Allen v. Winstandly

• Decision Date: 22 September 1893
• Parties: ALLEN et al. v. WINSTANDLY.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

135 Ind. 105

34 N.E. 699

ALLEN et al.

v.WINSTANDLY.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 22, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Pike county; D. J. Heffron, Judge.

Action by William C. Winstandly against David Allen and others to quiet title to certain personal property, and to restrain a sale thereof under execution. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Duncan & Batman, Richardson & Taylor, and John R. East, for appellants. Ely & Davenport, for appellee.

HACKNEY, J.

The appellee sought and secured, in the trial court, an injunction against the appellant Allen, as an execution creditor, and against Stillwell, as the sheriff holding such execution. The complaint alleged a judgment of the Morgan circuit court in favor of Allen for $2,750, against one Jesse A. Mitchell; that upon execution issued on that judgment the appellants had levied, and would sell, unless restrained, certain mules, cattle, and corn, the property of the appellee, as the property of said Mitchell; that appellee was not a party to said judgment, nor to the suit in which it was obtained, and did not owe any part of said execution, nor was said execution a lien on any of said property. It is further averred that the levy casts a cloud upon, and disparages, his title to said property, and he prays judgment quieting his title to said property, and an injunction against a sale of it on said execution. Upon the trial the court found the facts specially, and stated conclusions of law therefrom in favor of the appellee. Facts clearly showing the appellee's ownership are found in detail, and the judgment, levy, and purpose to sell are also found as alleged in the complaint. It is not found, as a substantive fact, nor as an ultimate fact, that the proposed sale cast a cloud upon, or in any manner disparaged, the appellee's title, nor are any facts found indicating, beyond those we have stated, a peculiar reason for the interposition of an equitable remedy. The sufficiency of the complaint, and the correctness of the conclusions of law upon the facts specially found, are presented here as reserved questions for review. It is claimed that equity will not interfere to prevent the sale of personal property belonging to one person upon an execution against another, in the absence of facts showing that no remedy at law exists. It is urged that no such facts are averred in the complaint; that no such facts are found by the court; and that in the presence of a remedy by proceedings in replevin, or, after sale, a suit on the sheriff's bond for damages, no such facts could exist. The principal support given to this contention is the generally recognized rule that equitable relief is denied where the law furnishes a remedy as adequate or as “practical and efficient” to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity, as it is stated in Watson v. Southerland, 5 Wall. 74.

The rule here insisted upon was applied in Henderson v. Bates, 3 Blackf. 460, a case wherein Henderson sought to enjoin the sale of his personal property for the payment of executions against others. The court said: “It is also as well settled that chancery will not entertain a bill when personal property is the subject-matter, unless in some peculiar cases, nor will it interpose and enjoin the sale of personal property taken in execution, either on the ground that it is not the property of the defendant in the execution, but belongs to a third person, or that it belongs to the complainant, unless it be shown that if the property were sold the complainant would be without remedy at law.” The peculiar cases in which it is there said that equity will interfere are those in which, from the peculiar character of the property, damages may not adequately compensate its loss to the owner. In Sidner v. White, 46 Ind. 588;Trueblood v. Hollingsworth, 48 Ind. 537;Hollingsworth v. Trueblood, 59 Ind. 542; and Anderson v. Crist, 113 Ind. 65, 15 N. E. Rep. 9,-the property of one was sought to be sold to pay the debt of another, and it was held that injunction would lie to restrain such sale. In the first of these cases the relief was proper, as an incident to the enforcement of an equitable right in the plaintiff to require the remaining property of the debtor to be sold before applying that purchased and held by the plaintiff from the debtor. In the other three cases the property of a cestui que trust was offered for sale to pay the debt of the trustee individually. The remedy in equity was proper, because of the peculiar guardianship of trust interests by courts of chancery. The cases of Elson v. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 300;Stout v. La Follette, 64 Ind. 365;Bank v. Cockrum, 80 Ind. 355; Bank v. Hargrove, Id. 364; Nicholson v. Stephens, 47 Ind. 185;Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222;Burch v. Dooley, 123 Ind. 288, 24 N. E. Rep. 110; and Greenwaldt v. May, 127 Ind. 511, 27 N. E. Rep. 158,-were all cases where sales of personal property were enjoined. In no one of these was the property taken that of a third person, but in every instance was that of the debtor. In every case the relief by injunction was incident to an equitable remedy, and involved the validity of tax levies, judgments, or other liens, or was necessary to maintain the custody of such property in the court. In neither of these lines of cases was the question made or considered that is presented by the present case, nor did the court at all times state the rule under which equitable relief was extended. These omissions are not reasons for the contention that in this state we have departed from the doctrine of Henderson v. Bates, supra. Of the cases in this state where injunctions against the sale of personal property have been sustained, there is but one other than those above cited that we have found, and that is Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22, 14 N. E. Rep. 593, where a widow sued to stay the sale of corn by the administrators of her husband's estate, she having chosen such corn as part of her statutory allowance. It was alleged, in addition to the facts we have stated, “that if it should be sold she would be left without necessary feed for her animals, and that other corn could not then be readily procured.” The court said, “This presented a state of facts which made it apparent that the plaintiff had no other complete and adequate remedy.” Whatever else may be said of this conclusion, it cannot be maintained that...