Allen v. Weber
| Decision Date | 04 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 42169-1-II,No. 42569-6-II,42169-1-II,42569-6-II |
| Parties | In re the Matter of: JANE VAN ALLEN, Respondent, v. VERNON WEBER, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Van Deren, J. — Vernon Weber appeals the trial court's order and judgment distributing the assets and debts acquired during his 20-year committed intimate relationship with Jane Van Allen.1 He challenges the trial court's (1) characterization of certain real property, (2) refusal to apply judicial estoppel to bar Van Allen from seeking an interest in properties she did not list as assets in her bankruptcy proceeding, and (3) denial of his motion for relief from judgment to revalue the chiropractic office. We affirm.
Vernon Weber and Jane Van Allen maintained a committed intimate relationship for 20 years—from 1990 until March 2009.2 During their relationship, Weber and Van Allen ownedsignificant real property, which included an Alaska Street home, a Federal Way lot, a Spanaway home (15101 13th Avenue), a chiropractic office (3425 South Tacoma Way), and a Spanaway rental (14907 13th Avenue).
On March 3, 2004, Weber established an unsecured credit line with Washington Mutual Bank. On March 26, 2004, Weber took a $61,359.95 advance on his credit line, which he and Van Allen used to acquire the Spanaway rental from Van Allen's brother, Harry Phipps Jr. On July 6, 2004, Phipps conveyed his interest in the Spanaway rental to Earth Home Ministries under a sale agreement.3 Van Allen was the only person connected with Earth Home Ministries. The property's value at the time of conveyance greatly exceeded the $61,000 purchase price. By May 30, 2006, Van Allen had paid down Weber's Washington Mutual credit line from $61,000 to approximately $37,000.
On October 11, 2005, Van Allen filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.4 Van Allen filed incomplete or inaccurate bankruptcy schedules of assets and liabilities. She listed her interest in the Spanaway home as her sole real property. Van Allen did not list the chiropractic office, the Spanaway rental, or the Federal Way lot on her asset schedule.
The bankruptcy trustee investigated Van Allen's assets and asked a realtor to price the Spanaway home for sale. Before the property was put on the market, Van Allen and the trustee reached an agreement for Van Allen to purchase the non-exempt equity of the Spanaway home in exchange for the trustee abandoning the remaining assets of the estate. On May 30, 2006, Webertook an $87,477.04 advance from his Washington Mutual line of credit and used it to pay a total of $89,556.08 to Van Allen's bankruptcy estate to protect the Spanaway home from liquidation to satisfy creditors. Van Allen's bankruptcy creditors were then paid in full.
In March 2009, Van Allen petitioned for dissolution of her relationship with Weber and distribution of their assets and debts. At trial, Weber argued that he and Van Allen did not have a committed intimate relationship and, further, that judicial estoppel should bar Van Allen from claiming an interest in any properties she did not disclose in her 2005 bankruptcy schedule of assets, including the Spanaway rental, the chiropractic office, and the Federal Way lot.
Van Allen's position was that her brother sold the Spanaway rental to her for less than market value because she was planning to make it a safe house for female victims of sexual assault and it was close to the home she shared with Weber. Weber testified that Van Allen made the deal with her brother, but she could not pay his $61,000 asking price; thus, he used his line of credit to purchase the Spanaway rental as a favor to Van Allen, who had bad credit. Weber expected Van Allen to repay the entire amount.
Weber asserted that it was Van Allen's idea to put the Spanaway rental property in Earth Home Ministries—"she wanted to put it in her name so she had something of hers" and "so she would have a place to move to if she wanted to." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 253, 340. Weber said that taking title in Earth Home Ministries did not concern him because Van Allen had agreed to make payments on the credit line used to purchase the property. He agreed that he and Van Allen paid far less than market value for the property and that the difference between the sale price and its value at the time of sale was a gift from Van Allen's brother. Weber thought that Van Allen's brother intended that Weber would have partial ownership of the gifted property.Thus, Weber expected to own the Spanaway rental even though the property was deeded to an entity in which he had no interest.
The trial court concluded that the parties had established a committed intimate relationship, refused to apply judicial estoppel to bar Van Allen from asserting an interest in properties not scheduled in her bankruptcy proceeding, and divided Weber and Van Allen's assets and liabilities.
The trial court calculated Van Allen's award by combining the values of (1) one-third of the chiropractic office, (2) 39 percent of the Spanaway home, (3) 75 percent of the Spanaway rental, and (4) a credit related to the Federal Way lot. Weber was awarded the remaining portions of those properties. By agreement of the parties, the trial court used the most recent Pierce County assessor's office's values for the real properties at issue.
After aggregating values of the portions of each property and offsetting her share of community-like liabilities, the trial court awarded Van Allen the Spanaway rental and a money judgment. Weber received full title to all other properties and remained liable for the outstanding balance on the credit line and the Internal Revenue Service debt. Weber appealed.
Following the distribution of property and liabilities, and after Weber filed his appeal, on June 27, 2011, the Pierce County assessor's office mailed its annual real property value change notices to Weber and Van Allen. The chiropractic office's assessed value was reduced from $182,200 to 79,800—a decrease of over 50 percent. The other real properties also decreased in value, but not nearly as much.
On August 2, 2011, Weber moved for relief from judgment based on the post-trial change in value for the chiropractic office.5 Weber's counsel submitted a proposed statement from thePierce County commercial appraiser stating that the downward adjustment was substantial when compared to other properties in Pierce County. The appraiser's proposed statement also asserted that one reason for the change was a correction in square footage of the parcel. In addition, the appraiser noted that he adjusted the value due to the odd shape of the property, which affected its marketability. The trial court denied Weber's motion. Weber timely appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment, which we consolidated with Weber's appeal of the underlying order and judgment.
On appeal, Weber acknowledges his 20-year committed intimate relationship with Van Allen, but he challenges the trial court's division of property based on the trial court's characterization of the Spanaway rental as Van Allen's separate property, its refusal to apply judicial estoppel to Van Allen's property claims to properties not listed in her assets in her bankruptcy proceeding, and its denial of his motion for relief from judgment due to the reduction in assessed value of the chiropractic office.
We review a trial court's characterization of property as community or separate de novo, but we review the findings of fact on which that characterization was based for substantial evidence. In re Estate of Borghi, 141 Wn. App. 294, 297, 169 P.3d 847 (2007), aff'd, 167 Wn.2d 480, 219 P.3d 932 (2009); In re Marriage of Skarbek, 100 Wn. App. 444, 447, 997 P.2d 447 (2000). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976 P.2d 102 (1999).
We review the trial court's distribution of property at the end of a committed intimate relationship, its decision about whether to apply judicial estoppel, and its decision on a motion for relief from judgment under CR 60(b) for abuse of discretion. Soltero v. Wimer, 159 Wn.2d 428, 433, 150 P.3d 552 (2007); Mitchell v. Wash. State Inst. of Pub. Policy, 153 Wn. App. 803, 821, 225 P.3d 280 (2009); Bartley-Williams v. Kendall, 134 Wn. App. 95, 98, 138 P.3d 1103 (2006). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). "We may affirm on any ground the record adequately supports." Skinner v. Holgate, 141 Wn. App. 840, 849, 173 P.3d 300 (2007).
Upon termination of a committed intimate relationship, the trial court evaluates the interest each party has in the property acquired during the relationship and then makes a just and equitable distribution of such property.6 In re Pennington, 142 Wn.2d 592, 602, 14 P.3d 764 (2000). Property acquired by the parties' efforts during a committed intimate relationship is presumed to be community-like and the trial court may equitably divide it between the parties. Soltero, 159 Wn.2d at 434 (citing Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 351-52, 898 P.2d 831 (1995)). Unlike a marital dissolution, the trial court must award separate property to its owner. Soltero, 159 Wn.2d at 434 (citing Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 350).
The marital dissolution laws do not apply directly to a committed intimate relationship, but we may look to those laws for guidance. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 349. The definitions of "separate" and "community property" found in RCW 26.16.010 to .030 apply by analogy and are useful in dividing property at the termination of a committed intimate relationship. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 351. Separate property is property "owned by a spouse before marriage and that acquired by him or her afterwards by gift,...
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