Allen v. Tuscarora Valley R. Co.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: MESTREZAT, J.
• Citation: 229 Pa. 97,78 A. 34
• Parties: ALLEN v. TUSCARORA VALLEY R. CO.
• Decision Date: 01 July 1910

78 A. 34
229 Pa. 97

ALLEN
v.
TUSCARORA VALLEY R. CO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 1, 1910.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Juniata County.

Action by R. B. Allen against the Tuscarora Valley Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed for a new trial.

Argued before MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

F. M. M. Pennell, for appellant.

J. H. Neely and James M. Barnett & Son, for appellee.

MESTREZAT, J. This was an action of trespass at common law brought July 1, 1904, by the plaintiff, a brakeman in the employ of the defendant company, to recover damages for injuries received in its service while he was in the act of coupling cars. The statement was filed with the praxape, and averred, inter alia, as follows: "It then and there was the duty of defendant corporation to adopt and use couplings for its cars of ordinary character and reasonable safety, according to the usages, habits, and ordinary risks of the business, but the defendant corporation, not regarding its duty in the premises, at or about February 20, 1904, at Juniata county aforesaid, carelessly and negligently adopted and used the pin and link coupler, a kind of coupler not then in ordinary use, but more dangerous than the usual and ordinary coupling employed by railroads, by reason whereof plaintiff, while engaged in coupling cars, so as aforesaid supplied and fitted with the pin and link coupler due to the negligence of defendant corporation, in the lawful performance of his work and exercising due and proper care, on or about February 20, 1904, aforesaid at the county of Juniata, was caught by the left hand between the two protruding irons, called 'bull noses,' parts of the couplings, and thereby his left hand was badly cut, bruised, lacerated, and torn," etc.

In December, 1908, a rule was granted on the defendant to show cause why the statement should not be amended, and on January 21, 1909, the rule was made absolute and the statement was amended so as to read, inter alia, as follows: "That said defendant corporation at the time of committing the grievances hereinafter mentioned was engaged in interstate commerce by railroad and a common carrier, and did haul on its line cars used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars, none of its cars being so equipped with couplers as aforesaid, in violation of Act Cong. March 2, 1803, c. 106, § 2, 27 Stat. 531 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174), and its supplements; that the train aforesaid was not composed of four wheel ears or eight wheel standard logging cars

78 A. 35

where the height of such cars from top of same to center of coupling does not exceed 25 inches used exclusively for the transportation of logs." The defendant objected to the allowance of the amendment on the ground that it introduced a new and different cause of action which was barred by the statute of limitations. The first assignment alleges error in making the rule absolute and permitting the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim. As we are of opinion that this assignment must be sustained, the other assignments become immaterial and need not be considered or determined. The amendment to the statement of claim, allowed by the court, brought the case within the act of Congress of March 2, 1893, and alleges that the cars were equipped with couplers in violation of the act. This statute was enacted, as its title declares, to promote the safety of employes and travelers upon railroads engaged in interstate commerce by compelling common carriers to equip their cars with automatic couplers, etc., and makes it unlawful for a common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact. Section 8 of the act provides: "That any employe of any such common carrier who may be injured by any locomotive, car, or train in use contrary to the provisions of this act shall not be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk thereby occasioned, although continuing in the employment of such carrier after the unlawful use of such locomotive, car, or train had been brought to his knowledge." The original statement, as observed, was at common law, and alleges that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the defendant company having carelessly and negligently adopted and used the pin and link coupler, more dangerous than the usual and ordinary coupling employed by railroads. Prior to the act of Congress, employes of common carriers assumed the risks and dangers naturally and ordinarily incident to their employment which included the risks and hazards arising from the performance of their duty in coupling cars. If the employe was injured in the discharge of that duty, and it was a risk which he assumed, the carrier was not responsible. But the act changes the liability of the carrier when engaged in interstate commerce, and what was lawful at common law before the passage of the act is made unlawful by the act. The statute abrogates the common law pro tanto, and imposes a liability on the carrier different from that imposed by the common law. The latter gives the employe a right of action for...