Alley v. Angelone
| Citation | 962 F.Supp. 827 |
| Decision Date | 10 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:95cv228. |
| Parties | Alvin E. ALLEY, James Fennell, James A. Godwin, Jr., Herman Gray, Jr., Richard Gray, William Hunter, Alvin Johnson, Essex Johnson, Gary Johnson, Kenneth R. Jones, John Lincoln, Terry Lockett, Michael A. McCoy, Thomas T. Newlin, Lucius Pegram, Clinton R. Powell, Lynwood W. Rawls, Jr., Dale E. Stutzman, Donnell Tillery, Anthony G. Wright, and Johnny Wynn, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. R. ANGELONE, VDOC Director, G.M. Johnson, VDOC Deputy Director, J.A. Smith, Jr., VDOC Regional Director, J. Jabe, GRCC Chief Warden, D.R. Lawson, GRCC Acting Chief Warden, G.L. Bass, GRCC Deputy Warden, and J.V. Beale, GRCC Assistant Warden, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Alvin E. Alley, Jarratt, VA, pro se.
Jill T. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, Correctional Litigation Section, Office of Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.
OPINION AND FINAL ORDER
Plaintiffs, Virginia inmates, bring this pro se action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 to redress alleged violations of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs claim that defendants have violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act and, as a result, violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and paid the statutory filing fee on March 6, 1995. By Order filed March 15, 1995, the Complaint was ordered filed. By Order filed October 20, 1995, plaintiffs John Lincoln and Michael A. McCoy were dismissed for failure to supply proof that they had exhausted their administrative remedies. By Order filed December 7, 1995, plaintiff Alvin Johnson was dismissed for failure to submit proof that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. By Order filed December 7, 1995, the court ordered defendants to respond to plaintiffs' Complaint within sixty (60) from the date thereof if they chose to return the Waiver of Service enclosed with that Order within thirty (30) days from the date thereof. On January 22, 1996, counsel for defendants, Jill Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, returned the Waiver of Service on behalf of defendants. Defendants timely filed an Answer on February 7, 1996.
By Order filed March 12, 1996, the court ordered that any dispositive motions be filed within thirty (30) days from the date thereof. On April 12, 1996, defendants, through counsel, filed a Motion for an Enlargement of Time in which to file their dispositive motion. By Order filed April 15, 1996, the court granted defendants' motion and directed defendants to file any dispositive motions within thirty (30) days from the date thereof.
On May 30, 1996, defendants, through counsel, filed another Motion for an Enlargement of Time. By Order filed May 31, the court granted defendants' Motion for an Enlargement of Time and directed defendants to file any dispositive motions by July 1, 1996. On July 1, 1996, defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
In accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975), plaintiffs were given an opportunity to respond to defendants' motion with any material that they wished to offer in rebuttal. By Order filed September 4, 1996, the court directed plaintiffs to file any responsive pleadings within twenty (20) days from the date thereof. The court also instructed plaintiffs that failure to submit any materials could result in an adverse judgment based on defendants' motion. Plaintiffs failed to respond. By order filed October 17, 1996, the court denied plaintiff Powell's motion for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiffs still have not filed any response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, this action is ready for judicial determination.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy whereby they under staffed all Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) institutions and incited riots at Haynesville Correctional Center, Dillwyn Correctional Center, Greensville Correctional Center, and other VDOC institutions. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have conspired to implement a de facto policy of under staffing security supervisors, correctional officers, rehabilitative treatment and support personnel. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that defendants allowed dereliction of duty by employees of the VDOC. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired to incite riots at various institutions, including Greensville Correctional Center. Plaintiffs were housed at Greensville Correctional Center at the time the riot occurred. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants arranged to manipulate the media coverage of the riots to broadcast false and misleading reports in an apparent attempt to influence prominent state officials and citizens. Defendants instituted a lockdown in response to the riots and ceased operation of the manufacturing and shipment of goods produced by inmates. Plaintiffs allege that defendants instituted a screening criteria for removing prisoners from lockdown status, whereby some Greensville inmates were released from lockdown while others were not.
Plaintiffs complain that the lockdown status caused a three-month interruption in their prison employment resulting in loss of wages and good conduct allowances. Plaintiffs allege that the lockdown resulted in numerous violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights including denial of recreation, commissary privileges, visitation, telephone access, access to the law library, mail, showers, rehabilitative programs, medical care, fresh air, personal hygiene products and cleaning products. In addition, plaintiffs allege that the minimum dietary requirements were not provided. Apparently, an unidentified plaintiff has suffered physical, mental and emotional harm.
In construing a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in plaintiff's pro se complaint must be taken as true. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1292 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1865, 64 L.Ed.2d 281 (1980). A pro se complaint, no matter how unartfully pleaded, must survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). A pro se complaint involving civil rights issues should be liberally construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 431 (1978). Dismissal may be appropriate where the complaint contains a detailed description of underlying facts which fail to state a viable claim. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-09, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292-94, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). However, where the complaint is broad, dismissal for failure to state a claim is improper. Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 121, 58 L.Ed.2d 133 (1978). Finally, where a pro se complaint contains a potentially cognizable claim, plaintiff should be allowed to particularize the claim. Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir.1965).
To the extent that plaintiffs are suing defendants in their official capacities for money damages in this Complaint, defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983.1 Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). If, on the other hand, plaintiffs are suing defendants in their individual capacities, they must affirmatively show that defendants "acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights." Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977); see also McDonald v. Dunning, 760 F.Supp. 1156, 1160 (E.D.Va.1991). It is not enough to show that subordinates of a sued official deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights; the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application in section 1983 cases. McDonald, 760 F.Supp. at 1160; see also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928. If plaintiffs have not alleged any personal connection between a defendant and a denial of their constitutional rights, that claim against that defendant must fail. Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928.
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' claims against them in their official capacities is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs generally allege that defendants have violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 et seq. Plaintiffs attempt to raise a claim under RICO. However, plaintiffs do not attempt to raise a claim under the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act. They claim that the defendants' violations of these statutes resulted in the their loss of employment within the correctional system. Plaintiffs claim that defendants conspired to under staff security supervisors, correctional officers, rehabilitative treatment staff and support personnel. Plaintiffs appear to allege that defendants incited the riots that occurred at various correctional facilities for the purpose of placing those facilities on lockdown status and, thus, to ultimately deprive plaintiffs of their employment for at least three months, decrease their earning of good conduct allowances, and decrease their chances for parole.
Civil remedies may be sought, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when a plaintiff has suffered an injury to his business or property as a result of a violation of section 1962.2 A plaintiff must...
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