Allen v. Walmart Stores, Inc.

• Citation: 22 F.Supp.3d 722
• Decision Date: 15 May 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–10263.
• Parties: C. Michael ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. WALMART STORES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

22 F.Supp.3d 722

C. Michael ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
WALMART STORES, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 13–10263.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed May 15, 2014

Motion granted.

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Mary A. Mahoney, Schwartz Law Firm, Farmington Hills, MI, for Plaintiff.

Elisa J. Lintemuth, Dykema, Grand Rapids, MI, Kiffi Y. Ford, Dykema Gossett, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. # 17)
SEAN F. COX, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff C. Michael Allen (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Wal–Mart Stores, East LP (incorrectly referred to as Walmart Stores, Inc.) (“Defendant” or “Wal–Mart”) violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) ¹ by failing and/or refusing to restore him to his position of store manager following his return from an FMLA-protected leave. Defendant

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maintains that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from his position prior to going on FMLA leave.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 17). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties, and the Court heard oral argument on the motion on April 17, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, this Court shall GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The parties dispute whether or not Plaintiff and Bartell specifically discussed his reassignment in the days after Plaintiff sent Bartell the e-mail. ( Compare Bartell Aff., ¶¶ 8, 9, attached to Def. Br. at Ex. 2 and Pl. Dep. at pp. 113–14). However, Plaintiff admits that he spoke with Bartell regarding the e-mail about a week after Plaintiff sent it. (Pl. Dep. at p. 115). Plaintiff further testified that he asked Bartell “what was going on,” and Bartell “said he didn't know, he sent up a note, and he would get back with me.” (Pl. Dep. at 115). It is undisputed that on November 2, 2010, Bartell forwarded Plaintiff's e-mail to his supervisor, Regional Human Resources Manager Danielle Bank. (Banks Aff. ¶ 4, attached to Def. Br. at Ex. 4).

On November 4, 2010, Plaintiff applied to take FMLA leave. (Pl. Dep. at 120). Plaintiff was released to return to work on January 25, 2011. (Pl. Dep. at pp. 119–120, 122–23). Plaintiff testified that, when he returned to work, he specifically asked to be put back into his original position as store manager. (Pl. Dep. at 128). Plaintiff claims that Bartell responded that Wal–Mart was accepting his request to step down as store manager and that the only position available to him was the assistant manager position at the Hartland, Michigan store. (Pl. Dep. at 127).

Plaintiff admits that he accepted the assistant manager position, but claims that it left him with “no other choice other than to terminate his employment.” (Pl. Dep. at 141; Pl. Ctr. Stmt. of Facts at ¶ 34). Plaintiff testified that the assistant manager

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position paid approximately $55,000 less than the store manager position. (Pl. Dep. at 139). Plaintiff resigned from his position as assistant manager of the Hartland, Michigan Wal–Mart store in April 2011. (Pl. Dep. at 145).

Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. on January 22, 2013 (Doc. # 1) alleging that Wal–Mart violated the FMLA by failing to reinstate him to his store manager position when he returned from FMLA leave. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the FMLA. On January 27, 2014, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 17). Plaintiff timely responded, (Doc. # 19), and Defendant timely replied. (Doc. # 21).

STANDARD OF DECISION

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“The party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact in the case.” LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993). “The moving party may meet its burden by showing that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case.” Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.1993). The plaintiff must come forth with more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position in order to survive summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The court must view the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

ANALYSIS

The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) “entitles qualifying employees to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year if, among other things, an employee has a ‘serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.’ ” Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir.2005) ( quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)).

If an individual takes FMLA-protected leave, that individual is entitled “on return from such leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).

The FMLA further provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). An individual may enforce his or her rights under the FMLA by instituting a private right of action in state or federal court against his or her employer. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(1), (a)(2).

Courts have held that “two distinct theories of recovery arise under these statutes.” Edgar v. JAC Products, Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir.2006), citing Arban v. West Pub. Co., 345 F.3d 390, 400–01 (6th Cir.2003). These theories are referred to

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as the “entitlement” or “interference” theory, and the “retaliation” theory. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 507.

The interference theory looks to “whether the employer provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA—for example, a twelve-week leave or reinstatement after taking a medical leave.” Edgar, 443 F.3d at 507, citing Arban, 345 F.3d at 401.

To establish a prima facie case of FMLA interference, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was an eligible employee; (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the FMLA; (3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the employee gave the employer notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir.2012), citing Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir.2006). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir.2007).

The...