees [advised] that she was not allowed to move about the airplane and was to stay seated to await departure.” ( Id. at ¶ 11). As a result, “Plaintiff developed a serious blood clot in her left leg, requiring surgery.” ( Id. at ¶ 12). Plaintiff therefore claims that “Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's serious injuries.” ( Id. at ¶ 13).

In support of her negligence claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant owed her a duty of care as a business invitee and as a passenger, and that Defendant violated its duty of care in the following ways:

• Fail[ed] to properly train its employees and agents to appropriately assess potential injuries caused by a delay;

• Fail[ed] to properly train American ¹ employees and agents to appropriately manage delays;

• Unreasonably hir[ed] or retain[ed] employees and agents who were not qualified to assess, manage, and investigate delays and the potential injury such a delay might cause;

• Fail[ed] to supervise American employees and agents in order to prevent potential injuries caused by a delay;

• Failed to repair and/or correct and/or warn of any hazardous and/or dangerous conditions, of which the Defendant, its agents, servants, and/or employees had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, by a reasonable and proper inspection;

• Failed to instruct all of its agents, and/or employees on the proper care and maintenance of its premises, and/or in the reporting of dangerous and/or hazardous conditions on Defendant's premises;

• Failed to provide rules, procedures and/or provide for periodic safety inspections for the discovery and/or correction of dangerous and hazardous conditions on Defendant's premises;

• Failed to construct Defendant's premises in a manner suitable and safe under the circumstance;

• Failed to observe all the duties of care imposed upon Defendant bythe (sic) statutes of the State of Michigan, Ordinances of the City in which Defendant's premises are located and the common law in such case made and provided;

• Others to be determined as discovery reveals.

( Id. at ¶ 16(a–j)). Plaintiff then asserts that she “sustained personal injuries as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' (sic) negligence as alleged herein.” ( Id. at ¶ 17; see also ¶¶ 18–21).

In lieu of filing an answer, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Def.'s Mtn., Dkt. # 3). First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim is both expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1968(ADA), 49 U.S.C. § 41713, and implicitly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), 49 U.S.C. § 40101. As set forth in more detail below, the Court finds that the Federal Aviation Act and applicable regulations implicitly preempt Plaintiff's claim and therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir.2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss, however, a complaint “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for defendant's conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.2013).

The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the “combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal [is to] require [a] plaintiff to have a greater knowledge ... of factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible complaint.’ ” New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). Put another way, complaints must contain “plausible statements as to when, where, in what or by whom,” Center for Bio–Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir.2011), in order to avoid merely pleading an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. The Federal Aviation Act implicitly preempts Plaintiff's negligence claim

A federal statute need not expressly preempt state law for the preemption doctrine to apply. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir.2012).² This is because “Congress' intent may be ... ‘implicitly contained in [a statute's] structure and purpose.’ ” Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citation omitted). Under the implied preemption doctrine, federal law acts to preempt state law in two ways: “field” preemption and “conflict” preemption. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 583–84 (6th Cir.2013). Field preemption occurs “where ‘pervasive’ federal regulation ‘preclude[s] enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’ ” Id. at 583 (citation omitted and alteration in original). Conflict preemption is as it sounds, “nullif[ying] state law ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.’ ” Id. at 584 (citation omitted). As set forth below, binding Sixth Circuit authority and persuasive authority from other circuits dictates a finding that the Federal Aviation Act and the Federal Aviation Administration's regulatory scheme concerning airline safety and tarmac operations implicitly preempt Plaintiff's negligence claim.

a. Preemption in aviation safety

In Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., 409 F.3d 784 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit adopted the “Third Circuit's reasoning in Abdullah [ v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir.1999),] that federal law establishes the standards of care in the field of aviation safety and thus preempts the field from state regulation.” Greene, 409 F.3d at 795. Stated differently, “Congress intended aviation safety to be exclusively federal in nature.” Id. at 794. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that federal law preempted a negligence claim against an aircraft manufacturer for an alleged breach of a duty to warn of a gyroscope's manufacturing defect. Id. at 794, 795.

In so holding, the Sixth Circuit in Greene noted the Federal Aviation Act's legislative history:

[The purpose of the Federal Aviation Act was to give] [t]he Administrator of the new Federal Aviation Agency full responsibility and authority for the advancement and promulgation of civil aeronautics generally, including promulgation and enforcement of safety regulations.

Id. at 794 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 2360, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741) (alterations in original). “The House Report also noted that ‘[i]t is essential that one agency of government, and one agency alone, be responsible for issuing safety regulations if we are to have timely and effective guidelines for safety in aviation.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).

Drawing on this and other legislative history, the Third Circuit in Abdullah concluded that “Congress intended to rest sole responsibility for supervising the aviation industry with the federal government.” Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 368. This includes, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration's implementation of “a comprehensive system of rules and regulations ... promot[ing] flight safety.” Id. at 369. Accordingly, the Third Circuit in Abdullah—in a case involving a negligence...