Allen v. State
| Decision Date | 03 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. SC19-1313,SC19-1313 |
| Citation | 322 So.3d 589 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | Scottie D. ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Jessica Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee
Scottie D. Allen appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons below, we affirm Allen's conviction and sentence of death.
Allen was indicted for the October 2, 2017, first-degree premeditated murder of Ryan Mason on June 25, 2018, and soon thereafter began asserting his right to self-representation. After finding Allen competent and conducting two inquiries under Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the trial court ruled that Allen could represent himself pro se, without standby counsel. Allen's guilt phase occurred on February 19-20, 2018. In his opening statement, Allen told the jury that he would not be presenting any evidence or calling any witnesses because it was the State's burden to prove his guilt.
The evidence presented at trial established that while serving a twenty-five-year prison sentence for second-degree murder, Allen strangled Mason to death in the cell they shared at Wakulla Correctional Institution. Allen confessed to planning and carrying out Mason's murder, including to an investigator from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) during a recorded interview, which was played for the jury, without objection from Allen. As the trial court cogently explained in its sentencing order, the evidence showed that:
Allen then calmly reported to a correctional officer that he had murdered his cellmate, which resulted in the discovery of Mason's body.
During his recorded statement to the FDLE agent, Allen said that Mason was "kicking like crazy" and that, during the strangling, when Mason was still conscious, Allen told Mason,
The medical examiner testified that Mason was choked with such force as to fracture his C6 vertebrae and that after three to five minutes of constant pressure, Mason suffered irreversible brain damage and died. He further testified that the shirt found around Mason's neck was wrapped and knotted so tightly it was difficult to cut through with a surgical scalpel, and that in addition to the injuries indicating that Mason's cause of death was ligature strangulation, Mason had injuries to his wrist
, forearm, and ankle, as well as unusual bruising behind his left knee.
The State presented testimony that the DNA mixture obtained from the shirt found around Mason's neck was 130 billion times more likely to come from Allen and Mason than Mason and an unrelated individual. In addition, the DNA mixture obtained from the victim's left-hand fingernails was 700 billion times more likely to have come from Allen and Mason than Mason and an unrelated individual.
After the State rested, Allen elected not to testify and rested without presenting a defense. He also did not present a closing argument. The jury found Allen guilty of first-degree murder on February 20, 2019.1
The penalty phase occurred later the same day, and Allen, who continued to represent himself, did not present mitigation or argument to the penalty-phase jury. Following the State's presentation, Allen's jury unanimously found that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following four aggravating factors: (1) Allen was previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Allen was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person; (3) the first-degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (4) the first-degree murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP).2 In addition, the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors it found the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt were sufficient to warrant a possible sentence of death; found that one or more individual jurors had not found that one or more mitigating circumstances was established by the greater weight of the evidence; and unanimously found that the aggravating factors it found the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Finally, the jury unanimously found that Allen should be sentenced to death.
Following the penalty-phase trial, Allen continued to represent himself and maintained his desire not to present mitigation during the Spencer3 hearing. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710(b). Additionally, the trial court appointed amicus counsel to develop and present mitigation to the trial court at the Spencer hearing. Amicus counsel retained Dr. Martin Falb as a mental health expert, and Allen submitted to and cooperated with an evaluation by Dr. Falb.
At the Spencer hearing, amicus counsel's mitigation presentation included the testimony of a mitigation specialist, who testified regarding Allen's background, and the testimony of Dr. Falb, a forensic psychologist. Dr. Falb testified that he did not diagnose Allen with antisocial personality disorder
because the psychologist who performed Allen's competency evaluation had already done so. However, Dr. Falb opined that as a result of Allen's antisocial personality disorder, he is "likely unable" to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Falb also testified that Allen "suffered some extreme measures of trauma in terms of emotional abuse, physical abuse, and sexual abuse beginning at a young enough age, along with substance abuse," and that Allen received a "very, very high" score of six on the tenquestion Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) test. Based on the testimony of the mitigation specialist during the Spencer hearing, Dr. Falb testified that Allen's ACE score could have been as high as eight out of ten. Dr. Falb further opined that it was likely Allen suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In explaining his PTSD diagnosis, Dr. Falb testified that Allen told him during their interview, "I can't say that what I did to him [the victim] wasn't related to my being angry about what had happened to me [earlier in life], but I was mad that he had been lying to me [about why he was in prison] for nine months." Regarding Allen's statement, "I can't say that what I did to him wasn't related," Dr. Falb testified that this statement "makes the point" for "a recurrence of the PTSD of that experience of what happened to [Allen] when he was being molested back at the age of eight to eleven." However, Dr. Falb further testified that Allen's statement, "I was mad at him for lying to me for nine months," was not "inconsistent with somebody rising to a level of anger if they're antisocial."
Following amicus counsel's mitigation presentation, the State relied on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202 to argue that it was entitled to have Allen evaluated by its own mental health expert, Dr. Greg Prichard, for purposes of rebutting the testimony of Dr. Falb. Allen stated, "I will not submit to an interview by [the] prosecution's doctor." Despite voicing uncertainty about how to proceed in light of Allen's decision not to present mitigation—a circumstance which rule 3.202 does not address—the trial court ultimately ordered Allen to submit to an evaluation by the State's mental health expert. The trial court ruled that the evaluation would be limited in scope to the mitigation addressed by Dr. Falb and further told Allen that his "cooperation is appreciated" but that if, during Dr. Prichard's interview, Allen got "to a situation ... outside what [Allen] want[ed] to answer, then [Allen should] just tell them that." Allen cooperated with Dr. Prichard's evaluation.
At the continued Spencer hearing on June 21, 2019, the State's mental health expert, Dr. Prichard, testified that he agreed with Dr. Falb that Allen has antisocial personality disorder
and further testified that "antisocial personality disorder is very much a driving factor for [Allen]." However, Dr. Prichard disagreed with Dr. Falb's PTSD diagnosis and testified that he did not see any indication of dissociation associated with PTSD. Dr. Prichard further testified that Allen told him "he was completely sober and straight the day the murder occurred," that Allen "said that he actually made the decision ... on Friday that he was going to kill [the victim on] Sunday," and that Allen's statements regarding the murder indicate that the killing was "very calm and pretty well planned out." Consequently, Dr. Prichard opined that he "didn't see any indication of ... mental, emotional disturbance anywhere around the time of the offense." Regarding the statutory...
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